From 1815 to 1848 all Austria's maritime provinces retained their Italian character. Even the Imperial navy was predominantly Italian, being in fact known as the Imperial Royal Veneta Marina. After 1848 it was re organized on German lines. Even after the first revolutionary war the northeastern littoral of the Adriatic remainedprevalently Italian, and Italian was the official language at Trieste as at Venice, at Cattaro as at Milan. The Slav population was primitive and ignorant; their only traces of culture were due to Italian influences. With the war of 1859 Austria lost Lombardy and, although after the creation of the Italian kingdom in 1861 she lost all author ity over the western shore of the Adriatic south of the Po and ceased to be the only naval power in that sea, Austria still predominated.
In 1866 Italy missed a priceless of completing her unity and, incidentally, of settling the vexed Adriatic question once for all in her own favor. But her generals failed to follow up their initial successes; Custozza, which could have been a decisive victory, be came a partial defeat, and the incompetence of Admiral Persano brought about the naval disaster at Lissa, although the Italians had all the elements of success. After the Prussian victory of Sadowa, Venice was surrendered to Italy and after the fall of Napoleon III the Papal States were incorporated in the Italian kingdom. But the heartily reciprocated hatred of Austria survived in Italy. History, as taught in Italian schools, fostered undying hatred of the Tedeschi ((Germans"), as the Austrians are popularly called; old men trans mitted to their families the legacy of rancor born of bitter memories against the former oppressors of Lombardy and Venetia; and the Irredentists strove to keep the question of Trent and Trieste steadily before their com patriots. Nevertheless, for a whole generation the Triple Alliance held together like a self denying ordinance between three mortal enemies who have decided to grip each other as tightly as they can, lest if any one of them be given elbow-room he should fly at the others' throats. The personal regard for Germany existing at one time on the Italian side developed into coolness on the growth of German peaceful penetration" into the peninsula. German capi tal financed banks with Italian names; German commercial travelers commanding the Italian language flooded the country; German-owned hotels received streams of German tourists; whole sections of the Italian map became Ger man and Austrian colonies, while German pro fessors flooded Italian seats of learning and spread the doctrines of German Kultur. Mean while, German diplomacy and France's colonial expansion in northern Africa aroused Italian sentiment against France with the result that from 1::: commercial relations between France and Italy were interrupted for 11 years. Even the fall of Crispi in 1896 brought no improvement in the strained relations. With the advent to Rome in 1898 of a brilliant French Ambassador, M. Barrere, the political horizon began to clear. In 1899 commercial relations were renewed and in 1904, much to the disgust of Germany and Austria, President Loubet visited Rome, where he was enthusiasti cally received. Regardless of the Alliance, Austrian officialdom specially exerted itself to irritate and oppress the (unredeemed" Italians under the Dual Monarchy. It had suited Bis marck to foster Italian jealousy of French and British sea power and, notwithstanding Italy's insistent request, he refused to extend the Alliance to the Mediterranean, a fatal error of which Germany was to reap the consequences later. In joining her two partners Italy had
assumed merely continental responsibilities: there was nothing in the Alliance that offered her any guarantee as to the inviolability of her coast line, which could only be threatened by France or England — or both. Italy began by arranging a complementary Mediterranean agreement with France. When England and France concluded the Entente Cordiale in 1904, the Mediterranean clauses of their arrange ment were integrally bound up with the Anglo Italian and Franco-Italian understandings with regard to the same waters. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 by Austria still further widened the breach between Vienna and Rome. In 1909 the late Tsar and the king of Italy met at Racconigi accompanied by their ministers and laid the foundations of a friendly understanding based upon their common hostil ity to the realization of German and Austro Hungarian interests in the Balkans. A direct consequence of this step was the Balkan League's attack on Turkey in 1912. Italy had shaken off her leading strings and ceased to be the Cinderella of the Triple Alliance; those strings were snapped when Italy made war on in 1911 and seized Tripoli. During the Tripolitan War the Austrian newspapers loaded Italy with abuse and Vienna placed every obstacle in her path, forbidding her to attack the Dardanelles, Preveza, San Giovanni di Medna, Salonica and Kavalla, and to seize the then Turkish islands of Chios and Mytelene. Thus the Italian and the Balkan League vic tories over the Turk caused! deep disappoint ment to both Germany and Austria. Germany had undoubtedly reaped the least benefit from the Alliance during the 10 years preceding the European War. The Kaiser had done' his best to keep his two partners together and in the position of subordinates, but both had' kicked over the traces —Aehrenthal in 1908 and Giolitti in 1911. Irredentist sentiment in Italy grew stronger and threatened to burst into flames. To prevent an immediate rupture between her two allies Germany urged the in stant renewal of the Alliance long before the fixed date on any possible terms whatever. German inspired newspapers hinted in 1912 that Italy would act wisely in confiding the direction of her Mediterranean interests to the Triple Alliance, advice which Italy naturally ignored; it was too late. In the hands of the late Marquis di San Giuliano the foreign policy of Italy was played to the advantage of Austria. Despite the warnings of non-official Italians and British friends of Italy the Marquis op posed Serbian aspirations to an Adriatic port and supported Austria in setting up a fictitious Albanian kingdom. By her course of action, Italy antagonized all the Balkan allies including Greece and upheld the interests of Austria. Already in 1913 Austria had sounded Italy with a proposed attack on Serbia, which plan was instantly rejected; the assassination of the archduke and his wife in the following year gave Austria her opportunity. This time Italy was not consulted. It did not leak out till 14 months later that the German Ambassa dor in Constantinople had informed his Italian colleague there on 15 July 1914 (eight days before the presentation of the Austrian ultima ium at Belgrade) that the Austrian note would be so worded as to render war inevitable. For some unexplained reason the Italian Am bassador (Signor Garroni) kept this piece of information for a year before communicating it to his government.