Numerous wars have demonstrated the strategical principles of concentration of ef fort, importance of initiative, value of sur prise and necessity for unrelenting pressure on a beaten enemy, and they have been demon strated again in the European War. But op erations of detached forces against the enemy's communications, of which there are many ex amples in former wars, seldom occurred in the late war. Such operations depend on rapid and resolute execution and close co-operation between the divided forces. Operations against communications are hardly practicable under modern war conditions with the huge forces and continuous fronts involved. General Maude used this method against the Turks at Kut el Amara, but it was not used in the great the atres in Europe.
The attack at Gallipoli can hardly be classed as an operation against communications, al though undertaken partly with the object of cutting off the Turks from their German allies. The operations demonstrated the futility of employing inadequate forces, for the French and British gained no advantage from this em ployment of a dozen divisions assisted by naval forces. The operations of the German sub marines were aimed at the British sea com munications. The Allies could not get at the German fleet because of mine fields and coast defenses and the submarines caused the em ployment of considerable naval forces against them. It is thus advantageous to menace the enemy's communications.
The European War may be termed a war of positions. The French and German armies, after marching toward one another, came into collision. The French army, led away by war like enthusiasm, threw itself without protection against the cannon, the machine guns and the trenches of the German army; and left thou sands of dead on the first battlefields. It re treated. At the Marne it offered a superb resistance, once more sacrificing thousands of lives. Then the German army retreated in its turn, but established itself solidly on the Aisne, protected by previously prepared trenches. The French army dug in opposite. Each adversary, finding himself unable to dislodge the other by direct assault, tried to outflank him. Thereupon began the famous "race to the sea'; the two armies stretched out trenches, face to face with one another, all the way between two im passable obstacles, the sea and Switzerland. The European War, much more than anypre ceding war, may be termed a war of materiel. An offensive, even a partial one, requires not only an enormous supply of cannon, munitions and machines, but also factories capable of producing them, railroads and highways suf ficient for their circulation, ships, cars and trucks in plenty to bring them up and special depots for their storage. The European War
may also be termed a war of attrition. In pre vious wars professional soldiers fought with their own resources and settled between them the quarrels of nations. To-day it is the na tions themselves, with all their forces, human and material, that take part in the struggle; they fight till one of the adversaries is com pletely exhausted. Thus, attrition, which ap plies to both men and materiel, is a factor which is bound to enter largely into final re sults. Attrition in men is irreparable; attri tion in materiel can be offset by greater activ ity irt the factories, but these factories must he sufficiently well equipped to meet the needs of the army under all circumstances. Attrition in men is not very dangerous for countries which have sufficient human reserves, such as Russia, nor yet for those like France and Great Britain, which can draw on their colonies. On the other hand, it is highly dangerous for countries like those of Central Europe, where human resources are strictly limited. For these countries there will inevitably come a moment when it will be impossible to find enough men to hold the front and to run the factories.
During the European War numerous ac tions and things occurred to change the sig nificance attached in certain quarters to the word strategy. Its meaning may be better grasped if illustrated, rather than defined. Hamley, a well-known English writer, claims that "the theatre of war is the province of strategy, the field of battle is the province of tactics." Clausewitz considered that "tactics is the employment of troops for the object of the fight; strategy is the adaptation of fighting for the object of the war." Derrecagaix, a French author, observed that "the combinations of strategy are governed by immutable prin ciples, while tactics includes operations which are subject to modification as improvements are made in war material." This, however, does not furnish the whole truth, as certain principles of tactics, such as concentration of force, the value of surprise and of superiority of fire, are as constant as those of strategy. At the commencement of the European War, the word strategy at once attained high popularity, rout of Bulgaria. This was due to the rein forcement of the Allies by Vemzelo's new Greek army, though this army was not used on the part of the field where the chief rupture was effected. Contributing causes were the dete rioration of the morale of the Bulcarian army and people and the skill with which General D'Esperey chose the time and place for the chief attack. The Allied intelligence was thorough in its functions. (See Fig. 4.).