The above-mentioned section secures to the mortgagee to whom a payment of' principal or interest has been made, or an acknowledgment in writing has been given, his right of action or suit as to the money for twenty years from the time of such payment or acknowledgment, and in the latter case his right of entry, distress, or action for the recovery of the land is during the same period secured to him by the 14th section ; but it being considered doubtful whether the 2nd section did not bar this right, when the act relied on as taking the case out of the statute was a payment of principal or interest, the 7 Wm. IV. and 1 Viet. c. 28, was passed, reserving to the mortgagee the right of entry, distress, and action for the reco very of the land for twenty years from the last payment of principal or interest, although more than twenty years may have elapsed since the right first accrued.
Arrears of dower, or damages for such arrears, are not to be recoverable by any action or suit beyond six years before the commencement of the action or snit. Be fore the act, there was no limitation either at law or in equity to a claim for arrears of dower during the life of the heir (sect 41).
Since the 31st day of December, 1833, no arrears of rent or of interest in respect of any money charged in any manner on land or rent, or any damages in respect of such arrear of rent or interest, can be recovered by any distress, action, or suit, but within six years next after the same respectively became due, or next after an acknowledgment in writing given to the person entitled thereto or his agent, signed by the person by whom the same was payable, or his agent; except where there has been a prior mortgagee or other incumbrancer in possession within one year next before an action or suit is brought by any person entitled to a sub sequent mortgage or other incumbrance on the same land, in which case the ar rears of interest may be recovered for the whole time during which such prior mortgagee or incumbrancer was in pos session, though it exceed the term of six years (sect. 42). It had already been established in equity, by analogy to the rule at law, that an account of rents and profits could not go back beyond six years before the filing of the bill, and in many cases where a party had neglected his rights, and where there was no disabi lity on the one side, or fraud on the other, the court has refused to carry the account farther back than the filing of the bill. (1
Ball and B., 130.) This discretionary jurisdiction seems to be within the saving of the 27th clause of the act. It seems that the above section refers to rents charged upon land only, to which it had been held that the former statutes did not apply, and not to conventional rents (2 Bing., N. C., 688), the limitations as to which are provided for by the 21 Jac. c. 16, s. 3, and the 3 and 4 Wm. IV.
e. 42, s. 3.
This clause contains no exception in favour of persons under disabilities.
Limitations as to tithes and other eccle siastical property are now regulated by 2 and 3 Wm. IV., c. 100; and 3 and 4 Wm. IV., c. 27.
As to limitations as to advowsons, the 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, s. 30, enacts that from the 31st day of December, 1833, no Quare Impedit or other action, nor any suit to enforce a right of presentation to any church, vicarage, or other ecclesi astical benefice, is to be brought after the expiration of the period during which three clerks in succession shall have held the same, all of whom obtained possession adversely to the right of the person claim ing, or of the person through whom he claims, if the times of such incumbencies together shall amount to sixty years, and if not, then after such farther period as with the times of such incumbencies shall make up the period of sixty years.
Limitations as to other incorporeal rights are now mainly regulated by 2 and 3 Wm. IV., c. 71. [PRESCRIPTION.] II. As to Limitations of Personal Ac tions and Suits relating to Personal Pro PertY• 1. Of actions of assault and battery.
By the 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3, all actions of trespass, of assault, battery, wounding, imprisonment, or any of them, must be commenced and sued within four years after the cause of action arises.
2. Of actions of slander.
By the 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3, all actions on the case for words must be commenced and sued within two years next after the words spoken.
3. Of actions arising upon simple con tract, and actions founded in wrong.
By the 21 Jac. I. c. 16, a. 3, all ac tions of trespass pare fregit, actions of trespass, detenue, trover, and replevin for taking away goods and cattle, actions of account and upon the case (except merchants' accounts), actions of debt grounded upon lending or contract without specialty, and actions of debt for arrearages of rent, must be commenced and sued within six years next after the cause of action arises.