During the progress of •these complicated negotiations the statesmen and diplomats of the Allied powers had not been idle in courting Italy. Of all the then neutral powers the action of Italy was most vital to the struggle, for she occupied a strategic position on the flank of both combatants. Her intervention on behalf of Germany and Austria would menace the French right-wing; and if she joined the Allies she would menace the Austrian left, while her fleet would establish a crushing superiority against Austria in the Mediterranean.• From the Italian point of view, the decision was necessarily dictated by the interests of Italy, and those interests were becoming clearly de fined. When the war broke out Italy's inter, ests were, on the whole, opposed to those of Germany and Austria; her relations with France and Great Britain were cordial and the sympathies of her people lay overwhelmingly with the Entente Allies. As already pointed out, uncompromising neutrality might leave Italy, at the end of the war, whichever side gained the victory, as the friend of neither the conquerors nor the vanquished, and with the realization of her national ambitions indefinitely postponed. It was not improbable that the pre dominant factor which guided the final decision of Italy was the question of whether she would be able to hold such territories (if ceded by Austria) in the event of a German victory. Perhaps the terms laid down were so framed as to invite rejection, following a precedent set by Austria in the Serbian' ultimatum. Ten days after their rejection by Baron Burian a secret agreement was concluded in London on 26 April 1915 between Italy, France, Great Britain and Russia. The terms of that treaty were first published to the world on 28 Nov. 1917 in Petrograd, by order of Leon Trotzky, the Bolshevist Foreign Minister of Russia. (See Lorrnms, TREATY OF, 1915). On 3 May 1915 Baron Sonnino sent to Vienna a formal de nunciation of the Italo-Austrian Alliance. Pub lic opinion in Italy had meanwhile become loudly clamorous for intervention. The fate of Belgium and Serbia had created a deep im pression and the news of the sinking of the Lusitania raised popular feeling to fever-point. Gabriele D'Annunzio (q.v.) and the grandsons of Garibaldi appealed to vast, enthusiastic audi ences. The Central Powers made one more attempt to save the situation. Baron Burian hastily offered further concessions as the basis for a new treaty. A political crisis then broke out. The neutralist ex-premier, Giolitti, who had fled from Rome a few months before, now reappeared. His followers agitated for accept ance of the Austro-Gennan terms. It seemed possible that he ;night return to power with an anti-war policy. Signor Salandra's resignation on 13 May, a week the meeting of Par liament, suddenly brought matters to a crisis and revealed the temper of the country. On the 16th it was announced amid great popular rejoicing, that the king had refused to accept the resignation of Salandra. Giolitti left Rome without facing Parliament and on the 20th the government secured overwhelming majorities in both chambers giving it extraordinary powep in the event of war. The Austrian execution of Cesare Battisti (q.v.) sent a thrill of horror through the country; the fiery eloquence of D'Annunzio, supplied the last spark for the con flagration. He gave voice to the indignant re volt against impotence and dependence when he exclaimed: "We will no longer,be a museum of antiquities, a kind of hostelry, a pleasure-resort under a sky painted over with Prussian blue for the benefit of international honeymoonersl" The Italian people called for war, not so much against the traditional foe of Italy as against the power which threatened the civilization of the 'world. On 22 May a general mobilization
was ordered and on the 23d Italy entered the war by a formal declaration of hostilities against Austria. Baron Sonnino's skilful diplomacy had put Italy technically in the right; she went to war on grounds fully justified by 'the public sentiment of Europe. So far from "coming in on the winning side," Italy joined the Allies at a moment when their prospects looked black. Mackerisen's phalanx was driving the Russians in Galicia and the British had suffered severely at Ypres. The first Dardanelles campaign had failed. In the spirit of Garibaldi and his Thousand, Italy entered'upon her latest war of liberation with a popular enthusiasm which had very little care for material rewards. ' Bibliography.—(Anierican Year Book 1915' (p. 95 et seq.) ; 'La Politica Estera Italiana, 1875-1916) (Bitonto 1916) • Anonymous, 'L'Adriatico) (Milan 1914); Bainville, J., 'La guerre et l'Italie) (Paris 1916) ; Billot, A. (former French Ambassador to Italy), 'La France et l'Italie: Histoiee des annees troublees 1881-1899' (Paris 1905) • Carnovale, L., 'Why Italy Entered the Great War; Perche ('Italia 6 entrata nclla grande guerra' (English and Italian; Chicago 1917); Cassi, G., 'IT Mare Adriatico': sue funzioni attraverse i tempi) (Milan 1915) ; Chlumecky. L. von, ''Oester reich-Ungarn and Italien' (Leipzig and Vienna 1907); Current Mstory (Vol. III, pp. 490-497, New York 1915); 'Diplomatische Akten stiicke Betreffend die Ereignisse am Balkan 13' Aug. 1912 bis 6 Nov. 1913' (Vienna 1914); 'Diplomatische Aktenstficke Betreffend die I3enehungen Oesterreich-Ungarns zu Italien in der Zeit von 20 Juli 1914 bis 23 Mai 1915' (Mem l'")15) • (llocurocriti diplomatici pre sentati al Parlamento Italiano dal Ministro degli \ ffari Esteri, Sonnino' (Italian uGreen Book,)" Rome 1913) ; Cocks, F. Seymour, 'The Secret Treaties and Understandings) (London '1918) ; Coolidge, A. C., 'Origins Of the Triple Alliance' (New York 1917) ; Dudan, A., 'La MOnarchia degli Absburghi) (Rome 1914); Fullerton, W. M., 'Problems of (Lon don 1914); Gayda, V., 'I-Italia d'oltre confine' ,(Turin 1914) ; Hall, 'Modern Europe, 1815 '1915) (New York 1917) ; Holt, L. H., and Chil ton, A. W., 'The History of Europe from 1862 to 1914' , '(New York 1918) ; 'Italy and the Adriatic' (Quarterly Review, October 1915); Miller, W., The Foreign Policy of Italy' (lb. April 1917) Parker, Sir G. 'The World in the Crucible' (New York 1915) ; 'Ponsonby, Arthur, 'War and Treaties, 1815-1914' (Lon don 1918) ; Re-Bartlett, Lucy,. 'International ism: Essays on Anglo-Italian Relationships' (London 1916) ; Seymour, C., Diplomatic 13ackground' of the War' (Yale 1916) • Steed, H. W., 'The' Hapsburg Monarchy' (London 1914) ; Tittoni, T., (Italian Foreign Minister), 'Sei A,nni di Politica 8stera 1903-09' Antologia, Rome 1912; Eng. trans. by Baron G di San Severino, London 1914); Underwood, F. M., (United Italy) (London 1912); Usher, R. G., (New York 1914); Vil lari, L., 'The' Republic of Ragusa) (London 1904) •, Zacher, A.., '(ItaIien von Heute) (Heidel berg 1911). HENRI F. KLEIN, Editorial Staff of The Americana.