To conclude the subject of flank attacks.
1. An army (B) may be placed out of the reach of the enemy's artillery, and consequently be ranged in a line parallel, and having one wing greatly reinforced without being oblique.
2. The line (D) may be greatly inclined, with its head towards the attack, and consequently be positively diago nal, without being reinforced.
3. It may be perpendicular (F), with a wing rein forced upon the flank of the enemy, without being dia gonal. Such was the disposition of the Prussians at Kunersdorf.
4. It may be horizontal (G) upon the heads of the enemy's columns, without being oblique.
There are several modifications of these different or ders ; as, for instance, of the third. The flank may be reinforced by an angle, of potence, perpendicular to the front, such as the Austrians adopted at Prague and Kollin.
The potence A, being perpendicular to the enemy's line C, reinforces the right wing of the line B, without being oblique. The same observation is applicable to an angle towards the rear.
It is probable, that the ancients, in general, prefem led the parallel order, reinforced on a wing, to the oblique order. Among the moderns, Turenne trriployed the former at the battle of Ensheim, and the latter at Sin sheim ; but these manoeuvres being executed by one division only, tvithout celerity, and in sight of the enemy, they had time to form a parallel line, and to reinforce the point attacked. The king of Prussia seems justly entitled to the honour of having first appreciated the advantages of such an order of battle as he displayed at Leuthen, because, until that moment, it had never been applied in a similar manner.
A parallel line, strongly reinforced on the most im portant point of attack, is unquestionably good, and co incides I‘ith the principle which we consider as the basis of all operations. It may therefore conduce to victory, but is nevertheless subjected to several inconveniences. The weak part of the line, being so near the enemy, may be drawn into action against the intentions of the com mander, and be defeated, and thus frustrate the advanta ges which might have been gained on the opposite flank. The reinforced part of the line may defeat its opponent; but it cannot, on that account, take the enemy's line in flank and rear, without making an extensive movement, which would cause a separation from the other divisions, if they happened to be engaged. But if those divisions were not engaged, and therefore enabled to follow the movements of the reinforced part of the line, still, as this mai.ceuvre would be circular, the enemy, by march ing on the chord of the arch, would oppose to it a direct and more rapid counter-movement, which would place the offensive on his side, and bring his mass of forces first on the principal point of attack. But the disposi
tion of the king of Prussia at Leuthen has quite a dif ferent effect ; not only is the extremity of the attacked wing overpowered by a whole line, but the flank of that wing is turned, and its rear taken in reverse ; and all this is performed without manoeuvre, or prolonging the diagonal direction, by simply marching the whole front from its oblique position straight forward. The divisions not destined to form the first attack cannot, from their distance, be engaged with a superior enemy. They incur no such risk, and yet they are in a situation to render successively their support to the wing which is en gaged.
Having thus attempted to explain the arrangements for battle, and the different modes of attack, we shall now proceed to consider what measures ought to be taken, after the termination of the battle, by the victorious, and by the defeated army. The army which has attacked and beaten its opponent should observe the following rules: 1. The light and other detached troops must instantly pursue the enemy, with the view of increasing his disorder ; the whole army follows more leisurely, and in good order. 2. As soon as we can perceive the direction of the enemy's retreat, we must determine what is to be done to increase his loss ; as, to cut off the retreat of a part of his force, or to place artillery in such a manner as to obstruct the retreat, and render it more confused and bloody, and prevent the enemy from rally ing. 3. All the posts which have been placed for the purpose of covering the retreat, must be instantly and vigorously attacked, in order to avail ourselves of the panic among the troops. 4. We pursue the enemy as long as day-light and the strength of the troops will permit, in order to push our victory to the utmost. For the maxim, that we ought to make a golden bridge for a flying enemy, is only to be put in practice when we can do no better. 5. As every battle is fought on account of some ulterior object, we should immediately proceed to the accomplishment of that object, as soon as we have made the necessary arrangements for the care of the wounded, &c. For every thing ought to be previously in readiness for the maintenance of the troops in their farther advance ; and we must be prepared to take ad vantage of all the errors which the enemy may commit in his retreat.