The difficulty of the subject renders it at least prudent to avail ourselves of all the aids which can be afforded by diversities in the structure of languages. These, indeed, are of themselves elegant subjects of study. No person who cultivates them can be indifferent about Universal Grammar, or insensible to the intimate connection which exists between the two pursuits. A very limited fact in philology not unfrequently suggests an important doctrine in the philosophy of grammar, which is afterwards con firmed by multiplied evidences, and, though formerly overlooked, exhibits, when known, a character of internal truth, and throws a broad light over the whole extent of the subject.
In no circumstance does the difficulty of this subject ap pear more conspicuous than in the diversity of sentiment which prevails on it. This diversity is indeed capable of being represented as chiefly, if not entirely, verbal. But, where verbal differences are pertinaciously adhered to, some misconceptions with regard to the subject itself are undoubtedly more or less prevalent. It cannot be said to be clearly understood among all who cultivate it, unless they either agree in the choice of the words by which their theories are expressed, or concur in acknowledging their differences of phraseology to be immaterial.
This is not at present the case. The cultivators of the science are divided into parties, which seem so distant from one another, that the philosophical analysis of language may be considered as still in its infancy. The account which we shall now give of it will not arrogate to itself the rank of a system matured for indiscriminate adoption. It will only be offered for deliberate consideration, as an attempt to advance the progress of this interesting branch of study, by exhibiting explanations which will show to partial sys terns several of their leading defects, and reconcile a variety of disputes without compromising the spirit of investigation On the Object or Universal Office of Language.
In order to investigate the characteristic differences by which words are distinguished, it is essential that we en tertain correct ideas of the OBJECT or PURPOSE of language. Grammarians have hitherto satisfied themselves, with de scribing it as consisting in the COMMUNICATION OF OUR THOUGHTS. Yet it does not appear certain that they have always entertained the same views of what is meant by this communication. Vague notions of the office of language have in consequence been entertained, and a confusion aris ing from this cause has impeded the inquiries which were made into the origin and distinctions of the various parts of speech. Mr Harris describes it as consisting in " an
exhibition of the energies or motions of the soul." These he divides into perception and volition ; and he considers every sentence as either " a sentence of assertion," or " a sentence of volition." Some consider the object of lan guage as simply consisting in the exhibition of a connec tion betwixt one idea and another, and therefore make the act of AFFIRMATION its universal office. These opinions, though slightly varying, agree in stating the communica tion of our thoughts to be the object of language.
That we may divest the subject of ambiguity, we shall enquire in what respects thought is ever communicated by language ; what are the circumstances that lead to such communication ; and AvIlether or not the importance of this object entitles it to be regarded as the sole and definite purpose for which it is formed and employed.
Men may evince, by various signs, that particular thoughts occupy their minds This is not only done by pantomimical language, hut by oral sounds constituting the materials of verbal discourse. \Ve sometimes shew by involuntary exclamations that we are affected by cer tain impressions called passions, which, though they ori ginate from outward causes, do not necessarily point to such causes in our mode of expressing them. At other times, words are employed as the signs of external objects which are known to the person addressed. The effect of the employment of these is to recal to his recollection ideas formerly possessed by him. \Ve show, at the same time, that they occupy our own minds. The meaning of the words being formerly known, they exhibit nothing new, except their connection with some present occasion. Old ideas thus recalled, however, do not constitute exactly the same state of thought which accompanied the former em ployment of the words. The mental exercises excited by the same word at different times are not strictly the same. They cannot be identical, because they are separate in stances of mental exercise. But they are not even per fectly similar. Amidst the varying movements of the hu man mind, in which one thought impels another, and in which external and internal causes modify the state of the percipient being, the appropriate affection produced by any particular word can never he separately obtained. It is always modified, either by humour, by degrees of activity in the mind, or by the kinds of exercise in which it has been previously engaged.