Attempt to Side-track the League.—Pres ident Wilson's insistence on the creation of the mandatory system was considered one of the crises of the conference. Another was the at tempt of the leaders to side-track the League of Nations during his absence in the Unued States, between 15 Feb. and 14 March 1919. They seem to have won the consent of Colonel House, who tnet the President at Brest on his return with a written statement of a plan to separate the league from the treaty, although on 25 January a specific vote of the conference had made it an integral part of that document then in the making. The plan was embodied in a aresolution, fathered by Mr. Balfour,' provid ing for a general settlement of all points and saying nothing about the league. Newspapers and statesmen of the conservative schooL who opposed the league, declared that it was a dead project; for it was evident that it would amount to nothing if deferred until the passions of the individual states had an opportunity to rise over the inevitable disappointments at the other fea tures of the treaty. President Wilson felt that he had been deceived and caused his news agency to announce that the vote of 25 Janup. ary was e(of final force" and that reports of contetnplated changes were untrue. The news WaS greeted with derision in many quarters. The world wanted peace and it said that Wilson stood in the way. But the United States was necessary to the world at that time, and it was not to be denied that its demands were un selfiah. When, therefore, the other statesmen realized that the President would oppose any aid to Etirope if there was an attempt to go on under the old system of concert, they yielded and agreed to abide by the vote of 25 January. They were yet to wring important concessions from hint in return for this agreement. This crisis past, the conference proceeded to con sider other matters equally perilous.
The Saar Valley and the Rhine Region. —One of these matters was the settlement of the claims of the Aliied states as to territories and reparation. By this time the Council of Ten had shrtmlcen to the Big Four — Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando. Great Brit ain and France had suffered heavily at the hands of Germany and their people demanded heavy reparation. The prime minister of each nation was forced to promise to collect damages to the uttermost President Wilson stood by the spirit of the Fourteen Points that ((there shall be no annexations, no contributions, no puni tive damages." He demanded that the amount to be paid by Germany should be mentioned in the treaty. His associates objected, because they realized that arty amount that Germany could pay or that Wilson would accept under the Fourteen Points would be so limited that public wrath in their respective countries would over whelm them.
At the same time territorial claims were pressing for attention. France had definite claims to the Saar coal fields and her military men, headed by General Foch, wished to have a long period of znilitary control of the entire west bank of the Rhine. By the short-lived treaty of 30 May 1814, the Saar Valley went to France, but it was awarded to Prussia on 20 Nov. 1815. France now demanded its °res toration') by annexation. She has little coal but an abundance of iron and believed that she needed this rich fuel deposit to promote her industrial development Her demands found some moral support in the heavy and wanton damage the Germans did to the Lens coal mines during the tie,riod of occupation. But the Saar
Valley is German through and through by race and feeling, and President Wilson felt that to hand it over to France would violate that part of the Fourteen Points which declared that are not to be handed about from one sovereigqty to another by an international con ference," and he opposed the demand. He thus antagonized the French people in two respects and aroused their strong hostility. To his own friends it seemed that he but stood out for the principle of a just peace which would not plant dte seed of future wars.
Other peoples had their claims to present, and they all took them straight to the President, who, it was known, occupied a central position in the negotiations. This was not so much because he had more power than Lloyd George and Clemenceau, but because those statesmen, representing the old diplomacy, were, in gen eral, willing to make deals sharing the gains for their own countries, as in the olden times. But they had to get the consent of the American President, and they found it hard to obtain, Not only was this true of Italy, who wished to get Fiume and cut off Jugoslavia from the Adriatic, but there were many small states, as Greece, Poland, Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia who asked his interest in their special claims. It was generally impossible to support them in their extrernity, and by refusing the President added to the stream of criticism. There were, also, groups of peoples aspiring to nationality, as the Egyptians and the Irish, who laid their claims before him. If he had seriously taken up their causes he would have brolcen up the conference; but by refusing to play politics with them he aroused their deep resentment. It seemed that his opponents took some satisfac tion in seeing this mass of criticism grow, ex pecting that It would eventually so weaken his influence at Paris that he would no longer be an obstacle to their wishes. Against this menace President Wilson played a vigorous stroke. On 7 April, when his opponents were momen tarily expecting him to yield, came the anounce ment that he had ordered the ship George Washington, then at Brooklyn, to be sent to Brest at once. It was tantamount to saying that he was going to withdraw from the conference if the combmations against him continued to operate. But Clemenceau was too wise to allow snch a thing to happen and next day the Paris Temps, by official inspiration, gave it as its opinion that the French government would not demand annexation of the Saar Valley. Other papers taking their cue modified their criticism of the President When the treaty was finally published it was seen that the Saar coal fields went to France in fee simple, as reparation for the damages at Lens; but it was provided that the political ad ministration of the valley should be left to the League of Nations and that a plebiscite at the end of 15 years should settle its ultimate political control. As for the demand that France should have military control over the west bank of the Rhine, the treaty made the entire west bank and a strip 50 kilometers wide on the east bank a demilitarized area under German control. Fort resses must not exist in it, nor manceuvres be held there, nor any other military steps taken. Thus were met France's comention that her border was exposed; but it was a settlement full of menace.