When the season for active operations returned, Sir William Howe directed his first attention to the surprise and destruction of the American mag azines. The town of Peekskill on the North river was used as a deposit for the munitions to be dis tributed among the troops in the Highlands: and at Danbury in Connecticut, there was a considerable collection of useful military stores. These places were attacked by means of expeditions forwarded in shipping, and much damage was done not easily repaired. On the other side, the British stores at Sagg harbour on Long Island, were destroyed by a bold movement executed by Colonel who captured also an armed schooner and a number of vessels laden with forage.
The whole continental army under the command of Washington, though much increased, numbered at the commencement of the campaign less than nine thousand men, of whom nearly one third were confined to the hospitals. Exposed under these circumstances to a greatly superior foe, the Fabian policy of caution, delay and strong intrenchments, strongly recommended itself to the general in chief, as the only system of warfare that offered a prospect of ultimate success. From the camp at Morris town, the army was therefore removed to a fortified position at Middlebrook, where it commanded a full view of the enemy's operations, and of the most important points to which they were likely to be directed. A body of militia, with a few regulars, under General Arnold, were also assembled on the western bank of the Delaware, to oppose the pass age of that river, in case it should be attempted by the British.
The main object of Sir William Howe, was the capture of Philadelphia; but with a broad and guarded river in front, it was evident that no ad vance could be made until a blow had been struck against the main continental army. It was equally plain that the lines at Middlebrook were too strong to be the object of direct attack. Sad experience had taught the British general how formidable is the slightest intrenchment protected by the fatal fire of American musketry: his only chance was in the resources of strategy, by which he hoped to seduce the American commander from his position on the heights; to engage on equal terms in the broad plains of Jersey, and to obtain a signal victory by the power of numerical superiority. Accord ingly the British forces were made to assume the appearance of an immediate advance upon Philadel phia: marches and countermarches were executed: and every contrivance resorted to, that was consid ered likely to excite the anxiety of Washington, and to occasion an incautious change in his pru dent preparations. The object and plans of the
enemy were, however, from the very beginning, wisely foreseen and understood. The movements were followed; but nothing could entice the Ameri can army from the strong fastnesses which always covered their marches and encampments. Sir William Howe saw each day the same lowering cloud hanging above and around him; but he found also—like the ancient Carthaginian—that he had no power to disperse its threatening masses, or to command even its thunders to break upon him in the plain.
The British commander was at length wearied out by this unprofitable contest with an enemy who was neither to be deceived nor overpowered. Pro tected by their position, he fully appreciated the physical force of the American army: and having now fully tested the skill of his adversary, he was satisfied that there was nothing to be gained in the conflict of military science. A new plan was there fore resolved upon, which in its first step involved nothing less than the total abandonment of the state of New Jersey. The British forces fell back to Amboy, closely followed and constantly harassed by the light divisions and skirmishers of the conti nental army. Sir William Howe made one last effort to reach the rear of his pursuers, and by cutting them dr from the high grounds to compel a battle; but when this was again defeated by the prudence of Washington, he gave up all hope of victory, and passed over to Staten Island for the purpose of embarkation.
The American general had now completely achieved a great and wonderful triumph. With a force exhthiting rather the shadow than the reality of an army, opposed to an enemy superior in num ber, and still more in every thing that constitutes efficiency in war, he had nevertheless successfully protected the chief city of America, won battles, captured trophies, and finally expelled the British from their proud and important conquest of a whole state. Never in the history of warfare was a greater result obtained by means so inadequate; and of the success itself, never was more due to the talent, the energy and the wisdom of the com mander-in-chief.