ORGAN ON. [In tho article Lome we have explained our reasons for allowing this article, from the pen of the editor of the ' Penny Cyclopedia,' to remain without any attempt to bring it into connection with the new matter of the present work. To it is added the article from the first Supplement to the' Penny eyeloprodial It is not possible to give a definition of any science which shall convey ita full import, and particularly to a person who does not already know what it is. Tim' difficulty will les experienced by any one who attempts to give a definition of Logic. Without then attempting a definition, or admitting the completeness or correctness of any definition hitherto given, It may be sufficient, for the purpose of showing what that matter is about which wo are discoursing, to say that logic is conversant about the formal laws of thought, and that it is not conversant about the matter which is subjected to such lawn.
This thing, whatever it may be, about which login is conversant, is presented to us, and is considered by us generally under the form of language. Whatever are the operations of the mind which are involved or contained in the exercise of thought, those operations may be generally expressed by language. It is assumed here, that by what ever names we designate the relation of the various consecutive and connected trains of ideas which pass through the mind, this relation is in all minds essentially the same. When two persons then possess a common language, one of them can express in this language, with a certain degree of accuracy, the various consecutive and connected trains of ideas which have plumed through his mind, with respect to any matter or matter& Another person, who, to use the common expression, understands this language, can, through this medium, com municate with the other person's mind; and if the expression of such ideas has been accurately made according to the form of the language, and if they are properly interpreted, the person who hears or reads what the other has written or said, may in his own mind perceive the same various consecutive and connected trains of ideas which the writer or speaker has experienced. If language con effect this, it follows that the mental operations or processes in the two individuals are connected and assimilated by virtue of their both being conform able to the same general laws. It is, however, the laws of thought about which login is conversant, and with language no further than as being the form of expression in which the thoughts of others are made known to us, and by which we aro enabled to compare those thoughts with our own.
Under the article LANGUAGE it has been stated in a general way what language is ; but mainly as to the materials of which it is com posed. It remains now to consider its form.
What is called a sentence comprehends in its simplest form a subject and a predicate, with something by which a relation between the subject and the predicate is expressed. "Men die" is a sentence, In which " men " is the subject, of which " dying " or " death " is pre dicated, that ie, in this sentence a judgment is expressed. Tho sentence indicates that two notions are present to the mind," men " and" death." What the relation is which the mind really contemplates between these two things, and bow it is possible for the mind to contemplate this or any other relation between two things, belongs not to the present inquiry, nor to the province of logic. It will be sufficient to observe, that this judgment or relation does not express or mean, as some writers say, any agreement or disagreement between the two notions, or that ono of them belongs or does not belong to the other ; nor is it the comparison in the mind of these two notions, at least, logically considered, it is not the comparison in the mind of the two notions as to the matter of them.
The sentence "men die" may also be expressed thus,—" men are mortal ;" where mortal is the predicate. The grammatical relation between " men " and "mortal," which is the symbolic representation of that conceived by the mind, is expressed in our language by the substantive verb " are," which is accordingly, in such sentences as this, called the copula. In some languages, as the Latin and Greek, which are rich in terminations, the relation between " men " and "mortal" is also expressed by a termination attached to the word " mortal," in addition to the copula, as " homines aunt mortales ; " and sometimes the copula est is omitted. When there is not a copula, either in the form of the verb " to be " or in some other verb of equivalent moaning, the copula is either expressed solely by the order of the words, which is the case with those languages which, like the English, have few ter minations, or the copula is expressed by a verbal termination which has a certain relation of fitness to the nominal termination, as in Latin and Greek, and In some cases by the order of the words also, as "homines moriuntur." The copula in itself has no meaning; its office Is to indicate that the subject and the predicate of the sentence are contemplated at once, and each in some relation to the other, in that operation of the mind of which the words " men are mortal " is the visible or sensuous sign. But the subject itself may be qualified by an attribute, or the generality of the subject (which according to the common interpretation of language is understood when it is not limited) may be restricted or confined by the use of appropriate words, as, "dying mon are prophetic," or "some dying men are prophetic." Again, the predicate may in like manner be qualified or limited ; as, " he writes," "ho writes a letter," " he writes letters sornetiniem." Thus every sentence, however complicated it may appear, is reducible to the form of subject, predicate, and copula. "A tall man on horse back in complete armour was seen crossing a deep and rapid river on a winter's day," and other sentences of the kind with which ordinary books of narrative abound, may all be reduced to a simple form. It is true that the number of different things or notions which such a sentence brings before the mind often create a degree of confusion, and render the apprehension of the affirmation or negation, which every simple sentence contains, a matter of some difficulty; and this is particularly the case when a sentence so constructed brings before the mind not material objects with which we are familiar, but notions which express things which are not subject to the cognisance of the senses. And hence it happens that argumentative discourse is not always the most difficult to apprehend. Indeed the difficulty of apprehension is some times greatest when the discourse consists of a long series of proposi tions in which under one set of circumstance/I one thing is affirmed or denied, or commanded or forbidden ; and tinder another set of circum stances other things are affirmed or denied, or commanded or forbidden ; or when things are stated, affirmatively or negatively, with a great many exceptions and limitations. A perusal of a modern act of parliament will show that this ie so.