After the failure of the negotiation, the mutual lan guage of the French and English governments breathed irreconcileable hatred. The French uttered, as usual, their unmeaning threats of invasion. The English ministers, anxious to unite the people, by fear, if not by love, favoured and propagated the rumour ; but, from the universal panic, some consequences followed, which the government neither wished for, nor intended to produce.
On the prospect of invasion, the people had been exhorted, but in vain, not to be moved by a false alarm, or give a blow to public credit. The diminution of gold became greater and greater every day. The run upon the bank continued to increase until the 25th of February, a day that will long be memorable, as the last on which the Bank of England was compelled, at the will of the bearer, to pay its promissory notes in gold and silver. Till the evening of the 25th, the run continued ; but, on the next clay, though it was Sunday, an order was issued from the privy council, requiring the directors of the bank to forbear issuing any cash in payment, until the sense of parliament could be taken upon the subject. A great crowd of people, who had assembled on Monday morning, as soon as the doors opened, were presented with hand bills, announcing the authority by which the stoppage had been sanctioned.
The resemblance of this stoppage to actual bank ruptcy, occurred to many persons who were not versed in the modern science of distinctions. But the friends to ministers boldly denied what they were pleased to call the false notion, of the bank being unable to make their payments in gold. They said, that it was a great measure of state, produced by the caution of the minis ter, that too great a drain of gold should not be made. They accused the Jacobins of having caused a distrust of the bank, and of having formed a design to ruin the credit of the country, by persuading the people that gold was preferable to bank notes. it is with pain that we notice the well-intentioned mind of Wilberforce himself, led away by this senseless clamour. In the first debate upon the subject, he attributed much of the public calamity to the conduct of the opposition. In answer to this, Mr Fox said, that it reminded him of a scene in Ben Jonson, where it appears, that an im postor had played his tricks very successfully for a long time upon his dupes ; and when he was detected, the dupes became very angry, not at the impostor, but those who had detected him. The consequences which have since resulted from the order to stop bank pay ments in cash, the depreciation and the deluge of paper currency were then predicted ; but, being Jacobin pre dictions, it was resolved, that they should not be be lieved.* The fact, of the bank directors having shel tered their stoppage under an order of the privy council, however glaring, was most shamefully denied by the directors. Several clays before the hank stopt its pay
ments, the directors, observing with great uneasiness the large and constant decrease in their cash, held a particular consultation on the subject; and perceiving that their cash was reduced to a certain sum, they came to a resolution to go to Mr Pitt, and tell him how they were circumstanced. They did so ; and Mr Pitt, seeing that the peal of alarm about invasion, which it had suited the views of ministers to ring, had produced more serious effects than he had foreseen, observed, that the alarm of invasion was now become much more general than he could sec necessary. They then press ed Mr Pitt to make some declaration in parliament, which should ease the public mind. On the 24th of February, they bad another interview with Mr Pitt. In a report by a committee of their whole court, it was declared that the cash was going ; which gave such an alarm for the safety of the house, that no time was lost in sending a deputation to Mr Pitt, to ask him how far they might venture to go in paying cash, and " when he would think it necessary to interfere." On the 27th of February, Mr Pitt gave notice of a motion to be made next day, for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the solvency of the Bank, and also to inquire and report as to the necessity of con tinuing to prohibit their money-payments. The opposi tion members strongly contended for an inquiry into the causes of the necessity of this measure. Here, they said, is an open acknowledgment, that the govern ment has been obliged to interrupt the right of the sub ject, the right of the holders of notes, to demand pay ment in gold and silver, yet a remedy is attempted, without examining the cause of this evil. Their motions for lull inquiry shared the general fate of the proposals of the same party. A committee, chosen by the minis terial party, was appointed, for the object, as Mr Pitt said, of assertaining that the affairs of the Bank were not in a dangerous state. They were not, lie added, by any means called upon to push their inquiries into circumstances, the disclosure of which would be at tended with temporary injury to the credit of the coun try, and with permanent embarrassment to the opera tions of the Bank. This secret and delicate committee seemed, indeed, to understand the lesson that was set .to them : they made no inquiries about the quantity of gold and silver in the bank ; they only compared the bank notes of their creditors with the money that was due to them by government. When the reports of this committee were brought up,t which Mr Pitt called highly consoling, the ministers assumed a high tone.