GRAND SCALE PREPARATIONS, 15 Nov. 1914 TO 1 JULY 1916.
1. A Year and a Half of Preparation.— LooIcing back to the history of the World War as a whole it is seen that Germany assumed the offensive in the beginning of the strug gle and kept it until the spring of 1917. This statement applies to the large features of strategy. She knew what her adversa ries could do, took liberties with them and managed to carry on the struggie without endangering her own position. The result was that she was able to strike in the West and in the East as occasion seemed to demand and thus apply her strength where it seemed likely to yield the best results. • This was due to Great Britain's state of unreadiness. Had the British artny been as strong in 1914 as in 1917 such a course would have been impossible; for with 1,500,000 trained troops ready to attack by the side of an equal number of Frenchmen, and with an overwhelming supply of munitions with which to smother the German entrenchments, the Icaiser could not have divided his army in order to attend to the menace in the East, and in one field or the other he would have been pressed to disaster. These speculations, how ever, would not be complete without the state ment that if Great Bntain had been as well prepared as France in the beginning it is not likely that the war would have occurred.
The plan of the German High Command in 1915 was well made. Granted that Great Britain would not at first become a serious factor in the war and that France alone could not do any great things, she contented herself in 1915 in playing a defensive game in the West and throwmg her entire surplus energy into the Eastern theatre of operations. It was already evident that Austria was no tnatch for Russia, not even in a defensive war. Nor could Bulgaria and Austria combined deal with Russia and Serbia. Strong German efforts were necessary here if the balance was to be kept even.
For the time being results seemed to justify her expectations. When the year opened the Russian army of General Brusiloff was south of the main passes of the Carpathians, ready to March through the plains of northern Hun gary, and the Entente Allies were talking con fidently of an expected capitulation by the eastern half of the Dual Empire. Then fol lowed the battle of Dunajec, which forced Brusiloff to retire frotn the Carpathians with the rapid re-conquest of Galicia. This cam
paign was not ended before the great German drive on Warsaw was begun, and by the end of the year Poland was occupied and Riga was all but held in the tight German fist. So com pletely was Russia's attention claimed that she could do nothing to help Serbia, and all that luckless country was overrun but the south we.stern corner. It was only by prompt action that the Funente Allies could fortify and hold Salonica, in Greece, and thus bar the Central Allies from that important means of access to the 2Egean Sea.
By these operations the Germans came into possession of the railroad from their own country through Austria to Nish, in Serbia, thence to Sofia, in Bulgaria, and thence to Constantinople. The tIBerlin-to-Bagdadp route was thus made a reality. It was a means of sending supplies to Turkey and helping her inaugurate a campaign against the British at the Isthmus of Suez; and it gave a great stimulus to the Pan-German sentiment The war revealed the wcakness of Austria-Hun gary. In fact, she was like putty in the hands of Germany, and Bulgaria and Turkey were little less than dependent provinces. Greece was kept from coming over to the side of the Central Allies by nothing but the fear of the British and French fleets. Before the war a great central confederacy under the direction of Germany was a dream of the Pan-Germans; at the end of 1915 it was all but a reality.
Later events showed how little it profited Germany to spend 1915 chasing this South eastern rainbow. All that she gained in that quarter but increased her obligations to de fend. If the day came when her strength at home was so much exhausted that she could no longer succor these outlying states they would fall with a crash which would endanger her whole structure. Her real menace was in the West, and it would have been better for her, but not for the world, if she had given it her best and earliest efforts. Save Galicia and draw Brusiloff from his threatened conquest of Hungary, if necessary, but after that con fine the eastern campaigns to the defensive. Such a course would have enabled her to throw heavy armies against the forces in France and Flanders at a time when they were little prepared to meet her.