From the point of view of most recent mili tary strategy, America's greatest contribution to the successful outcome of the European War was the hotly-contested battle of the Meuse, which resulted in cutting the main artery of the German supply system. Lip to the middle of September 1918 the Germans were able to operate unmolested the Sedan-Mezieres rail way running parallel to the front and furnish ing a base of supply for the whole line from much that might be of great utility in planning military operations, but it enables officers to gain personal experience of peoples and their customs, which might be invaluable to them and to their country, in the event of war. Special reconnaissances are made with refer ence to the actual military situation at the time, and a report of them is usually made at once, frequently upon the spot. They are known as topographical and armed reconnaissances, the latter being usually termed a patrol, scout, or secret reconnaissance. A reconnaissance in force is generally made just before a battle, for the purpose of forcing the enemy to develop his strength and dispositions.
The addition of infantry gives to recon noitering parties a strength and power of re sistance which cavalry can never attain by it self. The employment of artillery tends toward a similar end and the especial mobility of horse artillery renders it most appropriate for such service. Artillery is nevertheless seldom added to an ordinary reconnoitering party, its use being generally confined to a reconnaissance in force, or a special reconnaissance. But, although guns are not much employed upon this kind of duty, there may still be occasions where artil lery would prove a useful addition to the other Valenciennes to Metz. To cut this supply line at both ends and force withdrawal or capture on this entire front the British attacked in the north. The first few days of fighting yielded considerable gains. Fully conscious of the gravity of the situation, the enemy threw in division after division of fresh troops, and during the ensuing weeks occurred the bitterest fighting in which American troops took part. The second week of October practically all available units — about 28 divisions — were in the line. Progress could be made only a few yards at a time, but the continued hammering finally wore out the resistance of the enemy forces and the American troops broke through. Day after day steady gains were made up the west bank of the Meuse, until, on 7 November, the United States forces entered the outskirts of Sedan and definitely cut the German supply line. A day later the French forces came up on the left flank. The meeting of French and American troops on this historic spot signal ized the defeat of the German arms, a defeat as decisive and humiliating as that forced upon France 47 years before at the same spot. If
there had been questions before as to the ac ceptance of the armistice terms, the allied ad vance culminating in this meeting at Sedan left no choke in the matter. In the final paign of the war American troops thus played a part in a triumph which was beyond all praise.
The actual success of operations in war must primarily rest on the action of small bod ies; good previous strategical movements, a correct formation of the order of battle, a proper selection of the points to be attacked, will make the success when obtained of far greater importance; but the actual success must ultimately depend on the correct handling of small bodies of men. This is one of the fea tures of modern fighting and one which must be carefully considered. A battle under exist ing circumstances is a series of small battles or fights in which bodies of troops, perhaps not greater than a brigade, are engaged, and each of these bodies must be tactically com plete, must work for one object, and seek to carry one point. It has been said that for the future no direct attack can possibly be made on troops occupying a position and that at tacks must be made on the flanks: but recent experience shows that attacks on the flanks, unless supported by a strong front attack, can always be met and defeat. The strategy of the recent European War was largely influ enced by the enormous frontages successfully held. Relying on the defensive power of mod ern weapons, great extensions of lines were made for the purpose of resting flanks on se cure obstacles. When a line is persistently and sufficiently battered, a retirement becomes nec essary. This is depressing to the morale of the troops and even in a voluntary retirement the losses in men and materiel are unduly large. Therefore, a retirement should be avoided when possible and should be accom panied by a contraction of the front, either closing in on the centre leaving two exposed flanks, or to one side leaving one exposed flank. It would appear that whatever advantage ac crues from shortening the front would accrue equally to both sides. The advantage of a short front lies in the fact that it takes a greater preponderance of force to break a front strongly held than one weakly held. Further, the oppor tunity for manoeuvre is restricted by a narrow front. Wellington's withdrawal to the lines of Torres Vedras is a classical example of shortening front by retirement. The European War furnished one example of the successful shortening of a line in the Allied withdrawal to the Salonika position.