In the third place, it was of the very essence of the Re volution, to create, or, more properly speaking, to nourish and bring forth to notice, and reward, talents of every de scription ; and these talents were directed with single and undeviating energy and perseverance to one end. The military ardour, which was at first excited by the love of glory, and the wish to be instrumental in rendering France mistress of the world, and by the determination not to per mit foreign nations to destroy her national independence, or the effects of the Revolution, was cherished and strength ened by the conviction, that the path to the highest com mands was open to talents and merit. Thus her armies were filled with soldiers, who despised death, and who fought with that enthusiasm which such passions and hopes naturally produced ; while they were led by officers, select ed solely on account of their merit and fitness, for the com mand to which they were appointed. At the head of the government also, there were at almost every period of the Revolution, men admirably calculated to direct the efforts of the great machine which the Revolution had put in mo tion. Even the despotic and arbitrary nature of this govern ment, such as it existed in the time of Roberspierre, con tributed to the success of their arms; for it was the energy and secrecy of despotism directing the enthusiasm of the love of glory and national independence.
When we reflect therefore on the operation of all these causes ; that nearly the whole powers, both mental and cor poreal, of a populous nation, were directed to one object, in the attainment of which all were convinced they had the highest interest, and that all classes were further stimulat ed to exertion and perseverance, by the knowledge, that, while they were securing the national interest, and the li berties which the Revolution had brought then), they were treading the path which would certainly conduct them to a higher rank and influence in the state than they previous ly possessed, we shall not be astonished at their military successes. But, in order more thoroughly to develope the causes of these successes, we should reflect on the enemies they had to contend with. In the first place, the people of most of the countries which they invaded were disposed to receive them as friends, from a belief that they came to destroy all the oppressions under which they suf fered. In the second place, the councils and armies of their opponents were directed by much inferior talents, and by men who, besides their inferiority in talents, did not feel the operation of the same powerful motives for exertion and perseverence. There is also good reason to believe, that many of them proved traitors to their country, and fell be fore the influence of French gold, not less than by the su periority of the French arms. Lastly, France was a single
power against a combination of powers : the pressure of every defeat, brought into more close and compact union all the members that formed her commonwealth, while success, speaking powerfully to their love of national glo ry, equally produced the same effect. On the contrary, the combined powers had within them the elements of discor dance and disunion ; they were jealous of each other, and strongly disposed to separate, either after defeat or success. Their sense of the common danger to which they were all exposed from the French Revolution, was not sufficiently strong, or so continually present to their apprehcnsions,as to banish their mutual jealousy ; while their selfish views too plainly proved, that if they succeeded in putting down the Revolution, they would not fail to quarrel among them selves about the spoil. Such appear to us to have been the principal causes which produced the military successes of the French. On their side, great enthusiasm, great talents, great exertion and perseverance, the strong motives of per sonal ambition, and the love of national glory and indepen dence, all operating to one single object. On the side of the allies, talents neglected, and prej udicies hurtful to their cause persevered in ; no common bond of union ; mutual suspi cion and jealousy ; an inadequate sense of their own dan ger ; and treachery and disaffection among their subjects.
III. With respect to the change of the French govern ment, from a democratic form at least to a military des potism, it will be found, on examination, not to have been great in reality, and that the change which actually took place was produced by the operation of very simple and natural causes.
In the first place, the real change was not great ; for it would be difficult to point out any period of the Revolu tion, in which the people were not subjected to a most ar bitrary government—a government which well fitted them even for a military despotism. We shall not examine whe ther the state of France, threatened by numerous foes from without, and convulsed with intestine divisions, did not re quire and justify the arbitrary and severe government which was exercised over it; the cause or justification of this go vernment is not now the object of inquiry. The fact is indis putable, and it accounts, in our opinion, for the ease with which the French passed from the forms of a democratic go vernment to a military despotism, Besides, we should al ways recollect, that the French people had no conception of political liberty ; and if some idea and love of it sprung up, at the commencement of the Revolution, it was smothered by the tyranny and oppression which soon succeeded.