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In Connecticut and Rhode Island the corporate system of government, which they had inherited from the 17th century, necessitated no change. The general assemblies always had been the centres of power, and the leading officials were elective for short terms and were subject to the control of the electorate. So far as the internal organization of the Colonies was concerned that was all which the revolution de manded. In the two proprietary provinces—Pennsylvania and Maryland—the executives were not so directly interested and pledged to support the Imperial Government as were those of the royal provinces. But Governor Robert Eden of Maryland was so tactful that, though the last assembly met in
he was able, with the courts, to keep up some form of government there in the name of the Crown and proprietor until the early summer of 1776. In Pennsylvania the proprietors, though in sympathy with the British Government, never sought actively to influence events in their province. In the royal provinces the prorogation of the legislatures for indefinite or prolonged periods caused them early to disappear—that of Massachusetts in October, 1774. The bur gesses of Virginia last met for business in May, 1774. They were prorogued to several later dates, but the governor was never again able to meet them. The long and important session of January– March, 1775, was the last ever held by the New York assembly. In April, 1775, Governor John Martin of North Carolina met the assembly for the last time, and even then the provincial convention was in session at the same time and place and the membership of the two bodies was the same. In May, 1775, disappeared the assembly of Georgia; in June those of New Hampshire and South Carolina met for the last time. Governor William Franklin was able to meet the assembly of New Jersey as late as November, but months before that date the provincial convention had practically assumed the control of affairs.
After Bunker Hill the command at Boston had been transferred from Gage to Sir William Howe. In July, Washington took command of the colonists and gradually established some degree of order and discipline among them. Though the American levies were raw and ever fluctuating in numbers, the British never seriously attempted to break through their lines. Indeed, it was not the plan of the British to make New England the chief seat of war. As early as Aug. 2, 1775, Lord Dartmouth wrote to General Gage on "the obvious ad vantages that would attend the taking Possession of New York and the hazard of the Army's continuing at Boston." Rhode Island was considered as a convenient naval station, and steps were soon taken to secure possession of it and its surrounding waters. The British wished to so plan the war as to secure the maximum of advantage from their fleet. This would give them an easy command of the entire coast, and enable them to secure a foot hold at strategic centres. Hence it was that, though the arrival of a fresh supply of cannon enabled Washington to fortify Dor chester Heights, this simply enabled him to hasten a process for which Howe had long been preparing. The evacuation occurred
on March 17, 1776, and the British force withdrew temporarily to Halifax. Meantime the bold expeditions of Arnold and Mont gomery against Canada had met with only a partial success. Mont real had been occupied, but the asault upon Quebec had failed.
The view, as it was now repeatedly expressed by King and Parliament, was that the colonists were in open rebellion. North's offer of conciliation was peremptorily rejected by Congress. The acts of Parliament were being openly resisted, and Congress in its manifestos had ignored the two houses. Therefore the British Government stood committed to coercion. That was the meaning of the legislation of the winter of 1776—the prohibition of trade with the rebellious Colonies, the increase of the estimates for the Army and Navy, the employment of German auxiliaries for service in America.
eparations were made to send a large military and naval force the following season, which should operate in part against the insurgents in New York and the southern Colonies and in part through Canada. New England was no longer to be the direct object of attack. The Howes, as commanders of the royal Army and Navy, were appointed commissioners to grant assurance of peace and pardon and the repeal of the obnoxious acts, pro vided submission was made and some way could be found by Parliament in which an imperial revenue for purposes of defence could be secured from the Colonies. Military operations, mean while, should be directed against points of least resistance, and in that way, if possible, the union of, the Colonies should be broken. The trend of British policy indicated that an invasion from Canada might be attempted and an effort made to hold Charleston, Phila delphia, and especially New York as strategic points on the coast.
The course of events in the Colonies by which this situation was met was the erection of a system of feeble defences about New York and the removal thither of the Army of about 9,000 men in the spring of 1776; the fitting out of privateers to prey on British commerce ; the disarming of loyalists ; the opening of American ports to the trade of all peoples who were not subject to the British Crown ; and the tentative opening of relations with France. As the result of a combination of ill luck, bad management and American energy the British suffered a repulse at Charleston, South Carolina, in June, which was analogous to the affair of the year before at Bunker Hill, and which necessitated a postponement of their plans in the south.
The Congress and the various revolutionary bodies in the Colonies were forced to carry on war upon a constantly increas ing scale. They had to assume powers of government and gradu ally to perfect their organization for the purpose. Committees in Congress became more permanent. Conditions approximating to those which existed the year before in New England extended through the Colonies generally.