ments," (of which we believe we have occasionally made use, without specific acknowledgment), Locke's " Essay," Dr. Priestley's "Abridgment" of Hartley, Allison's "Essays on Taste," and Pro fessor Stewart's "Elements," as forming a pretty complete course Of reading on Mental Philosophy.
130. As we have made a reference from Mararursics to this article, our rea ders will probably expect from us some thing more metaphysical than what they will find in the foregoing part of it. We are not among those who consider meta physics as that science, falsely so called, which professes to enlarge human know ledge the limits of the objects of human contemplation, as the science of essences, Sze.; but we must acknowledge that we are disposed to allow a high rank to a few only of those branches of meta physics which do not justly class under the head of mental philosophy, or the Philosophy of the human mind. We re gard them as amusing speculations which may serve to sharpen the activity of the intellect, and which, confined within mo derate limits, may be safely indulged in by those whose time and culture of intel lect allow of such indulgence ; but we are no advocates for the young philoso pher spending his exertions upon them : they may, and we are aware often do, deeply interest the mind ; but few who think much will be unwilling to allow that an active imagination, or simply the devotement of the mind to an object, will create any interest in that object Which has no foundation in the real utility of it. We make these remarks with no wish to throw a stigma upon metaphysics in general, but simply to lead our readers to reject that stigma which many throw upon the philosophy of the human mind, but which belongs to some only of the branches of metaphysics ; and of these, principally to those which the good sense of the present day regards merely as ob jects of curiosity, notwithstanding the efforts of the learned Harris, to lead us back again into all the vagaries of the ancient philosophers. Whatever relates to the properties of the mind, to the ope fations of intellect and affection, is of high value in various points of view : as Dugald Stewart justly remarks, the phi losophy of the mind, abstracted entirely from that eminence which belongs to it in consequence of its practical applica tions, may claim a distinguished rank among those preparatory , disciplines, 'Which Bishop Berkeley has happily com . .
pared to " the crops which are raised, not for the sake of the harvest, but to be ploughed in as a dressing to the land." 131. Physics, including in its widest extent natural history, is that grand divi sion of human knowledge which has for its objects the properties, classifications, and laws, of all those things which affect the senses; metaphysics, (Parg/ta, comprehends all those speculations which have for their aim the properties, classi fication, and laws, of all those objects of human thought which by sensation alone could not be known to man. The ancient metaphysics comprehended many objects which can scarcely be said to lie within the sphere of human knowledge, and which are rather to be considered as the reveries of imagination than as the reali ties of intellect ; with these the science of metaphysics ought not to be confounded. We cannot pretend to give a complete enumeration of the objects of this sci ence, but it will not probably be useless to give such a statement and brief consi deration of them, as will at least more fully explain than is perhaps generally done, what kind of knowledge it pro fesses to have in view.
132. In the first place, metaphysics comprehends all investigations respect ing the existence and attributes of the Supreme Being. 'While we state this, however, we admit that we use the term in its widest extent. The most impor tant, because the most undeniable, and generally convincing, of these investiga tions come under the head of natural theology, which derives its proofs of the existence and attributes of the Supreme Being from the appearances of nature.
Revealed religion teaches us what God himself has been pleased to make known to us of his character : but this, though a just foundation of belief on this point, and, the guide of sound philosophy, scarcely comes under the bead of philo sophy. Those religious investigations which most properly class under the head of metaphysics, tend to prove the Divine existence and attributes from Cer tain principles which are supposed to be indisputable, by a' series of reasoning al together independent of the marks of design in the objects around us. Of these, we think that those which are to be found at the beginning of the second volume of " llartley's Observations" are the most satisfactory. He sets out with this prin ciple, 'something must have existed from all eternity,' which he thinks commands an instantaneous necessary assent, or at least the contrary of which (viz. that there was a time when nothing existed) the mind of every one refuses to admit. He next proceeds to show, that there, cannot have been a mere succession of finite dependent beings from all eternity; but there must exist at least one infinite independent being.' Ile concludes his reasoning in proof of this proposition, with a remark which we will quote, be cause many, feeling themselves embar rassed with what may justly be called the metaphysical proof of the existence of Cod, are apt to suppose, either that it has no weight, or that there is in their minds some wrong tendency, mental or moral, which impedes a ready assent to it. " Some of these (abstract metaphysi cal arguments) are more satisfactory to one person, some to another ; but in all there is something of perplexity and doubt, concerning the exact propriety of expression, and method of reasoning, and perhaps ever will be ; since the subject is infinite, and we finite." Indeed, we are decidedly of opinion, that any mind would justly be deemed an anomaly which, after resisting assent to the proof, ti posteriori, fairly and attentively weighed and understood, should be led by the proof, ci priori, to admit the existence of a first cause : and we strongly incline to the belief that the conviction which may be supposed to be derived from the lat ter, is in reality founded upon a previous, perhaps casual and even unintentional, consideration of the former, 133. This remark still more forcibly ap plies to the d priori arguments for the attributes of God. It is supposed to fol low from the necessity of the existence of an infinite, independent being, that he necessarily is endued with infinite power and knowledge, We admit that it by no means follows, from what we think an in disputable position, viz. that no human intellect could have inferred the one from the other without the ti posteriori proof, that therefore this inference has no force ; but we do think that it is on the works of God alone that we can found a full and satisfactory proof of his power and knowledge ; when these are admitted, however, we must resort to a metaphysical, but simple argument, to prove that they are unlimited—We do not wish to lead our readers to the idea, That Hartley confines his reasonings to the d priori argument for the attributes of God ; for this is by no means the fact; And we beg leave strongly to recommend to those of our readers who have not pre viously attended to them, those parts of .his works which relate to the Supreme Being ; we consider them as a treasure of profound reflections, which will serve as a clue to numberless difficulties, which may have perplexed and distressed the mind on the respective subjects.