These remarkable movements upon Trenton and Princeton, contain in themselves all the principles of strategy which are usually considered the ori ginal inventions of the French revolution. As ex amples of a genius beyond the progress of the age, they are brilliant evidences of the military skill of the commander, and have received the meed of unanimous admiration. Sir William Howe had every reason to suppose that Lis arrangements were those of a prudent and skilful general; his re tirement into winter quarters during the incle mency of the season, was justified by the regular customs of the time, founded on the accepted con clusions of military science. But he was opposed to an adversary capable of detecting the errors of ancient dogmas, and strong enough to break their trammels, when their fallacy stood unveiled before his judgment. We have seen Washington keeping the field and preserving the vigour of his opera tions, in spite of the rules which commanded inac tivity; and the British army found its divisions at tacked and defeated in detail, while they considered themselves in perfect safety under the shield of all former experience. That principle of warfare which was the secret of Napoleon's victories—the production of a local superiority of force, by con centration against a distant position—was evi dently a part of Washington's reasoning, and a main reliance for the success of his enterprises.
The two battles, though similar in their outlines, were very different in point of conception and exe cution. The attack upon Trenton was a blow struck against an enemy in position, which admit ted, therefore, of every advantage of preparation on the part of the assailant. The battle of Princeton belonged to a higher and more elaborate order of tactics. The American forces were already enga ged with a superior army, commanded by an officer of eminent reputation; and the change of plan was wholly contrived and executed with the enemy in front. It was entirely clue to the prompt genius and fertile resources of Washington, that his army was extricated from so perilous au exposure, and ena bled to attack the enemy's rear with such advantage as to leave it no choice but surrender or flight. A military critic, contemplating these inspirations with a soldier's eye, can easily appreciate the feel ings of the Great Frederick, when he sent a sword to the American commander, as a gift from the world's oldest general to its best.
As a natural result of these unexpected manccu vres, the British officers were thrown into a state of uncertainty, which gave to their subsequent opera tions an unusual character of timidity. The distant roll of the American artillery at Princeton, first an nounced to Lord Cornwallis the danger of his rear and the escape of his active adversary. Alarmed for the safety of his magazines, the British com mander instantly broke up from the Assumpink, and commenced a forced march upon New Bruns wick; moving with such celerity, as nearly to overtake the American rear at Princeton. On the
other hand Sir William Howe drew in all his forces, by concentration in the neighbourhood of Amboy and Brunswick, and abandoned all hope of prevent ing the recruiting service, by overawing the whole extent of the country. Washington, finding the sur prise of the stores impossible, moved northward into the Highlands of Jersey, in order to afford some relief to the fatigues of his troops; for long and se vere exposure to the inclemencies of the winter, without the usual protections, had produced sick ness and even complaint. It was finaliy considered necessary to abandon offensive operations, and to put the army under cover at Morristown. Among other prudent precautions adopted during this tem porary respite, the commander in chief caused the whole army to be inoculated; an operation then very uncommon in America, but which enabled him thereafter to defy a disease which had proved more fatal than the sword of the enemy.
The situation of American affairs—though far from brilliant—was much improved by the late suc cesses. The people of Jersey rose with fresh spirit, and in a number of small skirmishes inflicted loss upon the enemy both in men and stores: new hope was made to animate the public mind; while Con gress fanned the flame by judicious and well-timed incitements to vigorous action. Washington was authorised to raise sixteen regiments, and in further testimony of the public confidence, he was invested for six months with almost dictatorial powers in the conduct of the war. It was, however, found to he impossible to collect a sufficient force for active operations upon any considerable scale during the winter. All the hopes of the commander in chief were therefore turned to the next campaign; and in the mean time, an active warfare was carried on with small posts and foraging parties, which great ly annoyed the British army; while the frequent re ports of fresh successes excited the spirit of the American people. The most earnest applications were made to the several states, for reinforcements enlisted upon longer terms; for, as Washington strongly observed, " to the short engagements of our troops may be fairly and justly ascribed almost every misfortune that we have experienced." These representations produced at last their due impress ion; and the hope was abandoned of defending the country by hasty assemblages of militia, and of car rying on a protracted warfare upon the impulse and mere foundation of disinterested patriotism. The safety of our firesides, and the honour of the Ame rican arms must always require other and more efficient preparations.