The American force numhered fourteen thou sand five hundred men, lying on both sides of Charles river, and scattered along an extensive line of at least twelve miles. The right was posted on the hills about Roxbury, extending towards Dorchester, and was commanded by Major-general Ward: Washington fixed his head quarters, and personally directed the centre and reserve: Major general Lee lay with the left wing near the river Mystic.
The garrison of Boston exceeded twenty regi ments. Bunker's Hill was the post fortified and held by the main body under General Sir William Howe—another division was intrenched on Rox bury neck—and their position was further strength ened by a battery on Cop's hill, three floating bat teries in Mystic river, and a twenty gun ship.
The American forces were very far from pos sessing an efficiency by any means equal to their numbers. The commander-in-chief found " the materials for a good army—a great number of men, able bodied, active, zealous in the cause, and of unquestionable courage"—but in all military requi sites he soon perceived radical and almost irreme diable deficiencies. A few days after his arrival, it was discovered that the whole quantity of ammu nition on hand could barely supply nine rounds to each man: and in this situation, an army without bayonets, remained for two weeks, when a small supply of powder was received from Elizabeth Town in New Jersey. A siege was to be conducted without engineers, and with a scarcity of working tools: and the rigours of winter were to be sup ported by troops without tents or sufficient clothing.
But there were other difficulties lying at the root of military government and organization, greater and more important even than these. Each pro vince had levied its own quota of troops, according to regulations established by itself: and hence arose evils, of which the least was a dangerous want of uniformity. As an example. the soldiers of the 'Massachusetts line lived on a footing of per fect equality with platoon officers elected by them selves; and this sort of sociability was a greater re commendation to promotion than individual fitness. The creation of discipline in an army is, even under the most favourable circumstances, a work of time and attention: the embarrassments of a general may therefore be conceived, when placed at the head of such a host, all of whom were to be dis charged and replaced by new levies before the end of the succeeding mouth of December. An over ruling Providence had provided the only instru ment that was fitted for the time and the occasion. Washington applied himself indefatigably to the subduing of the difficulties around him. He or ganized his army into brigades and divisions, and proceeded to drill them with untiring perseverance. Through his recommendation, Congress was in duced to appoint a paymaster, quartermaster general, and other regular staff of a military estab lishment.
Towards the close of the season, the whole Ame rican army, officers and soldiers, was to be dis banded and renewed in the face of their be leaguered enemy. In the beginning of January, owing to discharges and unavoidable furloughs, the total of the forces scarcely exceeded nine thou sand men, though the number was afterwards increased to about fourteen thousand, when con gress, at the instance of their general, offered a bounty upon enlistment. It was with deep morti
fication that the commander-in-chief felt himself compelled to submit to a state of comparative in activity, by the utter inadequacy of his means to the purposes of offensive warfare: but he never neglected to make advances upon the enemy, when a favourable opportunity was presented. Ploughed Hill, Cobble's Hill, and Lechmere's Point were suc cessively occupied by the Americans: and the floating batteries were driven from their moorings by the cannonade to which they became exposed.
About the end of February 1776, Washington resolved by a decisive movement to bring the siege to some determinate conclusion. For this purpose, during the night, he occupied the commanding po sition of Dorchester heights with a strong force; and the besiegers were thus enabled to annoy the fleet in the harbour, and the army in the city of Boston itself. The British commander had now the alternative of dislodging the Americans by main force from their new post, or of wholly eva cuating the place. A plan to effect the former purpose was frustrated by a violent tempest, which scattered the vessels containing Lord Percy's chosen division: and evacuation was rendered in evitable by the increased strength of the American intrenchments. On the 17th of March, the retreat of the enemy's legions to their ships was witnessed by the undisciplined array of the besiegers; and shortly afterwards the British fleet bent its sails and was borne from the neighbourhood of the capital of New England. The glorious conquest thus achieved was hailed with joyful triumph throughout the colonies. A golden medal, com memorative of the occasion was struck by order of Congress, and a vote of thanks was passed to Washington and the army, " for their wise and spirited conduct in the siege and acquisition of Boston." In anticipation of the early retreat of the be sieged, and the probability of a hostile attempt upon New York, the commander-in-chief had al ready detached a strong force for the protection of that important city. The main American army was now marched southward, and reached New York on the 14th of April: batteries were erected, and every exertion used to strengthen the defence of the place. In consequence of the earnest re presentations of Washington, Congress was induced to vote a reinforcement of thirteen thousand eight hundred militia, and to form a flying camp for the purpose of repelling any attempt of the enemy to land on the Jersey shore; but it was long before other deficiencies, equally important, could be re medied, or even partially supplied. The sinews of war are not to be created by the prudence and ex perience of a commander; comforts and necessaries for an army require something more than vigilance and courage; and the fatal errors of short enlist ments and incomplete regiments, could only be ar rested by time and misfortune.