In the mean time, the Parisians, alike ferocious in their fears and in their triumphs, had signalized the 10th of August and the 1st clay of September, by massa cres, at which the heart freezes in the recital, on pre tence of the danger which was threatened by the ap proaching invaders. In November, the convention, intoxicated by the repulse of the hostile armies, passed their famous decree for fraternizing with all nations in pursuit of liberty—for annexing the Duchy of Savoy to the republic,—and for opening the navigation of the Scheldt. The event of the 10th of August, by which royalty in France was abolished, was deemed sufficient grounds by the British court for recalling our ambassa dor. The French ambassador, though no longer ac knowledged, remained in England. The fraternizing de cree of the convention, and the decree respecting the Scheldt, occasioned an offer of our assistance to be made to the States General ; an embargo to be laid on all ves sels freighted with corn to France ; and preparations for war by land and sea.
The substance of his majesty's speech when parlia ment next assembled, December 13th, was to declare the necessity of putting the nation in a posture of de fence against internal disaffection, and external hostility. The usurping government of France, it was declared, had shewn their contempt of the rights of neutral nations by their obnoxious decrees ; they had in particular in vaded the rights of our allies, the Dutch, in their decree for opening the navigation of the Scheldt.
War seemed now inevitable, yet France still held out the appearance of wishing for conciliation. M. Chauve lin, waving the ceremony of his being recognized at our court, informed Lord Grenville, in the name of the exe cutive council of the French nation, that France would not attack Holland while she preserved her neutrality ; and that the fraternizing decree had no reference to England.
With regard to the opening of the Scheldt, Chauvelin argued, that his country having rescued Belgium from the yoke of Austria, was bound to restore to the Bel gians all their rights, of which they had been deprived. The navigation of the Scheldt was certainly one of these. How could the right respecting the Scheldt be except ed ? particularly when it was of importance only to those who were deprived of it. The English government, after seine discussion with Chauvelin, notified, that their conditions of peace were, that France should renounce her views of aggression, relinquish her conquests, and confine herself to her own territory. France had already conquered the Netherlands, yet it seems to have been expected, that she should quietly give them up.
The fate of the unfortunate Louis XVI. which had been for some time anticipated, occasioned the imme diate dismissal of the French resident from London. It contributed, with the other horrible transactions of France, to rouse sensations of pity and indignation, which violently disposed the people of England for war.
Since the opening of the session in December 1792, the question of peace or war had been the subject of suc cessive debates. On the 12th of February, a message from his majesty announced, that France had declared war against Great Britain and the Dutch. Mr Pitt read this declaration of war, and endeavoured to justify the British government from its individual charges.—" The king of England was accused of having favoured the coalition. Mr Pitt solemnly denied the charge. His majesty had recalled his ambassador from Paris after the 10th of August ; but it was," said the minister, " be cause the government of France was from that day a government of usurpation. Chauvelin's letters of cre dence had been refused ; but not until the French had offered repeated offences. We were taxed with framing
the alien bill ; it was a pleasure of self-defence against foreign incendiaries. The French accused us of pro hibiting corn, arms, and ammunition, from being ex ported to France ; that too was a measure of self-defence against the designs of France, avowedly shewn in her treatment of Holland. We had prohibited the influx of assignats ; in so doing we had only shielded ourselves against a gigantic system of swindling. Lastly, we were accused of having prepared an armament to disturb the French operations in Belgium. True," said the minis ter, "we armed in our own defence when France sheav ed contempt of our allies; but we sought not to disturb their operations in Belgium, we meant to protect Hol land."—He concluded by moving for an address to sup port his majesty in the war.
Mr Fox opposed the address, because it pledged the house to an indefinite sanction of the past and future conduct of ministers. He proposed as an amendment to the address, that the house should promise to sup port the throne, in bringing France to such terms of pacification, as should be consistent with the honour of his majesty's crown, the interests of his people, and the security of our allies. The causes of war alleged by France, he did not pretend to justify indiscriminately. It had been customary with France, even under her an cient government, to crowd into a manifesto every com plaint, solid or insignificant, which could be mentioned as.grounds of hostility : but the dismission of Chanvelin, and our prohibiting the exportation of corn to France, (in violation of the treaty of 1786,) when a supply of grain was permitted to other countries, did not warrant us to say, that the war was pure aggression on the part of France. Mr Fox severely censured the conduct of ministers, in refusing to send an ambassador to France. Had our conduct been more candid and conciliating, the fate of Louis, as well as the war, might have been avert ed. But the minister negotiated inoffieially. What be nefit could arise from this strange distinction between official and unofficial negotiation, Mr Fox could not con ceive ; but had we negotiated, (he would ask,) with a real and conscientious wish for peace ? No ; we re monstrated against accessions of territory, and we com plained of the violated rights of our ally, but we propos ed nothing that we could rationally expect to be conced ed as a satisfaction. We pointed out nothing that could remove the alarm. We told them to abandon their con quests—to withdraw their troops from the Netherlands. \Vhile they were at war with the emperor, such a pro posal was not an offer of peace. It was an insult, and a pretext for quarrel. The invasion of our ally, by the opening of the navigation of the Scheldt, was set forth as the grounds of war ; but was this exclusive navigation really an object worthy of a war ? Did the state's gene ral think it such ? had they asked for our assistance ? had they determined to assert their right to the Scheldt by lorce of arms ? No, they had not ! flow then could we take the lead, in asserting a claim in which we were not principals, and in which the principals did not call for our interposition. As to the satisfaction which we sought, viz. the restitution of Belgium, it was evidently and wholly impossible to be admi.tcd. We made a pre tence of the balance of Europe to justify going to war, but had we not seen France invaded, her frontier town taken, and her capital threatened, without speaking of the balance of Europe, or interfering to preserve it. Now, when France had repelled invasion, we discovered that Europe was in danger. This was the language of men devoted, not to the preservation of peace, but to the coa lition against France.