In the second place, the real change which took place from the form of democracy to military depotism, may be traced to obvious and satisfactory causes. The national love of glory disposes all Frenchmen to a military life ; and throws round the military character a splendour which conceals its tyrannical and oppressive nature. This splen dour round the character of Bonaparte was, to the eyes of Frenchmen, of the most brilliant and dazzling kind : he had gone further towards the realization of their fond hope, that France would attain universal empire, than any of their monarchs, and therefore they not only submitted, but were favourably disposed, to the military government of a man who had done so much, and who, when their ac tual sovereign, they hoped would perfect the great under taking which they had so near their hearts. A people whose fondest wishes were centered in national glory and universal empire, could not but be attached to a military government, as the best suited to the accomplishment of those wishes, and to a man who they knew would conduct that military government with the greatest skill and suc cess. Even those who were not infected with this national and characteristic passion, hailed Bonaparte as the man who had put an end to •the coavulsions that had so long agitated France ; and though they still apprehended that his character, and the character of the people at large, would keep France in almost continual war, yet they at the same time trusted that, under him, the internal state of the kingdom would be quiet, and they would at length be freed from a rapid succession of tyrants.
But there was-another circumstance that reconciled the French people to a military government,—from the exten sion and long duration of the military system, a large por tion of the population were interested in it. Their rela tions and friends were in the army ; and if France were to become pacific, or if her government were not military, they would be thrown useless and unsupported on the world. Thus the same causes, which in part contributed to produce the military successes of the French, operated to render them fit subjects for a military government; and the Revolution, by increasing and calling into more energetic and general action their love of glory, as well as by de stroying all the habits of settled and regular life, also fitted them for a government which would cherish and flatter that love, and indulge their restless and irregular habits.
We shall defer at present the consideration of the ef fects on the character and condition of the French produc ed by the Revolution, as some of these effects were greatly heightened by the operation of the system which Bonaparte established and acted upon, after he became Emperor ; and therefore the subject will afterwards fall more properly under our notice. We shall now resume the history.
Moreau had long been the object of Bonaparte's hatred and jealousy ; but no opportunity occurred of crushing or removing him, till the spring of 1804, when, in conse quence of an accusation that he was implicated in a de sign to restore the Bourbons, he was seized and sentenced to be imprisoned ; but his popularity with the army was so great, that Bonaparte commuted this sentence to banish 3nent for life to the United States of America.
Symptoms of approaching hostilities with Germany had been long apparent in France ; but Bonaparte did not leave Paris to put himself at the head of his armies till the 24th of September 1805. As soon as he reached this place, he issued a manifesto, denouncing what he called the third coalition, which he attributed to the gold and hatred of England. As the operations and result of this war are de tailed in the History of AUSTRIA, we shall run rapidly over them here. The French army consisted of five divisions : they crossed the Rhine the day after Bonaparte reached Strasburg. Hostilities commenced on the 7th, when the Austrians were defeated in attempting to oppose the pas sage of part of the French across the bridge of Donawert. The main Austrian army was under General Mack ; but his conduct, either from incapacity, or from the interfer ence of the council of war at Vienna, was such, that the French advanced rapidly with upwards of 200,000 men, while he had not above 80,000. Swabia, Franconia, and Bavaria, wei e overrun in a very short time. Mack was entrenched at Ulm, where, on the 15th day of October, the 3d day after firing the first shot, his army was so dreadfully beaten, that he was obliged to capitulate on the 17th. The Archduke Charles, at the head of 95,000 men, in vain en deavoured to prevent this dreadful disaster, by a rapid march from Italy ; but corning up too late, and not being sufficiently strong to oppose Bonaparte, the latter pushed on towards Vienna, which he entered on the 12th of No vember. Austria, having been joined by Russia, resolved to hazard the fate of another battle, which was fought at _Austerlitz on the 27th of November. The engagement commenced at sunrise : in less than an hour, the left wing of the allies was entirely cut off; and this was the forerun ner of their total defeat. On the 5th of December an armis tice took place, which was followed by the treaty of Pres burg, on the 26th of that month. By this treaty, France was confirmed in the possession of all her conquests be yond the Alps, which had formerly belonged to Austria, Bonaparte was recognised as King of Italy ; and to this kingdom the Emperor of Germany ceded his part of the states of Venice. The Electors of Bavaria and \Virteni burg, having been made kings by Bonaparte, were recog nised as such by the Emperor ; and the Tyrol and Swabian principalities of Austria assigned to them.