The most important modifications of the mental effects of words arise from their connection with one another. By changes in this connection, new conjunctions of ideas are presented to the mind of the person addressed. The signs of thoughts formerly known to him are so exhibited as to excite impressions possessing the most striking novelty, and imparting the most important character, both to the immediate thoughts of the individual, and to those which are liable to occur on numerous future occasions. This is the case when, by means of words well understood, and therefore conveying in their separate state no idea that is new, we communicate information to one another, and ex ercise an influence on human opinions. On this office of language depends the whole benefit which mankind derive from the records of literature and science.
Engrossed by this most dignified application of language, authors have been induced to consider it as consisting en tirely in assertion ; that is, in expressing the connection of one idea with another, and conveying by these means new information. But, it may be called in question how far this account is strictly applicable to all language, or may be trusted for our guidance in tracing the steps of its ear liest history.
It has been hastily assumed, that language arises from an original and universal inclination to impart our thoughts gratuitously to one another. From this cause it has some times been erroneously concluded, that it is nothing else than a faithful transcript of the successions of human thought. This, however, is not its character. A man does not speak simply because he thinks. It is not a necessa ry result of the possession of a thinking faculty, nor does the inclination to speak regularly accompany its opera tions. It is the effect of a range of thoughts, which must be considered as limited when compared to the whole phe nomena of mind. Speech, like every other voluntary act of man, is founded on the presence of particular motives. It originates in his social nature taking advantage of his social state ; and it depends on the knowledge which each has of various links of connection existing betwixt him self and other thinking beings.
It is not natural to man to communicate all his thoughts. Supposing, therefore, that a complete analysis of the ori gin of thought were in our possession, this would not ne cessarily bring along with it a perfect theory of the origin and character of language; nor would the most perfect history of the formation of language lead us in the oppo site direction to a perfect analysis of the nature of thought.
But, allowing that we do not by means of language com municate all our thoughts, that we make a selection among them suited to our several occasions, it might still be con tended that we do nothing else by means of language than communicate our thoughts; that this is its universal of fice ; and that this position might be assumed as funda mental in entering on the subject of universal Grammar.
Some considerations will, we conceive, warrant us in he sitating before we concede even this point. We shall not stop to enquire if there is any acceptation in which this theory is true; but it is certainly susceptible of a meaning which is erroneous, and which has tended in some cases to distort philological enquiry. On the supposition now mentioned, language would still be considered as properly an exhibition of human thought.* The first observation which we have to make on this account of the subject is, that, if it were correct, language ought always to have a definite reference to our sentiments, and ought in fact to express them with fidelity. But we find that, when we desire a person to perform any act, our motives for it are kept out of view, and are not intended to be contemplated by the individual spoken to. The mo tives which are expected to operate on him are ideas of a different sort which we endeavour to excite. Even in the use of the plainest affirmations, we do not necessarily ex hibit our own thoughts. We may excite thoughts com pletely the reverse of them. This is always the case when we procure reception to a false proposition. The thought conveyed by our words has indeed been revolved in the mind as a contrivance for operating on another. In that other, however, we mean to produce a particular belief. This is certainly a thought ; yet it is not the belief, conse quently not the thought, which, in so Far as truto is con cerned, we ourselves entertain.
It might indeed be replied, that this employment of lan guage is unnatural ; that it is as much a deviation from its original purpose, in the right use of our faculties, as any act of drivelling folly committed by means of language, which ought not to be regarded as entering into its origi nal character. But it is to he remembered that this use or language, though disingenuous, is still characteristic of intellect and address.