Before sun-rise on the fourth of October, Sullivan and Wayne attacked and drove in the British out posts, and forced the light infantry and the fortieth regiment to give way with the loss of all their baggage. Their commanding officer, Colonel :Musgrave, hotly pressed by the conquerors, threw himself with five companies into Chew's house, a large stone structure near the road, which enabled him to pour a destructive fire of musketry upon the advancing Americans, without the possibility of a dangerous return. Some resolute attempts to storm the building were repulsed with loss, and as field pieces could make no impression, a corps of observation was left behind, while the column marched on, divided into two bodies. The attack of the right wing by the four brigades under Greene and Stephens, completely broke the British advance of light infantry, and Greene pushing forward with half of the division, routed a part of the main body, entered Germantown, and made a number of prisoners. Woodford's brigade under Stephens, unfortunately allowed itself to be sepa rated from the rest of the division, before Chew's house, and much time was wasted in a second in effectual cannonade from light field pieces upon that massive building. Still the British troops were retreating on every side: the prospect of suc cess was extremely flattering, and with disciplined troops, capable of executing complicated move ments with regularity and order, a decisive victory must have been the unquestionable result. Our narration has now to explain the causes which deranged the whole order of the enterprise, and rendered the first successes ultimately abortive.
It has already heen stated that two of the Ame rican columns were respectively subdivided at Chew's house, in consequence of the unlooked for resistance of its British garrison. The troops were further scattered in a pursuit conducted with unequal vigour, over a country full of hedges and inclosures. Washington, perceiving the increas ing confusion, exerted himself strenuously to check the evil; hut the darkness of the morning, which had been calculated on as an advantage, now pre vented the rallying of the several divisions, and proved the most serious obstacle to success. The general could only obtain an imperfect view of the field of operations, and the parties which ap proached each other, were unable to distinguish their comrades from the enemy. The two advances upon the enemy's rear, by the right and left flanks, were made too late to be of any utility, and thus the weight of the American attack which depended wholly on concentration, was frittered away and lost.
The British army now recovered from its first surprise—rallied the fugitives—and prepared vigo rously to assume the offensive. A fierce attack was made on Greene, who after a warm action, was compelled to retire from the town. Sullivan, hotly assailed by the brigades of Knyphausen, also re treated, and great disorder prevailed every where.
Washington was now convinced of the absolute necessity of his troops from the contest. The disputed town was therefore evac uated by the Americans and the army marched towards the Perkiomen, without loss or even pur suit from their exhausted opponents. On receiving a slight reinforcement, the continental forces again returned to the neighbourhood of the city and en camped at Skippack creek.
According to the official returns of the English general, his loss in the battle of Germantown scarcely exceeded five hundred men. On the side of the Americans, two hundred were killed, more than five hundred wounded, and four hundred made prisoners. Congress passed a resolution highly commending the plan of the battle, and thanking their commander and the army for their courage and conduct. Perhaps, without hyper-criticism, it may be observed as a fault, that the general design reposed too much reliance on the precision of troops, at best but imperfectly disciplined. Con verging movements depend for success on the nicest execution of the plan by the several divisions, and are liable to all kinds of untoward disappoint ments, even when executed with the best instru ments. It is for this reason that they seem to be at present rejected by the best authorities in military science, which give the preference to operations radiating from a fixed centre.
The main object of the American commander was now to compel the evacuation of Philadelphia, by cutting off the supplies of the British army. The fleet was effectually prevented from co-operation by the obstructions fixed in the channel of the Delaware, and by two small forts—one, called Fort Mifflin, on Mud island, near the confluence of the Delaware and Schuylkill, and the other at Red Bank, on the opposite Jersey shore. Strong par ties of militia scoured the whole country in the neighbourhood of the city, for the purpose of en forcing the resolution of Congress, which subjected to martial law all persons supplying provisions to the enemy.
Sir William Howe soon felt the increasing diffi culties of his situation, and began to prepare his plans for their forcible removal. Works were erected against fort Mifflin, which produced severe conflicts with Colonel Samuel Smith, who com manded the station. Lord Howe came up the river with his ships of war and transports, and anchored from Newcastle to Reedy Island; some frigates being detached in advance to remove the chevaux de frise that encumbered the channel. Considerable difficulties were encountered in effect ing this object, so that the obstructions below Mud Island were not cleared until the middle of October, while those covered by the American guns were yet untouched. The capture of the forts was therefore the next object, and it was ac cordingly attempted by a combined attack on land and water.