Persons under the disability of infancy, coverture, idiotcy, lunacy, unsoundness of mind, or absence beyond seas, or per sons claiming under them, notwithstand ing the period of twenty years shall have expired, are to be allowed ten years after the person to whom the right first accrued has ceased to be under any disability or has died (which shall have first hap pened) (sect. 16). It is to be observed that imprisonment is not a disability un der this act, as it was under 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 2.
But no entry, distress, or action is to be made or brought by any person under disability at the time of his right accru ing, or by any person claiming under him, but within forty years from the time at which the right first accrued, though such disability should have continued during the whole of such forty years, or although the term of ten years from the time at which the person to whom the right first accrued ceased to be under any disability, or died, should not have ex pired (sect. 17).
In the case of a person under disability at the time that his right accrued dying under such disability, no further time be yond the said term of twenty years next after the right accrued, or the said term of ten years after the death of such person, is to be allowed by reason of the disability of any other person (sect. Is).
No part of Great Britain and Ireland, nor the adjacent islands, is to be deemed beyond seas, within the meaning of the act (sect. 19).
No suit in equity is to be brought for the recovery of any land or rent but within the time when the plaintiff, if entitled at law, might have brought an action (sect. 24). This clause confirms the doctrine already established in courts of equity.
In cases of express trust, the right of the cestuy que trust to bring a suit against a trustee, or person claiming through him, is not to be deemed to have accrued till a conveyance has been made to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and then only as against such purchaser and persons claiming under him (sect. 26). In cases of express trust, no time, as between the cestuy que trust and trus tee, can operate as a bar to the right of the former; and the above-mentioned clause applies as between the cestuy que trust and strangers only. The possession of the trustee is that of the cestuy que trust, and the possession of the cestuy que trust cannot be adverse to the trustee, unless where there has been actual ouster of the trustee by the cestuy que trust, or where the latter denies the title of the trustee. Though no time bars a direct
trust, as between trustee and cestuy que trust, a court of equity will not allow a man to make out a case of constructive trust at a great distance of time, and after long acquiescence, but will in such cases apply rules as to length of time by ana logy to the statutes of limitation. (17 Ares., 97.) In cases of concealed fraud, the right of a person to bring a suit in equity for the recovery of land or rent of which he, or the person through whom he claims, has been deprived by such fraud, is to be deemed to have accrued at the time when the fraud was, or, with reasonable dili gence, might have been discovered ; but nothing in this clause is to affect the title of a purchaser for valuable consideration who was not a party to the fraud, and had, at the time of his purchase, no notice of such fraud (sect. 26). This principle had already been established in courts of equity.
By section 36, all real and mixed ac tions, except Ejectment, and the actions of Dower and Quare Impedit, were abo lished after the 31st of December 1834.
Since the 31st of December, 1833, no money secured upon land by any mort gage, judgment, lien, or otherwise, or charged upon land by way of legacy, can be recovered by action or suit, but within twenty years after the right to receive the same accrued, unless in the meantime some part of the money or interest thereon has been paid, or some acknowledgment in writing of the right thereto signed by the person liable to payment or hts agent, to the person entitled thereto or his agent ; in which case the action or suit must be brought within twenty years after such payment or acknowledgment (sect 40). This clause is a statutory confirmation of what was formerly established by deci sion as to money secured upon land; namely, that possession of the land by the mortgagor or person otherwise liable for payment of the money, without payment or demand of principal or interest for twenty years, was sufficient to raise the presumption of satisfaction. It has been determined that the limitation in this clause applies to bills of foreclosure, which are in substance suits to recover the money secured by mortgage. (9 Sim., 570.) With respect to legacies, there has been some variety of decision. Formerly it seems to have been thought that there was no limitation as to the time within which a legacy might be demanded, bn in the later cases the courts of equity ap pear to have adopted twenty years as the limit.