134.. Many proceed farther in the me taphysical arguments respecting the at tributes of God, and endeavour to prove, that the infinite, independent Being, pos sessed of infinite power and knowledge, must be infinitely benevolent. We ac knowledge ourselves able to feel no other ultimate proof of this position than (what abundantly proves the benevolence of God, though perhaps not immediately the infinite benevolence) the happiness and tendencies to happiness which are observable in the sentient beings which fall under our notice. Admit the bene volence of God from his works, and then the infinity of that benevolence may be shewn by a simple metaphysical argu ment. " Since the qualities of benevo lence and malevolence are as opposite to One another as light to darkness, they cannot co-exist in the same simple, un changeable being. If, therefore, we can prove Cod to be benevolent, from the balance of happiness, malevolence must be entirely excluded ; and we must sup pose the evils which we see and feel to be owing to some other cause, however unable we may be to assign this cause, or to form any conceptions of it."—The di vine benevolence, in every just view which the human mind can take of it, in cludes every moral quality which can exist in the divine mind ; holiness, jus tice,mercy, truth, all, as attributes of God, are only modifications of benevolence we need not therefore pursue these con siderations further on this point.—Con. nected with the divine benevolence is one important class of speculations, viz, those which refer to the existence of evil. This is a subject which has for ages exercised the human understanding, and still it is regarded as the chief difficulty with which the theist has to contend. We will not attempt to weaken the rea sonings of Hartley on this point, by laying en outline of them before our readers ; but we confidently refer to his ob. serrations, as containing the most solid and satisfactory investigations respecting it, and what to all who fully admit his principles of mental philosophy must give views which show the value of those principles which, from their consistence with the dictates of religion, both derive confirmation and lustre.
135. Besides these objects of metaphy sical speculation in connection with the Divine Being, there are some which seem to its to rank with the ancient metaphy sics; such as, the mode of the divine om nipresence, the nature of the divine infi nity, 8tc. Such things, it may reasonably be supposed, cannot be comprehended by finite beings; and if so, they cannot be the objects of human science, nor conse quently of the pursuit of a vise man; but this no more argues against the science of metaphysics, than the absurdity of the pursuit of a perpetual motion against the science of mechanics, or of the search af. ter the philosopher's stone against the study of chemistry.
136. Secondly, in the extensive sense of the term metaphysics, it comprehends all investigations respecting the opera tions, powers, and laws of the human mind, (which class tinder mental philoso phy,) and respecting the grounds of obli gation and of human duty, as far as they are derived from the consideration of the mental frame, (which class under moral philosophy.) It appears, however, that the term is more closely appropriate to those investigations which have for their object subjects connected with the study of the human mind, but which concern rather abstract speculation than practice ; for instance, whether the human mind is a distinct, independent substance, or whether the human frame consists of one uniform substance and perception, with its modes, is the result, necessary or otherwise, of the organization of the brain ; whether the human mind is ne cessarily incorruptible and immortal ; whether there is an external world as the cause of our sensations ; in what per.
sonal identity consists; whether power is an attribute of the human mind, tsc.
137. Respecting the homogeneity of the human frame, we have already had an opportunity of saying a few words near the beginning of this article: it appears to us a purely metaphysical question, al most solely of importance in consequence of the frequent misrepresentations (real, though probably unintentional,) of the opinions of those who hold the affirmative side of the question, and of its supposed connection with the natural immortality of the soul. The fact is, that the modern materialists may be considered as having proved, what is admitted by some of the ablest natural philosophers, that solidity, and the absence of all active power, are not properties of matter; and while the principle of vitality is on all hands admit ted as the result, necessary or otherwise, of a certain structure of matter, they see no greater difficulty in the hypothesis that the principle of percipiency is also. Per haps, if the question had been taken up respecting the lowest of the animal tribes, all of which possess percipiency, and it had first of all been considered whether the phenomena of percipiency in them required the admission of a substance different from that by whose organization the phenomena of vitality in them is pro duced ; and next, whether there is any essential difference between the perci. piency of the lowest animals, and those which firm the gradual ascending links between them and the highest of the brute creation ; and, lastly, whether there is any essential difference between the phenomena of percipiency observable in them, and those in the uncultivated and almost brutal savage; if, above all, all ideas of connection between the immate riality of the human soul and its natural immortality had been relinquished, the question would have appeared less fbr midable, and admitted of en easier deci sion.
138. The affirmative of the next ques tion, respecting the natural immortality of the soul, appears to us to be totally beyond the power of man to prove, from the light of philosophy at least. We have no idea of a substance separate from its properties; and even admitting that the human soul is a distinct substance from the body, what property is it known to possess which necessarily implies inde structibility ? What proof is there that sensation, memory, intellect, or affection, must necessarily continue, when the sub stance with which they are at least united, ceases to exist in its organized state ? We do not say that the contrary can be prov ed ; but we are not metaphysicians enough to discover any arguments for the once common hypothesis, (now, we believe, usually relinquished by philoso phical immaterialists), which have not been already found inadequate to prove the point. The question seems indeed of very little consequence, except to those who quit the guidance of revelation ; all must depend on the will of tire Supreme Being ; and the indications of his will, to be derived from the moral arguments for a future life, and still more from the Christian revelation, are worth a host of reasonings to prove, that a substance of Which we can know nothing, excepting its property of percipiency, possesses I what cannot follow from percipiency, be cause we have satisfactory ground to be lieve, that percipiency is at times totally suspended.