STATUTES OF LIMITATION. There appear to have been no times limited by the common law within which actions might be brought; for though it is said by Bracton (lib. 2, fol. 228), that, omnes actions in mundo infra certa tempura limitationem habent ;" yet with the exception of the period of a year and a day, mentioned by Spelman (Gloss., N), as fixed by the antient law for the heir of a tenant to claim after the death of his ancestor, and for the tenant to make his claim upon a disseisor, all the limitations of actions in the English law have been established by statute. Certain remarkable periods were first fixed upon, within which the cause of action must have arisen. Thus in the time of Henry III., the limitations in a writ of right, which was then from the time of Henry I., was by the Statute of Merton, C. 8, reduced to the time of Henry IL ; and by the Statute of Westminster, 1, c. 8, the period within which writs of right might be sued out was brought down to the time of Richard I. (Co. Lit., 114, b.) Since the 4 Hen. VII., c. 24, which limitad the time within which persona might make their claim to land of which a fine had been levied with proclamations, various statutes have been passed for the purpose of limiting the time within which actions and snits relating to real property may be commenced. The 21 Jac. I., c 16, limited the period for all writs of formedon to twenty years; and it was enacted generally that no person should make entry into any lands, but within twenty years next after his right of entry accrued. The act contained a saving of the rights of certain persons therein enu merated.
By the 9 Geo. III. c. 16, the right of the crown to sue or implead for any manors, lands, or other hereditaments (except liberties or franchises) was limited to sixty years. Before this act, the rale that males' to oceterrit regi was uni versal; and it still prevails as a maxim of law, except where abridged by statute. The same maxim applies to the duchy of Cornwall, which, it vests in the crown from time to time, so long as there is no eldest son of the king, or other person entitled to the dignity, is not with in the above statute.
The next statute upon this subject is the important act of the 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 27, by which great changes were made in the remedies for trying the rights to real property, and which embodies the greater part of the present law of limita tions relating thereto.
By section 2, no person can make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within twenty years after the right to make such entry or distress, or bring such action, has accrued to the claimant, or some person through whom he claims. The meaning of the terms " land," " rent,' and " person," is explained in the first section of this act. It is sufficient to state here the general object of the act. The explana tion of its particular provisions belongs to law treatises.
An administrator for the purposes of this act is to claim from the death of the intestate (sect. 6). This section removes, for the purposes of the act, that distinc tion which existed, under the old law, between executors and administrators, by which the right of the former was con sidered to commence from the death of the testator, and that of the latter from the grant of adminstration.
The enactments contained in the sec tions from the 3rd to the 13th included, are intended to remove one of the great difficulties that attended the investigation of titles under the old law, namely, the determination of the time at which ad verse possession commenced. Whether possession was adverse or not, was fre quently a question of fact to be deter mined by a jury, and subject to great un certainty, and the question was often further embarrassed by the various rules of law, as well as by the principle for merly laid down, that possession, rightful in its commencement, did not become wrongful or adverse as against the true owner by being continued beyond the period at which the right of the party in possession ceased.