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In consequence of the policy thus adopted, largely increased burdens were devolved on the Imperial Government, while the conquest and the events which led to it strengthened imperialist sentiment. The course of action which was at first favoured by leading officials, both in England and the Colonies, was a more systematic administration of Indian affairs, the employment of sufficient regular troops under the commander-in-chief to defend the newly acquired territory, the maintenance of posts with English settlers in the interior on a scale sufficient to prevent the French or Spanish from securing the trade of the region. Improved methods of administration were urged; French methods were praised and the shortcomings of the surviving chartered Colonies were again emphasized. This all re quired additional revenue, as well as administrative vigour, and that at a time when Great Britain was especially burdened with debt and when several of the Colonies had recently incurred heavy expenditures. The large acquisitions of territory also neces sitated some changes in the acts of trade. The necessity for their more vigorous enforcement was revealed by the existence of a large contraband trade between the colonists and the enemy dur ing the later years of the war and also of a considerable illegal trade with Europe. These conditions, together with the conviction that, z.3 the continental Colonies had reaped the chief advantages of the war, some favour should be extended to the islands, led to the passage of the Sugar Act by the Grenville ministry in
It also caused a resort to writs of assistance in two of the Col onies, and finally the legalization of them in all the Colonies by Act of Parliament (1767). The aid of the Navy was directly invoked in the enforcement of the trade laws, and the activity of the cus toms officials and of the admiralty courts in the Colonies was in creased. Garrisons of regular troops—numbering several thousand —with a commander-in-chief were now present in the Colonies in time of peace, and their aid might possibly be invoked by the civil power to suppress disorder. The Sugar Act itself was a trade and revenue act combined, and the fact was expressed in the preamble of the measure. It was intended directly to affect the traffic be tween the northern Colonies and the foreign West Indies in lumber and food-stuffs, molasses and rum. The duty on foreign molasses, for which provision had been made in the Molasses Act of 1733, was halved; but now it was proposed really to collect this duty. A cry was immediately raised in New England that, if the duty was collected, the manufacture of rum—of which molasses was the staple material—would be lessened or wholly prevented and a most important industry sacrificed. The fisheries would incidentally suffer. In spite, however, of the opposition which it provoked in the northern Colonies, it is probable that the Sugar Act could have been permanently enforced. The Act of Trade of 1673 and the Molasses Act—though it was not fully executed—were two early instances of the exercise by Parliament of the right to tax the colonies. Had the Sugar Act been enforced, a clear and decisive precedent in favour of this right would have been established. In view of the general situation, that was probably as far as the British Government should have gone at that time. But it im mediately committed itself to another and still more significant measure, and the two acts combined caused an outburst of pro test and resistance from the colonists.
Repeatedly in earlier years the imposition of a stamp duty upon the Colonies had been suggested. The cost of the regular troops which must be stationed in America was es timated at about £300,000 annually. The Sugar Act was expected to yield about £45,000 a year. It was thought that the colonies should raise about I i oo,000 more as their reasonable share of the cost. George Grenville resolved to secure this by means of a stamp duty. This would fall upon the island colonies equally with those of the continent, though it would be expended chiefly for the en larged military force on the mainland. Though its simplicity and ease of collection recommended it, the Stamp Act was a purely fiscal measure, and its character was not concealed by any fea tures which allied it to the earlier acts for the regulation of trade. It was passed by Parliament in 1765, almost without debate and with scarcely a thought that it would be resisted. It provided for the appointment of officials to distribute the stamped papers in the colonies and further extended the power of the admiralty courts by giving them jurisdiction over violations of this act. The legal theory upon which the act was based was that of the unqualified sovereignty of Parliament as the representative body for the whole empire, and that its authority, if it chose to use it, was as effective for purposes of taxation as for the regulation of trade or other objects of legislation. But never before, during the
century. and a half of colonial history, had the taxing power been so unqualifiedly exercised. It followed close on the heels of the Sugar Act, which itself had aroused much hostile criticism. The two measures also came at a time when the consciousness of strength among the Colonists had been increased by the defeat and expulsion of the French. Moreover, at the time when the policy was initiated, George III. had undertaken to crush the Whig party and to revive the latent prerogatives of his office. This resulted in the formation of a series of coalition ministries. Vacillation and uncertainty were thus introduced into the colonial policy of the Government. The royal policy also brought into the public service in England and kept there an unusually large group of inferior men who persistently blundered in the treatment of colonial questions. It was only with the accession of the North ministry, in 177o, that permanence and a certain consistency were secured. But, in the view of the colonists, the prestige of the Government had by that time been seriously lowered.
Determined opposition to the Stamp Act was shown in all the Colonies, by or before the time (Nov. I) when it was to go into effect. The forms assumed by this opposition were such as characterized the entire controversy with Great Britain until the opening of hostilities in 1775. It consisted in the passage of resolutions of protest by the lower houses of some of the colonial legislatures ; in the calling of a congress at New York which was attended by delegates from nine of the Colonies; in the activity of mobs organized under the name of the "Sons of Liberty"; and, finally, in a somewhat widely extended movement against the importation of British, or even foreign, goods and in favour of frugality and the en couragement of home manufactures. The newspaper press also sprang into much greater activity than ever before, and many notable pamphlets were published. The most important resolu tions at the outset were those adopted by the Virginia House of Burgesses and by the House of Representatives of Massa chusetts. Through the first-named body the dramatic eloquence of Patrick Henry forced five resolutions. Two others, which threatened resistance and the coercion of any who should venture to uphold the home Government, failed to pass, but the whole seven were published broadcast through the Colonies. The calling of a general congress was proposed by the House of Representatives of Massachusetts. Prominent among its mem bers was James Otis, who had already distinguished himself by radical opposition to measures of the Government, especially in the case against writs of assistance which was argued bef ore the superior court in 1761. Samuel Adams, already a prominent man, was now elected a member of the House from Boston. He almost immediately became its leader, drafting its most important resolu tions and papers, and to a large extent directing its policy. With the aid of others he was able greatly to increase the activity of the town-meeting in Boston, and in the course of a few years to de velop it on occasion into a great popular convention. Throughout New England the town and its institutions served well the pur poses of opposition and facilitated its extension over large areas. The intense Puritan spirit, with its century and a half of pro nounced independence, both in polity and temper, was lacking outside New England; though on the frontiers of the provinces from Pennsylvania southward was a Scottish-Irish population which exhibited many of the New England characteristics. But the tenant farmers of New York, the German pietist sects of Pennsylvania, the Quakers wherever they had settled, and in general the adherents of the English Church were inclined toward indifference or, as the controversy progressed, toward positive loyalism. Hence the mixture of nationalities in the middle colo nies greatly increased the difficulty of rousing that section to concerted action. In Pennsylvania the issues were obscured by a struggle on the part of the western counties to secure equal rep resentation with those of the east. This helped to make loyalists of the Quakers. Special grievances also produced among the frontier settlements of North and South Carolina quite as much dislike of the officials and social leaders of the tide-water region as they could possibly feel toward Crown and Parliament. Throughout the struggle New England and Virginia exhibited a unity and decision in action which were not equalled elsewhere.