STRATEGY, the science of directing, with promptitude, precision and clearness, masses of troops to gain possession of points of import ance in military operations. Its object is to so direct these masses that upon reaching any designated point, the army shall have a better position than that held by the enemy, or shall have such a position as will force him to change his position, or shall be superior to him in num bers, or shall have some decided advantage over the enemy, in case of a conflict. In general, it may be divided into peace and war strategy, and the latter can be subdivided into that in the area of hostilities and that at home, comprising the mobilization, etc., of units and resources to support the forces at the front. There are two main principles which guide all warfare, whether on land or sea, and these are concen tration and the initiative. Concentration con sists in so disposing the forces that they may be superior to the enemy at the critical point and moment. A belligerent secures the initia tive when he compels the enemy to conform to his movements, to accept battle on his own terms, and that means when his concentration is completed. The value of the initiative it that it enables the belligerent securing it to take advantage of concentration, and strategy is the art by which a belligerent brings about this condition of affairs. The initiative must not be confounded with the offensive, they are not synonymous terms.
There is a close relationship between strat egy and tactics. Strategy is, in a peculiar sense, the science of generals in command of armies; while tactics in all its ramifications, from the elementary drill of the soldier to orders of battle, from the bivouac of an outpost to the encampment of an army, now belongs to offi cers of all grades. Yet with these marked dif ferences, it is sheer pedantry to pretend to de fine the precise limits of these two prominent branches of the military art, as they present a multitude of exceptions in which they approach and run into each other. Tactics, if we re strict its meaning to the evolutions and manoeu vres of troops on the field of battle, may be taught with mathematical exactness, because every movement is accurately prescribed, and the more so the lower we descend the scale of this branch of military knowledge. But this is far from being true of strategy; because in the calculations involved in its operations, a great many considerations enter which do not admit of exact computation, and upon which success or failure essentially depend; as time, the character of the roads over which the army has to move, the nature of the obstacles which lie between it and the enemy, the moral quali ties and activity of the enemy's forces, etc.
In a mountainous country, the strategical points, although few in number, are generally very prominent. The junction of several val leys, or roads along the crests of several ridges, would naturally be of great value to an army occupying it, as the forces might operate in any one of the valleys or along any of the roads with an equal facility, while the enemy, once committed to one line, could. not change to an Other without great labor and loss of time, necessitated by the retrograde movement result ing from the difficulty of crossing the interven-' ing spurs or valleys. In the campaign of 1796 97, in Italy, Bonaparte, by causing the redoubt which closed the pass of the Montenotte to be occupied by 1,200 men, was able to interpose his army between the armies of the allies— Aus trians and Sardinians—and whip them in de tail. At this time the allies, numbering about 60,000 men, were operating in three columns by three roads separated by very difficult mountain ous country. Bonaparte, with about 30,000 men, holding the middle road, the pass of the Monte notte, very successfully accomplished his plan of attacking in succession the columns of the enemy. The campaign was thus decided from its inception, and the redoubt of Montenotte, seconded by a small and brave garrison had great influence upon the final result. The capi tal city of a country is usually a very import ant strategical point. This may proceed, not from its influence on the military operations of a campaign or from its position, but from the fact that it is the seat of the government the occupation of which by the enemy may have a lasting and damaging effect in a political point of view. During the American Civil War great importance was attached to the capture of the city of Richmond. and all the campaigns of the army of the Potomac were made with that city as the objective point, with the idea that its fall would put an end to the war. This was undoubtedly too much to expect, for the bul wark of the rebellion was not the city of Rich mond, but the Confederate armies, and their capture or overwhelming defeat was necessary before the fall of the city would be a decisive cause of the close of the war. The supplies and reinforcements of the Confederate army were nearly all drawn from the States south of Virginia, and as long as the avenues of sup ply remained intact the cohesion of the army was assured and it remained a menacing force.