The same imperfection of our knowledge, which is a hindrance to us when we attempt to form an exact definition of a miracle, and to explain the manner in which it may be conceived to take place, becomes rather an auxiliary when we con fine ourselves to the humbler task of answering those objectors who dogmatically pronounce that miracles are impossible. To meet such objectors, it is by no means necessary that we shall be able to state the manner in which miracles are wrought ; it is sufficient if we can point to some manner in which they may be wrought, without being liable to, or notwithstanding, the objections alleged against them. Before proceeding to speak of the positive evidences on which the belief in miracles properly rests, it may be well to notice a few of these objections, the purpose of which is to pre clude the admission of evidence at all, on the ground of the impossibility, or utter incredibility, of the thing to be proved.
The best known and the most frequently repeated of this class of objections is that of Hume A miracle,' he says, `is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.' According to the view that has been taken in the preceding remarks, it cannot with any accuracy be said that a miracle is ' a violation of the laws of nature.' It is the effect of a supernatural cause, acting along with and in addition to the natural causes constituting the system of the world. It is produced, therefore, by a different combination of causes from that which is at work in the production of natural phenomena. The laws of nature are only general expressions of that uniform arrangement accord ing to which the same causes invariably produce the same effect. They would be violated by the production, at different times, of different effects from the same cause ; but they are not violated when different effects are produced from different causes. The experience which testifies tq their uniformity tells us only what effects may be ex pected to follow from a repetition of the same cause ; it cannot tell us what effects will follow from the introduction of a different cause. This, which is in substance the answer given to Hume by Brown, appears the most satisfactory among the various arguments by which the sceptical philosopher's position has been assailed.
In support of this argument, however, it will be necessary to meet another objection, advanced by a philosopher of a very different spirit from Hume, but which is equally incompatible with any belief in a real miracle. A miracle,' says Schleier
macher, has a positive relation, by which it extends to all that is future, and a negative rela tion, which in a certain sense affects all that is past. In so far as that does not follow which would have followed, according to the natural con nection of the aggregate of finite causes, in so far an effect is hindered, not by the influence of other natural counteracting causes belonging to the same series, but notwithstanding the concurrence of all effective causes to the production of the effect. Every thing, therefore, which from all past time contributed to this effect, is in a certain measure annihilated ; and instead of the interpolation of a single supernatural agent into the course of nature, the whole conception of nature is destroyed. On the positive side, something takes place which is conceived as incapable of following from the.a,ggre. gate of finite causes. But, inasmuch as this event itself now becomes an actual link in the chain of nature, every future event must be other than it would have been had this one miracle not taken place.' On this and other grounds, Schleiermacher is led to maintain that there is no real distinction between the natural and the supernatural ; the miracles being only miraculous relatively to us, through our imperfect knowledge of the hidden causes in nature, by meats of which they were wrought.
This objection proceeds on an assumption which is not merely unwarranted, but actually contradicted by experience. It assumes that the system of material nature is a rigid, not an elastic system ; that it is one which obstinately resists the introduction of new forces, not one which is cap able of adapting itself to them. We know by experience that the voluntary actions of men can be interposed among the phenomena of matter, and exercise an influence over them, so that cer tain results may be produced or not, according to the will of a man, without affecting the stability of the universe, or the coherence of its parts as a system. What the will of man can effect to a small extent, the will of God can surely effect to a greater extent : and this is a sufficient answer to the objection which declares the miracle to be impossible; though we may not be able to say with certainty whether it is actually brought to pass in this or in some other way. There may be many means, unknown to us, by which such an event may be produced ; but if it can be produced in any way it is not impossible.