The methods of marching and fighting invented and carried into execution by the great Frederick, form an admirable study for all who would acquire a perfect knowledge of military dispositions. On examining the Prussian orders of march, at the battles of Kol lin, llossbaeln end Leuthen, (Plates CCCLXXXIV. CCCLXXXV. CCCLXXXVI. and CCCLXXXVII.) it will be seen that the armies moved in columns by a flank,* each line forming a column ; and that this or der of march was obtained by simply breaking the lines into open columns of companies. It will be equally easy to perceive with what facility these columns again formed in order of battle, by wheeling into line. The following are the advantages which this method offers for all kinds of marches and orders of battle. 1. By means of this order of march, the army can make all its movements without being disunited ; and, conse quently, it is not liable to have its right or left columns successively overpowered, since the whole is formed in two only, with no more distance between them than is usual between the first and second lines. 2. The enemy cannot penetrate between these columns, or cut them off. 3. By taking the direction which the line of battle is to occupy, the army, on arriving upon the ground, can be formed in a few minutes ; that is, in the time requir ed for all the divisions to wheel into the allignement. It is only necessary to cover this march with an advanced guard, which will answer the double purpose of protect ing the army, and of keeping the enemy in suspense re specting the real point of attack. 4. The army having no other distances to observe to form into two lines, than the two hundred or three hundred paces between the two columns, and that between platoons, there can be no difficulty in executing the manoeuvre with precision. 5. When the army intending to outflank the enemy has reached the proper point, by a concealed movement, and is in the necessary direction for that purpose, by suddenly forming into line, the enemy will neither have time to form a potence, nor to change front entirely ; and consequently, he will be overpowered on one of his extremities by a mass of forces which it will be impos sible for him to resist. This was mot e clearly proved at Leuthen than in any other battle. 6 If it be not ad visable to form the army into two columns, of the same length as the line of battle, they may be converted (if the ground will permit) into four, by doubling the lines, or by marching by wings, without, on that account, em barrassing the formation of the line. When the foul co lumns moving in the order of doubled lines, have arrived within a short distance Iron the point where they are to form, the even columns (second and fourth) will halt, and protect the further movement of the others, until their heads are disengaged ; when the first platoons will immediately fall in at a proper distance from the last of the leading columns; and thus they will be in position to wheel up, and form a contiguous line, (Plate CCCLXX XIII. Fig. 41.) If they are formed by wings, to draw up in two lines is executed by a simple change of direction, simultaneously made by the head and rear of each co lumn. The order of march at the battle of Leuthen ex plains this at first sight.
To the method above described, we may attribute the facility which Frederick displayed in manoeuvring upon the flanks of his enemy ; and the means of keeping his army in columns until the moment of attack, when they formed line in an instant. The s5'stent of keeping his army constantly united, of opposing a mass to isolated parts, a whole line to a single extremity of a line, could only be put in execution by means of the order above described, which united promptitude of formation, with connection and simplicity.
We have already observed, that in making an oblique attack upon one of the extremities of the enen”'s line, measures must be taken to make this attack practicable, by masking the preparatory movements ; otherwise it will be in the power of the hostile army to move in a cot responding direction with the columns intending to turn its flank, and to continue to present a front to them, or even to turn their own flanks. As, for example, when
two armies march in the directions CD, and AB, they will form an angle in the point E.
Whence it follows, that whichever first reaches the point E, will have gained the flank of the other, and will consequently turn it. Let AB be the army march ing by divisions, or otherwise, with a strong corps of cavalry at its head, to attack and gain the flank of CD with all possible speed : if CD be vigilant, there will be no difficulty in frustrating the manceavre, by reaching the point E before the enemy. For, having timely in formation, AB cannot anticipate his antagonist, because the distance from D to E is less than that from B to E ; consequently CD has the advantage, and AB may be considered as defeated, provided proper care is taken to profit by the circumstance, and the attack is made boldly. To be convinced of this, we need only examine how AB can oppose it. As soon as the cavalry CD has passed the point E, the army AB has no other resource than to 'form an angle or potence BF. This movement being executed in haste, will not be very orderly : while the cavalry in E, having already formed in line, will advance, and gain still more on the flank by continuing to incline to the left, while moving to the attack. Hence they will outflank, and make the onset before the enemy's horse in BF can be ready. Another inconvenience arises from the formation en fzotence. The army, hav ing previously marched with proper distances between the columns or lines, is thus suddenly thrown together by the lines forming to the rear, which may produce such confusion, that both the first and second line may be muted together before they can be disengaged.
\Vhile the cavalry CD is making the attack, the in fantry will have time to reach the point E ; and should they be only a few battalions, they must nevertheless ad vance, without waiting until others are come up. No thing would be so injurious as to lose time by irresolu tion, because it is evident that they can march forward without standing in need of being supported by the army ; for, supposing CD to have marched by divisions to the left, and the cavalry by superior speed to have gained, during the movement, six or eight hundred paces in advance, the infantry will arrive at E, about the time that the cavalry, after having made the shock, will be engaged in forming anew, and will thus be in readiness to protect it while busied in that operation ; after which they can march on both together against the enemy, who, finding his cavalry overthrown in the first charge, will be found endeavouring to form his right wing of infantry en fzotence, or with an angle thrown back; but as in this manoeuvre his disordered cavalry will obstruct him, he will order them to move off to the right. If at this moment the infantry CD advance, they will find the enemy still in the act of forming, and defeat him with ease. Admitting that these battalions have preceded the others by some hundred paces, they will soon be followed by the succeeding, who, having in their turn, reached the point, will advance in a kind of echelon of battalions, and thus come gradually, and in proper time, into ac tion ; and if the whole take the precaution to incline to wards the left, while advancing, the enemy, in a short time, will be so completely taken in flank and rear, as to make it impossible for him to take any effectual mea sures of resistance.* Besides, the angle at B offers an excellent mark for the artillery to enfilade and beat in reverse. In this manner a great army may be so com pressed by an inferior force, as to seem totally sur rounded.