This is nearly what took place at the battle of Leuthen (1757), when the king of Prussia advancing against the Austrian army, made demon strations am if he would attack their right wing. Marshal Daun, though for a time he suspected the feint, was at length deceived, and sent all his reserves to strengthen that wing : the king observing this, pro ceeded immediately to execute an oblique attack ; for which purpose his columns moved rapidly to the right and deployed on the left wing of the Austrians ; this wing gave way, and the right wing wheeling up to attack the Prussians' left, the two armies were brought into parallel positions. These movements produced in the Austrian line disorder, and openings by which the Prussian cavalry penetrated and took pos session of the village of Leuthen : the Austrians rallied twice after wards, but they were finally obliged to retreat. At the battle of Albuera (1811) the French general at first moved his columns as if he intended to attack the left of the allies, but soon causing them to change the direction of their march, ho rapidly placed nearly two thirds of his army in order of battle perpendicular to the right of the British line. By this movement the allies were obliged to change their front, and, as this was done under a heavy fire, the enemy was upon them before they had time to complete the new formation.
When an army, in the position A n, is attacked on one wing, as n, by the corps at, and is in danger of being turned, it may endeavour to prevent the success of the manoeuvre by throwing back that wing in a direction P c, parallel to that of the attacking corps, at : this is called forming the army en potence ; the angle n is, however, weak, for the troops in n c by falling back may become crowded and disordered ; may become exposed to a raking fire from at, and nc to a like fire from troops at N. It is evident, however, that at cannot now turn the flank n c without making a circuitous movement, by which it may become separated from the rest of its line : and if the army A n is strong enough, it may form a line parallel to the direction of c n. By such a movement the parallel order would be restored, and the wing A might even be made to turn the left, q. of its opponent : this should of course be attempted, as the return to a parallel order of battle leads to no useful result. In order to effect it, the division B should retire gradually, while the brigades in A n wheel back, in order to keep in connection with it ; at the same time the brigades at A wheel to their front so as to form the new line A'c', in a direction oblique to that of Cy An attack on an enemy's line is often made by a strong division drawn up in one column for the purpose of forcing its way through the line at some point where it appears to be weak, and thus compel ling the different corps to retire that they may not be separately over whelmed. This is the mode of attack which was practised with so much success by Napoleon against the Continental armies, but which failed when attempted against the British troops, both in Spain and at Waterloo.
it is adopted when an attack is to be made on an enemy behind retrenchments, in which ease the troops move as much as possible towards the ealient angles of the work in order to avoid the direct fire ; it is also necessary when the ground only permits the troops to advance on a narrow front, as in defiling through a ravine; In fact, if an enemy's position have obstructions in its front, it must necessarily be attacked in columns if at all. The columns should be connected with each other by bodies of light troops, and the attack should be made with a view of separating a wing of the enemy from his main body.
The attack in column possesses some advantages over one mode by troops deployed in line while the men remain steady In the column ; for the enemy is intimidated by the sight of a vast body coming against him, while the assailants feel confidence from their union. A rapid auccetslon of efforts directed against troops in a slender line will also, in general, succeed in breaking their order ; but there ere several cir cumstances which more than counterbalance these advantages: during the advance over uneven ground the men lose their ranks and fall into confusion ; the flanking fire of the enemy's artillery makes great havoc among the crowded masses, and the cohunns can only oppose this fire by an irregular fire from its aides; disorder then ensues, the commands of the officers are no longer regarded, and an attempt to deploy for the purpose of making an attack in line only completes the disorganisation. An attack in column can indeed, scarcely succeed unless it were preceded by a heavy fire of artillery : this will put the enemy's line in disorder; and in the event of forcing it, the column may then be deployed in order to secure its advantages.
If a line, nearly equal in strength to that of the opponent, on being attacked in column, were to stand firmly, it is probable that the attack would fail • and even if the line were penetrated, the troops, by form ing themselves in hollow squares, disposed chequer-wise, so that their fires may cross on the ground in their front, have invariably been found capable of resisting the efforts of the assailants. This last ma necuvre was recommended by General Joraini, and was for the first time employed at the battle of Aspen', in 1809. In that action Napo leon, perceiving the Austrian line to be weakened in the centre, ordered it to be attacked by the whole corps of Marshal Lannes, which for this purpose was drawn up in one great column. The column, preceded by artillery, advanced rapidly, and succeeded in penetrating the line. The troops in that part gave ground, but forming themselves in squares, they resisted all the efforts of the French cavalry to disperse them, while the wings of the army closing upon the flanks of the column, poured into it a destructive fire of artillery, which at length forced it to retire in confusion between the two fortified villages which supported its wings. The attack of the French at the battle of Wagram had, however, complete success : the Austrians, being doubtful of the pre cise spot at which Napoleon would cross the Danube, had very widely dispersed their troops; the centre of their line was particularly weak, and against this part the French emperor determined to direct a dense column. This was composed of the reserve of the army, and the charge was preceded by a heavy cannonade, which still further dispersed the Austrian troops. The army, being thus broken, was compelled to retreat. At the battle of Talavera (1809), the French in strong columns attacked, at the same time, the centre and both wings of the British line. The latter was drawn up three deep, and its fire of musketry and artillery, directed against the heads and flanks of the columns, aided by charges of cavalry, drove the enemy back with great slaughter. An indiscreet pursuit made by the Guards was the cause of much dis order in the centre ; and the enemy returning to the charge, that part of the line was completely broken ; but fresh troops being ordered up to the spot, their fire kept the enemy in check till the disordered troops rallied, and the artillery continuing to play on the flanks of the enemy's columns, the latter at length gave way.