The inactivity of the northern armies gave an undivided interest to the military operations con ducted in the southern states. It has already been stated that a detachment under Colonel Campbell sailed from New York about the end of November 1778; owing to the total want of preparation, Sa vannah and the whole state of Georgia fell an easy conquest to these troops, assisted by General Pre vost, who had moved northward from East Florida for that purpose. South Carolina was defended by General Lincoln with great obstinacy and vari ous success, until the middle of September 1779, when the arrival of Count D'Estaing changed the character of the operations and encouraged the allies to undertake the siege of Savannah. This enterprise failed, owing to a hurried and prema ture attempt to carry the place by storm; but it was conducted with extreme gallantry and only abandoned after heavy losses. The French arma ment then sailed from the coast, in order to escape the tempestuous season, the approach of which had precipitated their operations.
About the middle of February 1780, an expedi tion from New York, under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, entered the harbour of Charleston, and it was now evident that overwhelming forces of the enemy were about to undertake the subjugation of the south. After a vigorous and obstinate siege, Charleston fell, notwithstanding the reinforcements forwarded to Lincoln by the American commander; a few trifling skirmishes completed the conquest, and left South Carolina and Georgia in the almost undisturbed possession of the British. Clinton returned to New York in the beginning of June, having entrusted the southern command to Lord Cornwallis with an army of four thousand men.
On the twenty-fifth of July, General Gates as sumed the command of the American forces in the South, by selection of Congress. Within one month afterwards, the bloody and decisive battle of Camden destroyed his army, and reduced the war in the Carolinas to a contest of partisans.
The sufferings of the principal army in their winter quarters (1779-80), were again of the most distressing character. In order to preserve the credit of the continental money, congress had resol ved that the emission should never exceed two hundred millions: that amount was already expen ded, and it was now proposed to substitute a system of requisitions of specific articles upon the several states. The commander-in-chief strongly resisted this experiment; for he was fully persuaded that no war could be carried on upon any other than a national basis, and that the quotas of thirteen gov ernments could never be collected when they were really wanted. In the mean time, the troops were
reduced first to half allowance, then to less; and finally when the commissary general declared him self without supplies or credit, requisitions were reluctantly issued to the surrounding country. In consequence of these difficulties, the army remained for several successive days without meat, and their pay was five months in arrear, with no early pros pect of liquidation. It can be no matter of sur prise, therefore, that a mutiny broke out in two Connecticut regiments, which was suppressed with difficulty. The strength of the Americans was thus paralyzed, and the exaggerated reports carried into New York, induced a general belief that they were about to disband. By actual returns made on the Sd of June, the army under Washington's imme diate controul included only three thousand seven hundred and sixty men, present and fit for duty— while on the 18th of the same month, by the return of Sir Henry Clinton, the British force in New York counted twelve thousand regulars ready to be em ployed in the field.
On the 6th of June, General Knyphausen had made a descent upon Elizabethtown, by way of con firming and encouraging the supposed disaffection of the American troops. In this design he was soon satisfied that no success was attainable, and he retired to his place of landing, after exercising much unnecessary severity upon the country and its inhabitants. Clinton resumed the design of offensive operations in New Jersey; but after some severe fighting at Springfield with the corps of General Greene, he also was induced to abandon the project, and to withdraw the British army into Staten Island. The caution exhibited in these operations by the British commander, is perhaps to be ascribed to the intelligence received that a French fleet and army might be immediately ex pected.
A new impulse was now given to the activity of Congress and of the several states. All felt the ne cessity of turning the expected succours to the best account, and the most munificent gifts were therefore contributed by patriotic citizens. An engagement had been hastily entered into with the French am bassador, that the troops of his sovereign should be received by an army of twenty five thousand conti nentals, and that ample supplies for the combined forces should be laid up in magazines. Notwith standing all the exertions that were made, the arri val of Count Rochambeau and his army at Newport, in the month of July, found the Americans not only unprepared for active operations, but without any certainty as to the strength of the expected forces of the states.