It might also be said, that in this use of language we closely imitate the sentences in which our own ideas are bona fide communicated, and that our success in falsehood depends on the closeness of this imitation. This fact only shows that dissimulation does not affect language in its structure. But its object must imply the real motives of the speaker. This account of it, therefore, must be defi cient. If we can form a general theory on the subject which will embrace these as well as all other occasions on which it is used, a material advantage will undoubtedly be obtained.
The existence of false sentences is not our only reason for declining to regard the communication of thought, at least that communication which consists in assertion, as the universal office of language. We shall find that Im perative sentences cannot, without great awkwardness, he reduced to affirmations or communications of our know ledge. But, reserving that argument for the next Chap ter, we shall now endeavour to unfold, in a more detailed manner, some of the intricacies in which this part of the subject is involved.
Different.circumstances concur to impress the philoso phical inquirer with an idea, that the communication of our thoughts is the object of language. One, at which we have already hinted, is, that this communication is the ob ject of a great part of language, perhaps by far the great est. This is most especially the case in polished and lite rary communities. It is the object of the greater part of the language of men of philosophical habits, the only per sons who concern themselves with analytical inquiries on the subject ; and it recommends itself as exhibiting the most important species of influence which language has exerted on society.
There are also some particulars in which all human speech agrees with the office of communicating thought, and which have led to an acquiescence in that account of its general object. One is, that the use of it always pro ceeds from some thoughts existing in the mind. Another is, that language consists of the signs of thought. A third, that the thoughts corresponding to these signs are con templated by the individual using them. And the last is,
that language terminates in exciting thoughts in the per son addressed. But, though these points of coincidence are real, a closer attention will, we think, convince our readers, that they do not of themselves constitute a com munication of our thoughts.
The mere circumstance that the employment of Ian guage is in every instance the effect of previous thought is by no means peculiar to this department of human exer tion. All our voluntary actions arc as much the effect of our mental operations as the uttering or the writing of sen tences. In the use of language, as in other exertions, we indeed execute our own designs ; but the enquiry is still equally open as before, what is our specific design in using language ? The second circumstance essential to language, which has perhaps tended to confirm the notion that its specific object is to communicate our thoughts, is, that the signs of human thought form the materials of which language consists. Such signs arc always the media employed when we communicate our thoughts to one another. Yet it may be inquired, whether they admit of being also applied to other uses, and whether the object of language is, on that account, still more general ? The third circumstance of which we took notice, that the thoughts of which our words are the signs are enter tained by the individual using them, is little more than a condensation of the two former, and requires no separate observation.
The truth will evolve itself in the clearest light when we discuss the last particular in which language has one common character with the communication of thought, that it produces appropriate thoughts in the mind of the person addressed. This is always the intention of the speaker, and if it is used by him in a skilful manner, the production of such thoughts is the consequence. This object is much more general than the communication of our own thoughts ; but it is not too general to be stated as the real object of language. The conveyance of our sen timents, volitions, and opinions, is only an important part of it. The definite object of language consists in TILE PRO