Sometimes there may appear to be, and in fact may be, a difficulty even in a very similar sentence, as to the resolution of it into subject, predicate, and copula. The discussion of this matter belongs to the doctrine of propositions ; but so much may be here said, that eo far as all propositions are contemplated in their formal and not their material character, they agree in this, that the subject is viewed as something either co-extensive with or included in the predicate. Both the form of language and the form of thought of which language is merely the exponent, forbid us to contemplate a subject in a greater extent than its predicate. The sentence " I hope to succeed " is thus reduced (Whately's ' p. 59) : sub. pred.
To succeed is what I hope; which is the same thing as " success is my hope ; " end the remark is made "that an infinitive (which the author has already defined to be a noun substantive) is never the predicate, except when another infinitive is the subject." But we may just as well express the proposition thus :— sub. pred.
What I hope is to succeed; that is "my hope is success." Now as both "hope " and "success" are gendral terms, that la, are words capable of being applied severally to an infinity of particular things ; and as neither hope nor success are conceived by the mind in any relation of subordination to one another, as that either of containing or contained, or of species and genus [GENUs], it is indifferent whether we use the phrase my hope (sub.) is success (prod.), or success (sub.) is my hope (pred.). But this sentence, we conceive, would by most people be reduced thus:— sub. pred.
I hope to succeed ; where "hope of success" is that which the subject, ego, predicates of itself, that is, these word° indicate a mental operation in which the subject (it matters not whether contemplating itself or contemplated by another) is viewed (logically) simply as within certain limits of predication.
Every simple sentence which is intelligible is reducible to the form A is or is not a; but it should be observed that the former sentence has two meanings, as already observed. It may mean either that a is contained in n, or that A is coextensive with n, where a is the subject, and ri the predicate, and is the copula. It is important to bear in mind this double meaning of the sentence " A is n." If it ehould be said that "A is 13" may also moan "a contains a," we can then say that n is contained in A; and so we are where we were before. In ordinary language tho ambiguity of the form A is n ie sometimes removed by words of limitation, as "all," " every," " some ;" but frequently there are no such words used, and the consequence is ambiguity.
The sentence " A is not n" may mean either that A is not co-exten sive with n, or that no part of A is contained in or that some part of A is not ()contained in ; but this ambiguity also is generally avoided in common speech by the use of words of limitation, or by attaching the negative to the subject. It is obvious that negative propositions are subject to more ambiguity than affirmative propositions. Negative propositions have given logicians much trouble, and it is clear that wo only obtain a clear notion of their import by a tacit reference to affirmative propositions. In itself a negative proposition has no mean
ing; by the very supposition of its being negative, it excludes the notion of all eignificancy ; and yet by means of such propositions we attain to knowledge. The Stoke (who seem to have had a logic of their own) called such a sentence as " Pleasure is not good " an affirmative sentence also : their reasons for this are stated, though somewhat obscurely, by Apuleius. (' Philosophy of ,Plato,' lib. iii.) Simple sentences are generally combined in written or spoken dis course in such a manner that the whole meaning of the speaker cannot be reached, except by considering two or more sentences together. Sentences may be so combined, either in the way of co-ordination or sub-ordination, but this distinction, which is made by Dr. Becker in his excellent German grammar, though it is applicable to some extent to all languages, is perhaps more par ticularly applicable to the German language than to our own. Two sentences are combined by way of co-ordination when they are connected by such a conjunction as and, as "he eats and drinks," where we have two distinct sentences, each of which contains a separate and independent affirmation ; but we cannot reach the whole of what is said of the subject " he," without contemplating the two sentences together. The conjunction " but " is also often used to unite co-ordinate sentences, as " he speaks German, but not fluently," where the sentence beginning with " but limits the generality of the former assertion; • and the whole sentence does not differ in mean ing from "he speaks German, and he speaks German not fluently." Subordinate sentences are connected with the principal sentence in a great variety of ways, among which the union by means of the pronouns and words of pronominal origin is perhaps the most frequent : as," I do not know when he will come ;" "he lives luxuriously, while others arc starving." In both cases, both the combination of co-ordinate sentences and the combination of subordinate with a principal sentence, certain words are used, which are generally distinguished from other words which connect sentences, by the name of causal,; such are in English, "for," " therefore," then," and " since " (not as words indicating time)," because," and some others. All languages have words which correspond in meaning to these words. Now it is the combination of sentences produced by such words as these which generally makes up a large part of discourse, written or spoken. When the discourse is bare narration of facts, it is often little more than a succession of affirmative or negative propositions, but so connected and expressed as to render the discourse more pleasing than if the propositions were enunciated separately and in their simple form ; but still not logically connected. Besides the ornament and variety which we are enabled to give by written discourse to mere narrative, there is generally a kind of coherence or sequence in the bare facts of narration, which, when some facts are known, can ho anticipated by the hearer, or Mader, and this again helps to render the language of bare narration less tedious.