If it be necessary, before proceeding to the attack, to make ourselves masters of some obstacle in front, we must examine wherein the obstacle consists; whether we cannot get round it, or how we can rapidly surmount it. Such obstacles may be of two kinds ; 1. Such as from their nature obstruct the approach. 2. Such as are occupied with troops, and, by the fire from them, prevent the attack, because we should be compelled to present a !lank to them ; such as villages, heights, Sec. if the obstacles are of the first kind, we must elideas our I. To force the enemy to leave his position, uy a rapid movement towards his flank or rear, by means we may be enabled to avoid or surmount the obstacle ; .2.. If that be impossible, we should endeavour to disco ver some place, which, either from the nature of the ground, or the N‘ant of prudence on the part of the enemy, is not exposed to his fire ; 3. We should examine whether, from some point, we may not be able to bring a superior fire to bear upon him, and thus silence his fire at those points where our passage is obstructed. At all events, our troops must be supplied with all that is necessary for forming a road over the obstacle ; in deed more than one road should be prepared, and the breaking off and deploying ought to be performed in good order, and with rapidity. In the case of ob stacles of the second kind, we should, I. Endeavour, by an oblique attack on the flank or rear of the enemy, to relieve ourselves from the necessity of attacking the obstacle itself; 2. If that be not practicable, we must endeavour to pave a way for ourselves by artillery ; in which ease, howitzers, used against villages and en trenchments, will be of great service ; 3. We must make an attack upon them, according to the nature of the circumstances, supported by the whole army.
If we can only get at the enemy at certain points, where we are sure that he has concentrated his whole force, we must endeavour to ascertain the number, situation, and nature of these points ; whether some of them may not have been neglected, and which of them have the weakest fire ; whether we may not be able to draw off his attention from some of them, by false attacks or otherwise ; or whether, by means of batteries well placed, we may not be able to silence his fire on the points of attack. Our dispositions must be made accordingly, and we must determine the number of attacks, and the time at which each is to be made ; the number of troops to be employed, with the order in which they are to attack, as well as the position of the troops which are to sustain each attack ; as also, what is to be done after a successful or unsuccessful attack, and how a false attack, which has made good progress, may he sustained.
The following dispositions are necessary in the at tack of an entrenched camp. In the first place, we must. examine the whole entrenchment, in order to find out its weak parts. These may have been occasioned by the fault of the enemy ; as, for example, when the flanks are not secured ; when, at some points, the works are not complete, of a weak profile, or are so construct ed, that we can approach them without being exposed to their fire; or the weakness may be occasioned by the nature of the ground. It is also necessary to as
certain the means which the enemy possesses within his entrenchments, to renew the contest, or to make a good retreat. In the second place, having sufficiently investigated these matters, we proceed to make our dispositions for the attack. These consist, I. In de termining the number of attacks, false and real, with the time at which they are to be made ; the number of the troops, their order, ST.c. as above. 2. The troops must be supplied with all things necessary for the ac complishment of their purpose, such as hurdles or las cines, if there are wolt-holes," or marshy places to be passed, or ditches to be filled up, and axes, when pal lisades, Ste. are to be attacked. 3. We must deter mine the signals, and the time of the several attacks. \Vith regard to the latter, we may observe, that night attacks have the following advantages : \Ve can the more easily surprise and alarm the enemy ; while we conceal our own dispositions, and have little or no thing to apprehend from his fire until we come up to the entrenchment. But this mode of attack has like wise great disadvantages : the columns may easily lose their way, and miss the time and place of attack ; we must dread the most dangerous kind of defence, by the enemy mounting the breast-work, and preventing us from climbing up. The troops cannot be kept together at night ; many remain behind ; and terror and disor der spread as easily among the assailants as among the defenders. In a night attack we lose the advantage which might be expected from a previous cannonade on the enemy's works ; and even if we should succeed in penetrating the works, it is probable that we may not be able to lollow up our advantage, and to render it de cisive. On account of these disadvantages, most at tacks on entrenchments arc made by day. In general, we would recommend the following rules as the safest with respect to the time of attack. A night attack should be made only when we expect to take the ene my by surprise ; or when he has bad, discouraged, or ill-disposed troops. It is always advisable, however, to march, and make our dispositions during the night, in order to commence the attack by day-light, unless we have reason to dread confusion and disorder. At all events, we should attack as soon after dawn as pos sible, in order that we may have time to follow up a victory.
Hitherto we have taken it for granted that the de fending party had made good dispositions. It is pos sible, however, that he may have committed errors, which must also be taken into the account. The troops may be ill posted or disposed upon the field of battle; the troops, or the different kinds of arms, may not be able to sustain each other ; the reserves may be ill placed, or at too great a distance ; a part of the line may form a projecting angle, perhaps not very well covered ; we may be able, by a rapid movement, to compel the enemy to change his order of battle ; or, he may be, as it were, nailed to his position, from the fear of losing some essential advantages by attempting to advance.