Again, the campaign of Moreau, in 1800, is a good example of a base of this kind, the base being formed by the High Rhine and the Lake of Constance and the line of the Lower Rhine, the French being in possession of Switzerland. Napoleon wished Moreau to pass the Rhine at Schauffhaueen with his whole fanny, and thus to cut Kray off. As he had a tete-de-pont at 13.ile, however, he was content with making certain of a lesser success, and, ordering Lecourbe to pass at Schaull hausen, he himself, with half the army, crossed at BAle, effected a junction at Enghen, and occupied Stockhack, which was a very important point un the Austrian line of retreat. Kray, finding himself cut off in the angle of time high and low Rhine, with 60,000 men, endeavoured to retreat, but was met by Moreau and defeated at Enghen.
If we consider Spain roughly as a rectangle, three of the sides of which are formed by the sea and in possession of the English, whilst the fourth is in possession of the French, it will be seep what immense advantage the maritime base of Torres Vedran, at the extremity of one of the sides, conferred.
Lines of operations, as has been before stated, should at all times be interior [STRATCOT], so that the portions of an army moving on them may at any time be massed in superior numbers to the enemy at any point where a collision may occur ; but at time same time a single road or strategic line, or indeed a single lino of operations, may often be unfavourable, as it does not give ao great security against time enter prises of the enemy, and in the presence of the enemy is extremely bad, as it necessitates the column being of great length on the line of march, rendering it unwieldy and liable to be overwhelmed by an attack in front, or cut in half at the same time. Linea at a distance from one another are objectionable, in so far as they may become exterior, and the troops on them be attacked in detail and overwhelmed before they can support each other. When it is said that a commander should always endeavour to op emte on interior, and make the enemy operate s.n exterior, lines of operations, it must be understood that mere dis tanco apart on the map is not the only criterion of lines being exterior or interior. Lines which appear exterior from their distance apart on the map may be really interior from their advantage of cross roada,&c., and more especially from the superiority in the rate of marching of the army moving on them. There is always an immense advantage in
maintaining as large a strategical front as possible, for by eo doing thu cuemy is kept in doubt and suspense as to the point on which it is intended to strike a deciaive blow ; but the length of this strategical point must of course be limited by the necessity of maintaining interior lines. Superiority in the rate of marching is then of immense importance. The divisions of an army which can march twice as fast as another are on interior lines, when 80 or 90 miles apart, to their enemy, when his divisions are 50 miles apart.
Napoleon said that if two armies are equal in all things except num bers and the rate of marching, the relative values of the two armies will not be found by comparing their numbers, but by comparing the products of their numbers and rates.
These considerations will show the immense superiority some rapid means of transit along the strategic front may give ; for instance, a rail way. It was by availing himself of a railway in this manner, that the Emperor Louie Napoleon made that splendid movement at the com mencement of the late Italian war, when, by suddenly concentrating his forces, which had been extended along the whole line of the Ticino, on his extreme left, he crossed, and attacking the Austrian army before it could concentrate, won the battle of Magenta.
With respect to converging and diverging lines of operations. Di verging, or, as they are sometimes excentric lines, proceeding from any one point or more in a base, may perhaps occasionally be found advantageous for offensive operations, since by them bodies of troops may be rapidly moved up at once to different points in an enemy's line, and, if compelled to retreat from such points, they will gradually approach each other, and be able to unite at some point in their rear; but they are only admissible when the marches have been so ordered that interior strategical lines are observed, so that the divi sions, by falling back or repassing the central point, may be in superior force at the point of collision. It is evident, therefore, that such lines should nut have a great degree of divergence, especially when there are few or no cross roads of communication, since then the columns in their advance may become so far separated as to be in danger of being cut off in detail.