WAR, SCIENCE OF. The science of war has been divided by military writers into Strategy and Tactics, and sometimes into Grand and Elementary Tactics. Under STIL1TEOY and TACTICS we hare defined what are the limits of those divisions, and given the general principles which govern atrategio operations; as also some of the prin cipal definitions, such as Base of Operations, Lines of Operations, Interior Lines, &c. It is, therefore, unnecessary to recur to these further than to recapitulate the main principles which are or should be the basis of all military operations, and which, though often neg lected when stated, appear self-evident truisms. These general prin. ciples are : to bring the mass of the forces successively into collision with portions of the enemy ; to operate as much as possible on his communications without exposing your own ; and, thirdly, with a view of being superior at the point of collision, to act on interior lines. [STRATEGY.] These principles must be borne in mind in making all military combinations, whether for a campaign or on the day of battle; and such combinations will be more or less good as these principles are more or less carried out.
In Europe, an army while in the field can draw much of its support from the country in which It is acting, and therefore it does not wholly depend upon its magazines for its means of subsistence ; yet even in this part of the world the supplies of provision and forage which can be obtained in an enemy's country are often precarious, and an army without regular communication with its depots is in danger of being reduced to the necessity of surrendering in order to avoid being starved. Such a disaster is still more likely to overtake an army in the East, if unprovided with the means of support in itself, since there the military force of the enemy consists largely in swarms of light cavalry, who, avoiding regular engagements, hang continually neon the flanks and roar of the army, both preventing supplies from arriving and cutting off all parties who may be beyond the protection of the main body. In fact, an army is in all cases dependent on its communi cations with its depots and base of operationa for receiving its supplies, not only of provisions, but also of ammunition and reinforcements, and also in getting rid of its sick and wounded. And, further, such is the moral or psychical effect on an armyof its communications being inter rupted, that it has always been held by the greatest generals, not only of our own time, but of antiquity, that such an event is the sure pre lude to disorganisation and defeat.. Now a base of operatione may be
a single fortress or sea-port town; but, as a general rule, it is a long strip of country, and in this latter case a slight consideration of its object and of the general principles which should guide all military combinations indicate what is the best form for a base of operations, namely, that it should form two bides of an angle approaching more or less to a right angle, so situated with respect to the theatre of war that one side is parallel and the other perpendicular to the enemy's base of operations. For it is evident that, supposing the enemy to have advanced into the theatre of war, a great power of acting on his com munications is afforded by employing the end of the most advanced portion of the rectangular base for enterin? the theatre of war ; fur it places the army on the enemy's communications in his rear without at the same time exposing its own. It is not necessary that the bast, should be right-angled to give this advantage; for, in fact, a base of any other form is good when, by projecting into the theatre of war, it gives the power more or less of acting from an advanced point on the communications of the enemy. Napoleon's theatre of war at the com mencement of the Austerlitz campaign was bounded on the north by the 3Isyn and northern boundary of the Austrian dominions, on the west by the Rhine and western boundary of Piedmont, on the south by the Gulf of Genoa, Romania, and the Adriatic and lllyria. The base formed by the Rhine and the 3layn, supposing the country north of the 3Layn to be in possession of the Prench, is a base of the best kind. The Rhine is parallel and the 3layn at right angles to the Austrian base. Supposing, then, an Austrian army to advance into the theatre of war west of Bamberg, the French, advancing from Bam berg and Bareith, would cut off their communications, that is, their supplies of all descriptions, and in case of defeat, which is therefore probable, their lines of retreat, and, driving them into the angle between the 3layn and Rhine, utterly destroy them, while at the same time the communications of the French would be secure, and they could receive supplies and reinforcements, and, if defeated,—which, with these advantages in their favour, would not be probable,—they might with ease retreat into some fortified portion of their base of operations.