139. We shall have an opportunity of offering a few remarks on the next of the metaphysical inquiries which we have mentioned, in the article Tones', or FEELING, sense of; and we theretbre proceed to the following subject, viz. re specting personal identity. This is a point of considerable importance, since, if the circumstances which constitute per sonal identity could be shown to be incon sistent with the infinitely important doc trine of a future life, it would greatly affect the evidences for that doctrine ; but the fact appears to be, that all which true philosophy has to do, is to bring back the airy speculations of some meta physicians to the level of common sense; to show either that they are unfounded, or that they have no immediate tendency to affect the belief in a future retribution. That we are through life, and under every change of body and of mind, the same intelligent accountable beings, is a fact which we know by consciousness ; and whether we will or not, we must accept of this evidence. The only question is, what are the circumstances which consti tute identity of person, amidst all the changes of body and of mind which a man undergoes in the course of a long life? If any and every hypothesis for the solu tion of this problem be insufficient, it does not follow that there is no such thing as personal identity; but merely that such hypothesis is unsatisfactory and untrue. The fact is, that different hypotheses have been advanced on the subject, that per haps no one of them can be pronounced fully satisfactory, and that some meta physicians, laying hold of the weak parts of such hypotheses, have actually profess ed to believe that there is no such thing as personal identity. The conviction, however, of permanent identity is happi ly too firmly inwrought in the mental system, to allow any thing but an attach ment to system little short of insanity to eradicate it. Whether or not we can as certain in what it consists, the conscious ness of every individual is a constant and sufficient ground for Ids • admitting the fact ; and if any one should work up his mind to a speculative disbelief of it, while he continues to possess a prospective and retrospective capacity, sensation and men. Sal feeling, he cannot, in any considerable degree, as far as this life is concerned, act upon his opinion. The chief impor tance of such an error respects its con nection with a future state of retribution, and even here the incredulity of vice alone can, we should suppose, produce in a sane mind any doubt as to the continuance of identity. The grand point is, will the system of thought and affection to which the word self is applied, be raised again to activity ; and if so, (and tin contradic tion can be urged against the strong evi dence which we have fur• it), all is safe as far as respects the sameness-of that self. And if to constitute personal identity it should be necessary that more than the same organization of matter he preserved as a vehicle for that system of thought and affection, that even the same system of particles should be preserved.. 1)r. Watts's hypothesis of permanent stamina, which, if not actually proved, has never been disproved, affords a proof of perso Dsi identity in this sense of word, which may satisfy the most scrupulous mate rialist, and the most captious sceptic. Respecting this subject, we refer our readers to the work from which we have derived several of the tiwegoing state ments, viz. "Belsham's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind ;" where they will find a luminouS view of this dif ficult subject, and references to the chief writers who have discussed it. They will also find in the same useful work, a view of several other of those discussions which we consider as most strictly meta physical, with similar references. • 140 The last of those questions which we spoke of in this department of meta physics is, whether power is an attribute of the human mind. " Power, as an at tribute of the mind," says Mr. Belsham, "may be defined, the capacity of carry ing into effect the determinations of the will." Those philosophers who maintain, that it is'an attribute of the human mind, from consciousness and observa tion ; and they affirm, that though we can not define it, we have a notion of it. Those Who take the negative side of the question contend, that all we are con scious of is volition, and the effect pro duced ; and that what some call a consci ousness of power, is nothing more than a belief, that the effect will follow the vo lition, which belief is sometimes errone ous; they also argue, that our total igno rance of the manner in which muscular motion is produced, proves that the mind is not the efficient and proper cause of this wonderful effect.—We are of opi.
pion, that it is very much, though not wholly, a dispute about terms. Upon Mr. Belsham's definition of power, we should have supposed, that no difference of opinion could exist, whether it be a property of the mind ; but they are very different questions, whether the mind possess such capacity in consequence of the ordinations of the Supreme Being, and whether, when exercising this capa city, it is to be considered as the efficient cause of muscular motions. In this sense, all causation appears to resolve itself into the constant agency of the Deity; and we see no reason to hesitate in admitting, that all the energies or powers both of body or of mind, are simply modes of his operation.
