Whether with or without the connivance of Germany, Austria meant to make war on Ser bia. Italy proclaimed with no uncertain voice that this was an act of aggression and that the purely defensive stipulations of her alliance re lieved her of any obligation to stand on the side of Austria. That Italy should not enter as an ally of the Central powers into a war as to the origin of which she was not con sulted, and in which the successes of her allies would have been fatal to her own ambi tion, was obvious. She stood aloof, mistress of her own actions; and then came the great temptation — the offer to Italy of the Trentino by Austria as a gift in return for neutrality. But the Italian people saw that to accept the gift would be to mortgage the whole future of Italy; to Austria it would have been blackmail extorted in the hour of danger; to Germany, who could lose nothing by the transaction, it would have been a gift thrown to a poor relation. But there were other elements• at work besides the considerations of mere mate rial interests. Italy stood divided between three opinions: there were those who favored the Triple Alliance and believed in a German victory; there were the °neutraliste'i and the Irredentists, who demanded war against. Aus tria. The entry of Great Britain gave the Triplicists pause; there was the British navy and a great, exposed Italian coast-line; neu trality presented a different but equally un pleasant problem: a German victory would make Italy a German satellite for all time, while on the other hand an Allied victory with Italy indifferently standing aside, would only leave her out in the cold if ever °alter ations to the • map of Europe" should take place, Furthermore, the Irredentist policy of active participation on the side of the Entente was unpracticable at the time; Italy was pared and had not recovered from the burden of the Turkish War. An immediate declara tion of war against Germany was difficult for many reasons, of which not the least was the appearance of bad faith. Thus Italy declared her neutrality, though it was no secret to which side her political and sentimental inclinations leaned. In 1902 Italy had assured France that her alliance with Austria and Germany was not directed against the Republic; in the terms of her alliance Italy had stipulated that she should never be called to fight against Eng land; in the summer of 1914, even before the European crisis assumed dangerous propor tions, Italy had whispered a friendly warning to England to be on her guard; and in the dark days preceding the first battle of the Marne, a generous assurance from Italy en abled France to remove some 500,000 troops from the Italian frontier and throw them across the path of the invader. • The two last-men tioned services rendered by Italy to the Allied cause should not be forgotten; they were of incalculable value to the Entente. However, the immediate occasion for hostile action against Austria and Germany was still wanting. Sig nor Salandra had been Premier since March 1914; in opposition stood Signor Gioiitti, four times Premier and the most powerful political influence in Italy. He desired certain gains for his country, but preferred bargaining to war and urged acceptance of the Austrian offers. The majority in the Italian Par harneat was neutralist; the aristocracy largely pro-German. It was among the masses of people, however, that different counsels pre vailed. So early as 26 July 1914 M. Barrere wired to his government, °I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business?' It was not long before German and Austrian methods of warfare aroused intense indignation in Italy. Many Italians joined the French and British armies; thousands of Italians who were Austrian subjects by birth flocked over the bor ders into Italy and offered themselves to fight against Austria. Added to mingled enthusiasm and indignation, the concrete grievance of an Italian "Alsace-Lorraine° existing in the shape i of Italia Irredenta could only intensify the martial spirit that spread over Italy during the nine months of neutrality. popular sentiment, free from the responsibility of statesmanship, not neutral.
The full records of the early diplomatic negotiations between Austria and Italy have not been made public. The Austrian 'Red Book' and the Italian 'Green Book' published, for the first time the text of articles III, IV and VII of the Triple Alliance, hitherto kept secret. Though containing an invaluable reve lation of long standing friction between the tyro states, the books cover only one month of diplomatic history, from 25 July to 25 Aug. 1914. From an official statement issued in Washington by the Italian Ambassador on 25 May 1915, we learn that early in July 1914 the Italian government, °preoccupied by the pre vailing feeling in Vienna, caused to be laid before the Austro-Hungarian government a number of suggestions advising moderation, and warning it of the impending danger of a European •outbreak The course adopted by Austria-Hungary against Serbia constituted, moreover, a direct encroachment upon the gen eral interests of Italy, both political and eco nomical, in the Balkan Peninsula. Austria Hungary could not for a moment imagine that Italy could remain indifferent while Serbian independence was being trodden upon. . . . Therefore when Austria-Hungary [after re peated warnings from Italy] ignored the usual practices and menaced Serbia by sending her an ultimatum without in any way notifying the Italian government of what she proposed to do . . . she not only severed her alliance with Italy but committed an act inimical to Italy's interests." The statement declares that °Con versations were initiated immediately after July 23 [the date of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia] for the purpose of giving a new lease of life to the treaty which Italy alleged had been violated and thereby annulled by the act of Austria-Hungary. This object could be
