If the controversies of later times have brought the supernatural character of the miracles into greater prominence, it is not because the divine element is comparatively neglected, but because it is more clearly seen to be in this case identified with the supernatural. As the conception of a fixed order of nature, and of the extreme rarity of deviations from that order, became gradually established in men's minds, the exceptional cha racter, in this respect, of the gospel -narrative necessarily acquired greater significance ; and when scepticism, adapting its mode of attack to the current ideas of its age, proceeded on this ground to deny the credibility of the narrative itself, it was seen that the whole truth of the Christian revela tion was really involved in the issue. To say that the miracles of Christ are credible only if they can be explained as natural events, is in effect to say that they were human acts wrought by human means, and thus to destroy their significant cha racter as tokens of God's presence. And when to this is added the consideration that our Lord him self expressly appeals to his miracles as wrought by the finger of God, and so bearing witness that God had sent him, it becomes clear that the moral, as well as the sensible evidences of Christianity, are concerned in the decision of the question, and that our entire belief in Christ is overthrown if the supernatural character of his miracles is denied. Under these circumstances it was natural that so important a controversy concerning the nature of the thing should have its influence in modifying and fixing the meaning of the word ; and that a name, which in its etymology and original use denoted merely a wonderful or astonishing work, should finally be limited to those works which are regarded as exceptions to the established course of nature. Accepting this as the proper signification of the term miracle in its present use, let us endea vour to ascertain with somewhat more precision the nature of the events denoted by it.
A very slight observation of the phenomena of the visible world is sufficient to indicate a division of them into two great classes—those which are produced by the action of mind, and those which are produced by the action of matter ; those in which human volition is exercised, and those in which it is not. The fact that such a distinction exists is acknowledged by the universal language of mankind. It is acknowledged even in those ingenious theories which have been framed to deny or to explain it away, and whose very ingenuity testifies to the stubborn vitality of the fact of con sciousness against which they are directed. Explain or evade it as we may, the fact is unquestionable, that there are some phenomena of nature which we regard as dependent on the regular action of mate rial causes, which have been in operation from the beginning of the present state of things, and which will continue in operation so long as that state of things is permitted to last ; and that there are other phenomena which we regard as dependent upon the free action of man, which may take place or not according as he wills to act or to forbear, and which, having once taken place, may or may not take place again, according to the free choice of man to bring them about or not. No amount of argument will persuade a man who has a stone in his hand, and feels that it is in his power to throw it or not as he pleases, that the throwing of that stone is as much a part of the fixed order of the universe as the alternations of day and night, or of summer and winter. The distinction in no degree depends upon the frequency or rarity of the phenomena. The aloe, which flowers once in a century, or the comet that returns after 600 years, is as much a part of the regular order of nature as the blossoming of the rose or the phases of the moon : the work which a man does every day is as much a part of his voluntary action, as that which he performs only once in his life. The difference is one of kind, not of degree : the phe nomena of the one class are regarded as necessary, those of the other as contingent ; the one are sup posed to take place regularly by virtue of certain established laws of nature, the other are supposed to take place occasionally by the free interposition of a personal agent.
In endeavouring to apply an analogous distinc tion to the conception of a miracle, as compared with that of a natural phenomenon, we must be careful not to press the analogy beyond the point to which it may be fairly extended. An apparent objection meets us at the outset. It is true, it may be urged, that to have any conception of God at all we must conceive him as a person, and per sonality necessarily implies will and the power of free action according to that will. But the will of God is manifested in the regular order of the universe no less than in departures from that order. There is a broad and marked contrast between those necessary phenomena of the world which take place independently of man, and those contingent phenomena which are brought about by a direct interposition of human will ; but no such contrast can be supposed to exist in relation to the Being on whom the whole world is dependent. If, then, all the sensible phenomena of the universe are alike manifestations of the divine will, what room, it may be asked, is there for any special interposi tion of that will, such as man exerts in a world which is not dependent on him, and which he can only partially control ? In answer to this objection it may be observed, first, that the distinction between the general and the special action of God's will is a distinction not relative to God, but to man; and, secondly, that it is proposed, not as an explanation of the mode in which miracles must or do take place, but only as suggesting a mode in which they may take place, and thus as answering the objection which denies that they can take place at all. For, first, the miracle is not supposed to be anything special or exceptional in the sight of God. It is as much foreseen and fore-ordained by him, is as much a part of his eternal purpose from the beginning, as the most ordinary natural occurrence ; but it differs from ordinary occurrences in the manner in which it is manifested to us; and these modes of manifes tation are, relatively to us, the ground of a valid distinction in our conceptions of the divine activity We do not see the operation of the divine mind upon the material world in itself, but only in its effects; and it is from a difference in the effects that we infer an analogous difference in the mode of causation. And, secondly, this distinction is not proposed as an argument to prove the necessity or the reality of miracles; but only to obviate a pre liminary objection against their possibility, and thus to clear the way for an examination of their proper evidence. We may have no right to assume, as is perhaps implied in some definitions, that a miracle is the effect of a determination of the divine will immediately preceding; for it may be brought about in many other ways of which we have no conception : we only say that, for aught we know to the contrary, it may be brought about in such a way; and if it may be brought about in any way, it is not impossible. Still less have we a right to say that the normal phenomena of the world are the effect, not of the divine will, but of material forces left to their own action; for we do not know that matter ever is left to its own action, nor whether, if so left, it would possess any force at all. But we may have evidence which warrants us in saying that it has pleased God, on certain occa sions, to exert his power in a manner different from that in which he exerts it in the ordinary govern ment of the world; the difference being indicated by a diversity in the visible results. In his ordi nary government he so acts as to exhibit as the result a fixed and necessary series of material causes and effects: in his extraordinary interposi tions he so acts as to bring about at a particular time a particular phenomenon which does not form part of the same necessary series. And as the nearest, indeed the only, parallel to this diversity, within the field of our own experience, is that fur. nished by the free action of the human will, the language furnished by this analogy is the most appropriate that can be employed by us to express the processes of the infinite mind in a manner intelligible by finite minds.