In our present ignorance of the manner in which the action of the regular forces of nature is carried on, and of the means by which exceptions are brought about, it is perhaps not possible to frame any definition of a miracle which shall not bg open to objections. Themtetus, in the dialogue which bears his name, being asked to give a definition of science, replies that geometry and astronomy and music are sciences, and is told by Socrates that he has given many sciences instead of one. Yet there are cases in which the many, however philosophically defective, furnishes for practical purposes a more satisfactory account than the one. No man doubts that to raise the dead to life, to heal the sick by a word spoken at a distance, to still a tempest by rebuking it, are miracles ; though he may not be able to frame a general definition which shall in clude under it these and all other miracles, con ceivable as well as actual. The most that we can hope to do is to explain what a miracle is not; and, in order to do this, we must inquire what is meant by that course of nature to which miracles are said to be an exception.
Two kinds of natural causes come within the field of our experience ; physical or necessary causes—to which class belong all the material con ditions requisite to the occurrence of a sensible change ; and efficient or free causes—of which the only instance directly perceived is found in the power of voluntary action possessed by ourselves as personal agents. For our present purpose, it is not necessary to enter upon the abstruse metaphy sical questions connected with this subject, such as the determination of the difference between physi cal and mathematical necessity ; the inquiries whether action can properly be attributed to matter ; whether there is anything in the relation of a material cause to its effect analogous to power as exerted by conscious agents ; whether material causation implies anything more than invariable sequence, etc. We shall merely assume what is implied in the conception of an uniform system of nature ; that in material causation every event is determined to take place through some antecedent phenomenon, or group of phenomena, from which it invariably follows ; and we shall assume also that by natural events are meant such as take place either through this causation or by an exer cise of human will. If, therefore, any event takes place in the world which is neither the result of such a series of necessary antecedents, extending back to the beginning of the present state of things, nor produced by the will of a human agent, such an event is supernatural or miraculous.
The want of precision in this statement is partly owing to the fact that we are unable to say at what point in the chain of antecedents the super natural power will be exerted, nor at what subse quent point the effect will become visible. Before
the establishment of a course of nature, nothing is miraculous ; for a miracle, as Bishop Butler has observed, is in its very notion relative to a course of nature, and implies somewhat different from it. The introduction of any new power into nature after the settlement and during the continuance of its course, would be a miracle ; but it by no means follows that the phenomenon in which the effect of that power first becomes visible may not be directly brought about by the action of material causes. If a man brings certain chemical elements into combination with each other, and thus pro duces an effect which, without that combination, would not have taken place, the effect itself is the immediate result of the natural action of the ele ments ; but the operation which brought those elements together is a voluntary act, not included in the general course of nature. Now, if a being of power superior to man were to bring about a similar combination of elements beyond the reach of man's control, the result would be miraculous, but the action of the elements themselves would be according to natural law. We do not say that such is the actual manner in which miracles have taken place, but only that such an occurrence is conceivable, and that an event conceived as taking place in this way is conceived as miraculous.
Hence, when we say that a miracle is not the result of a series of necessary antecedents, we do not therefore imply that it has no physical con ditions:, but only that it would not have taken place wiout some addition to those conditions tS beyond w takes place in natural causation. We deny, there ore, that the antecedents are the cient reason of the miracle, in the same way and to the same extent as they are of natural events. But in saying this we do not imply that the miracle is an event without a cause. It is the effect of a supernatural cause, as ordinary events are the effects of natural causes. There is nothing incre dible in the supposition of such a supernatural cause—at least to those who believe in a God who, though working in the world, is yet distinct from the world. The possibility of miracles in general (we are not speaking of the evidence for or against the actual occurrence of a particular miracle) is not more incredible than the possibility of creation at all. Those who believe that the world was created in time, do not therefore believe that God, before the creation, existed in an eternity of idleness. Personal existence is itself an activity ; and if there was a personal God before the creation of the world, there was also a divine action before the creation of the world. In creating the world, therefore, God did not begin to act, but entered on a different mode of action. If a new exertion of divine power was possible then, it is equally possible at any subsequent time.