141. Some of our readers will proba bly be disposed to censure us, because we have not ranked the doctrine of ne cessity, as it is called, among the meta physical speculations of this class. We are fully aware, that there is an abun dance of abstruse discussion connected with it ; but in its unencumbered, simple state, the doctrine of motives seems to rank among the practical laws of our frame. At any rate we shall not here enter upon the subject, having already given a short statement of the subject in its proper place : to which, therefore, we beg leave to refer our readers.
142. Thirdly, metaphysics claims as its own, all inquiries respecting the nature of infinity, motion, duration, space, &c, We do not mean to affirm, that these in quiries are destitute of value, certainly not that they are destitute of interest ; hut we cannot, as far as they are distinct from the practical laws of body or mind, attribute any very high importance to them. The speculations of the metaphy sician respecting duration are among the most important of this class, and with the selection of some remarks on the subject from Belsham's Elements we shall close this article.—A succession of sensations and ideas is continually passing through the mind, during the state of vigilance, the knowledge of which we attain by consciousness. The idea of succession is acquired by reflecting upon this train of ideas and sensations, and from no other source. The velocity of the succession of ideas in the same person, is different at different times ; and the variation is sometimes voluntary, and sometimes in voluntary. The velocity of sensations must always correspond with that of the external impressions: that of ideas de pends very much upon the state of the body : they seem to succeed each other with greater rapidity in the evening than in the morning, in youth than in age, in health than in sickness, in a cheerful frame of mind than when under depres sion. The course of ideas is in some de gree obedient to voluntary efforts ; but no effort can retain one in the mind be yond a very short time, nor can we call up any given number in a given time.
143. Duration, as applied to any finite being, signifies continued successive ex istence. The idea of duration is acquir ed from reflecting upon the succession of our ideas. While this succession conti nues, we are conscious of the continu ance of existence ; when it is suspended or forgotten, the consciousness of exist ence, and the idea of duration, is propor tionably interrupted. Also, any portion of ,duration appears longer or shorter, in exact proportion to the number of ideas which are recollected in a given interval. While we ourselves continue to exist, we perceive that other beings, whether si milar or dissimilar to ourselves, also con tinue to exist: hence we transfer the idea of duration, and even of successive dura tion, to them, and to all other beings that exist; and duration becomes a measure common to universal existence.—Dura tion is either limited, or unlimited. Li mited duration is time ; unlimited is eternity.—Duration, like space, can only be measured by itself; but it wants an ad vantage which extension possesses, and which arises from the possibility of apply ing one portion of it to another. The time that any one idea continues in the view of the mind is an instant ; and dur ing it we are insensible of duration, the very notion of which implies succession. The most natural measure of time, is the number of ideas recollected to have in tervened between any two given instants ; and when all other measures are wanting, this will answer tolerably well. Equable successions really existing, and regularly returning, serve as the most correct mea sures of time ; such are the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, which being also va rious, and publicly visible, have been uni versally adopted, as the most convenient measures of time. These are, however, only the measures of duration, and not duration itself, which is the succession of ideas.
144. If the continued succession of ideas constitute the true duration of intel ligent beings siinilar to ourselves, it gill foroW ; 1. That if thought be suspended between death and the resurrection, the two instants will appear to be contiguous, and with respect to every individual, will ' actually be so. 2. That the duration of the existence of an intelligent being is to be measured, not by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, but by the number of ideas which pass through his mind in the course of his life. 3. That an Omni potent Being, by increasing the velocity of the succession of ideas, may cause the same revolution of the heavenly bodies, which appears as a day to one, to appear as more than a thousand years to another. 4. That if a being, in all other respects constituted like ourselves, should have all his ideas at once present to his mind, without any succession, he could form no conception of successive duration. 5. That to an all-perfect mind, all whose ideas are equally, invariably, and at all times present, the attribute of successive duration can with no propriety be as cribed.