attained only by the conclusion of new agree ments. The conversations were renewed, with additional propositions as the basis, in Decem ber The final correspondence published in the 'Red Book' leaves the impression of an approaching agreement between San Giuliano and Count Berchtold. On 16 October 1914 San Giuliano died and was succeeded in the Foreign Office by Baron Sonnino. A long and intri cate diplomatic duel now began between Italy and Austria, Germany intervening. Early in December 1914 Baron Sonnino took his stand upon the terms of the Triple Alliance, espe cially Article VII, according to which Italy and Austria-Hungary were pledged to *give reciprocally all information calculated to en lighten each other concerning their own inten tions and those of other powers,* and that if either of the two parties *should be obliged to change the status quo' in the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the iEgean seas, such change *would only take place after previous arrangement between the two powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire* as a result of such change. By this clause Austria was bound not to occupy any Balkan territory without a pre vious agreement with Italy nor without ade quately compensating her. Austria having in vaded Serbia and thereby disturbed the whole political gravity of the Balkans, compensation was due to Italy. In reply to Count Berchtold's contention that Italy could have no grievance, because the Austrian occupation of Serbia was only *momentary,* Baron Sonnino reminded him that in April 1912 Austria had protested against the Italian bombardment of the Dardanelles and had prohibited even the use of searchlights against the Turkish coast, on the ground that such acts were an infringement of Article VII. Furthermore, Austria had also threatened that oif the Italian government desired to regain its liberty of action the Austro-Hungarian gov ernment would do the same.* At this point the diplomatic honors lay with Baron Sonnino, who maintained that Italy was entitled to apply the same tegulations to Austria at war as that country had applied to Italy when at war. On 20 Dec. 1914 Count Berchtold accepted the principle of Baron Sonnino's stipulations. Prince Billow, former German Chancellor, was sent to Rome to keep Italy neutral by vicarious offers at the expense of Austria. The Austrian diplomats were playing for time, but Baron Sonnino pinned them down to the question, *What compensation are you prepared to offer for a breach of the Triple Alliance, which you are compelled to admit?* The appointment of Baron Burian (q.v.) as Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister in place of Count Berchtold introduced a counteracting factor. Baron •Burian was willing to offer compensations from other people's territory and suggested that Italy should look for her compensation after the war in Albania. The suggestion was rejected by Italy. Germany pressed Austria to surrender the Trentino and Prince Billow urged Italy not to demand Trieste. Italy was meanwhile put ting her army on a war basis and laying up mili tary stores. Rome became the centre of politi cal gravity for all the principal belligerents, out bidding each other for the support of Italy. On 12 Feb. 1915 Baron Sonnino withdrew his original proposals for the cession to Italy of at least the unredeemed territories of the Trentino and the port of Trieste, and addressed a warning to Austria that any new military action undertaken in the Balkans against either Serbia or Montenegro, without previous agree ment with Italy, would be considered an in fringement of Article VII of the Alliance and would lead to grave consequences. The result of this step was to secure a temporary'immunity from attack for Serbia at a time when there were credible rumors of a fresh invasion with German assistance. Negotiations began afresh in March 1915 with an offer by Baron Burian, now converted, by German pressure, to the principle that compensation must be made from Austrian territory. Baron Sonnino insisted on immediate negotiations without German inter vention. Burian's offer of *territories in South Tyrol, including the city of Trent," coupled with suggestions for a counter-payment by Italy, was rejected as too and meagre. On 20 March Prince Billow informed Baron Sonnino that Germany would guarantee the exe cution of any agreement arrived at between Vienna and Rome. As Italy had insisted that the transference of any territories agreed upon must be made at once, the German offer of guarantees touched the heart of the contro versy and led Baron Sonnino to ask what use the guarantee would be in case the Central Powers were defeated. On 8 April the Italian demands were definitely. formulated, demanding the cession of the Trentino with the setting up of the boundaries fixed for the kingdom of Italy in 1811, and a new eastern frontier, to include .Gradisca and Gorizia; the formation of Trieste and its neighborhood into an autono mous state completely independent of Austria; the cession of the Curzolari Islands off the coast of Dalmatia; the immediate evacuation by Austria-‘Hungary of Trieste; the recognition of Italian sovereignty over Vallona and dis trict, and the renunciation by Austria-Hungary of any claims in Albania. In return for these concessions, Italy would pay 200,000,000 lire ($40,000,000) as indemnification for loss of gov ernment property, would pledge herself to maintain neutrality throughout the war toward both Austria and Germany, and would re nounce, for the duration of the war any further claim under Article VII of the Triple Alliance. These proposals were declined by Vienna on 16 April 1915.