But when discourse Is not limited to bare narration of facts, it assumes a form which still more interests the hearer or reader, and keeps his intellectual powers in constant exercise. Here the discourse does not barely communicate something from the writer to the reader : it does more ; it is constantly addressing itself to those faculties of the reason which the reader and the writer have in common, and it is con stantly proceeding on the assumption that a great number of universal propositions are admitted to be true by the reader and the writer. Thus, if we say of a certain man—" he is not liked, because he is pre sumptuous," two things arc affirmed ; first, that a "certain man is not liked;" second, "that he is presumptuous." Bnt by the use of the word " because," the writer means to affirm something more than the truth of the two propositions ; for we may suppose it possible to affirm many propositions of a man without considering the propositions related to one another in any other way than as all relating to one man as the subject. The words " because he is presumptuous" are designed by the writer to express seine connection with or relation to " not being liked," which connection or relation must exist in the mind of all other persons as well as in his own, or it cannot be understood. Now, what is that connection which he and all mankind, and a largo part of mankind unconsciously, contemplate when this compound sentence is enunciated i The subject of the whole sentence is some given person or individual who is said " not to be liked," a proposition universally intelligible. He is said "to be presumptuous,' which is also universally intelligible. Now, the word " because " has this office :—it introduces something to the reader's notice to which the universal judgment of mankind attaches the notion of dislike ; some thing which is followed by dislike ; something without which there may be dislike, but with which there must be dislike • that is, must be in this sense : the reader does not know the spoken of, and therefore does not know that he is disliked till he is told so; but he knows something of that individual, namely, his presumption, and he also blew, that lie dislikes a presumptuous individual. He therefore understands the writer, and he admits that statement which is intro duced by the word " because " as a reason (to use the common expres sion) why the man is disliked. He has in fact assented to the universal proposition that " a presumptuous man is disliked ; " he has already mentally formed for himself a general rule that all presumptuous People are disliked, and it is by virtue of himself and the writer acknowledging this universal affirmation as true, that lie collects the writer's meaning. But there is no logical inference hero ; there is no syllogism.
The speaker or writer might, however, say, all that he knew of a certain man was "that he was presumptuous; " and he might add to the sentence, and " therefore I conclude that he is disliked." If the reader or hearer assented to the conclusion introduced by the word " therefore," he would assent to the following mode of stating what he had heard: 1. All presumptuous persons are disliked.
2. This man is a presumptuous person ; 3. Therefore he is disliked ; which is called a syllogism, and is one of the most common forms of a syllogism, in which the first part, or major premiss, is not expressed. The greatest part of written and spoken discourse is either in this form or in that of a consecutive series of syllogisms, called, by logicians, sorites.
The first two propositions are generally called the premises, and the third is called the conclusion ; and in such a syllogism everything which is called a conclusion is deduced, or considered as deduced, from two other propositions, one of which, as already observed, is commonly suppressed, but is referred to by such a word as " because," " there fore," &c. It is, however, very clear that nothing is proved even by a
syllogism. In the common form of language something is affirmed particularly as a fact, and something is said in the way of a conclusion. The mind perceives no reason why this conolusion is made in the par ticular instance, more than it should be in any other given instance of the same kind. But while something is in form concluded particularly, something is by implication affirmed universally. A person not accus tomed to analyse his own thoughts may not always be able to discover what is that universal affirmation which contains the particular con clusion; but if the argument, as it is generally termed, be expressed in the complete form of a syllogism, he at once perceives what universal proposition must be admitted or proved, in order that the particular one shall be true; if he has already given his assent to the proposition as stated, without a clear conceptiou of the extent of the admission which he will be considered to have made, he is enabled by means of the syllogistic form to examiue more clearly that mental operation which to him was before confused. The conclusion of the syllogism proves nothing; as an inference or illation it necessarily follows from the premises, that is, the mind cannot conceive it other wise ; and in this operation it is subjected to laws of thought which are irresistible. When the truth of the premises is ascertained or admitted (which, for the purpose of argumentation, is the same thing) the conclusion, which before was logically correct, now becomes also true. All discourse of the kind called argumentative, indeed all dis course so far as it contains inferences, may be reduced to the form of a series of syllogisms, from which it will appear what universal affirma tions or negations are implicitly coutained in the discourse. It will also show what universal affirmations or negations are used as a means of attaining to other affirmations or negations which are not true unless the first are true, and which whcu attained become the premises of other conclusions. Discourse of the argumentative kind has for its object to establish particular things, or things which are comprehended within other things. Particular things, so far as they are the object of sensuous perceptions, are directly established by evidence, as for instance, the qualities of any material object ; but there are many things which are not susceptible of this kind of evidence, and of which there is no evidence but the universal consent of mankind. In as argumentative discourse therefore the writer who has particular things to prove, alleges, expressly or by implication, universal truths, and ho affirms, either expressly or by the implication of language, that the particular things are contained within the universal. If the reader assent to the universal truths, and also admit that the particular things are contained therein, the writer accomplishes his purpose, and his demonstration is complete. He is said to have deduced something, or to have made a deduction. If all written or spoken discourse were in the form of perfect syllogisms, there could be little confusion or dis pute about what is called the premises and the conclusion, for the whole matter would be so placed before the reader, that he would always perceive the general proposition within which it is affirmed that the particular is included. It is then the general condition of every syllogism imperfectly expressed, that when we are speakiug of what we call one thing, we are in effect speaking of many thiugs : for that which is asserted of one can equally be asserted of all things of the kind, and it is not possible to conceive it true of one without conceiving it true of all.