Where a train was forty-five minutes late when a gust of wind threw it from the track and injured a passenger, it was held that though the train would have escaped the gust of wind had it 'been on time, yet the accident was neither the natural nor prob able consequence of the delay; McClary v. R. Co., 3 Neb. 44, 19 Am. Rep. 631. When a horse hitched to a defective hitching-post was frightened by the running away of an other 'horse, and broke the post and ran over a person in the street, the latter could not recover against the owner of the post for the defect in the post as the cause of the injury; City of Rockford v. Tripp, 83 Ill. 247, 25 Am. Rep. 381. Negligently setting fire to grass on the property of another may be found to be the proximate cause of the death of one burned whilst attempting to extinguish it; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Siler, 229 Ill. 390, 82 N. E. 362, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 819, 11 Ann. Cas. 368. Exposure to cold was held the proximate cause of injury to the health of one who, although ill at the time, would not have suffered seriously but for such exposure; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Daugherty, 108 S. W. 336, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1392, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 740. The escape of oil from a tank near a river bank was held the proximate cause of injury caused by the oil to boats lower down; Brennan Construc tion Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. D. C. 554, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 535, 10 Ann. Cas. 865. Where a railroad obstructed a rail road crossing and delayed a physician, held that his patient had a right of action against it if she suffered by the delay; Terry v. R. Co. (Miss.) 60 South. 729. Permitting a road to remain out of repair so that fire appara tus is hindered in responding to an alarm is not the proximate cause of the destruc tion of the property by fire; Hazel v. Owens bciro, 99 S. W. 315, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 627, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 235.
The question of proximate cause is said to be determined, not by the existence or non-existence of intervening events, but by their character and the natural connection between the original act or omission and the injurious consequences. When the in tervening cause is set in operation by the original negligence, such negligence is still the proximate cause ; Seith v. Electric Co.,_ 241 Ill. 252, 89 N. E. 425, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 978, 132 Am. St. Rep. 204. If the party guilty of the first act of negligence might have anticipated the intervening cause, the connection is not broken ; Seith v. Electric Co., 241 Ill. 252, 89 N. E. 425, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 978, 132 Am. St. Rep. 204 ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Columbia, 65 Kan. ,390, 69 Pac. 338, 58 L. R. A. 399; Smith v. Tel. Co., 113 Mo. App. 429, 87 S. W. 71; Citizens Telephone Co. of Texas Y. Thomas, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 20, 99 S. W. 879. Any number of causes and effects may intervene, and if they are such as might with reasonable dil igence have been foreseen, the last result is to be considered as the proximate result. But whenever a new cause intervenes, which is not a consequence of the first wrongful cause, which is not under control of the wrongdoer, which could not have been fore seen by the exercise of reasonable diligence, and except for which the final injurious con sequence could not have happened, then such injurious consequence must be deemed too remote; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Stan
ford, 12 Kan. 354, 15 Am. Rep. 362 ; Kreigh v. Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co., 152 Fed. 120, 81 C. C. A. 338, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.1 684. Gas was negligently permitted to re main in a mine. A workman was overcome by the gas, and, in removing him to the sur face, his leg was broken in the elevator. The gas-filled mine was not the proximate cause of the broken leg ; Teis v. Smuggler Min. Co., 158 Fed. 260, 85 C. C. A. 478, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 893.
The cases in which the original wrong doer is still liable, though independent acts of other persons may have intervened, are classified generally by Prescott F. Hall in 15 Marv. L. Rev. 541, as: 1. Acts directly malicious ; Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 52 N. E. 679, 44 L. R. A. 216 (where an explosion was held the proxi mate cause, though the person insured by it was forced by another into the position of danger). Taylor v. Hayes, 63 Vt. 475, 21 Atl. 610; Isham v. Dow's Estate, 70 Vt. 588. 41 Atl. 585, 45 L. R. A. 87, 67 Am. St. Rep. One who violates a duty owed to oth ers or commits a tortious or wrongfully neg ligent act is liable, not only for those in juries which are the direct and immediate consequences of his act, but for such con sequential injuries as, according to common experience, are likely to, and in fact do. result from his act ; Smethurst v. Barton Square Church, 148 Mass. 261, 19 N. E. 387. 2 L. 'R. A. 695, 12 Am. St. Rep. 550 (snow from a roof fell on a horse causing it to start and thereby injure a passer-by).
2. Acts such as wilful misrepresentation and false warranties: Of this class of cases is Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (where a druggist carelessly labelled a deadly poison as a harmless med icine); where a druggist labelled extract of belladonna as extract of dandelion ; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 ; where naphtha was sold for oil ; Wellington v. Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 ; or poisonous food ; Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass. 411, 1 N. E. 154, 52 Am. Rep. 715 ; or a proprietary med icine containing ingredients harmful to one using it according to its directions ; Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S. E. 118, 5 L. R. A. 612, 20 Am. St. Rep. 324 ; or a beverage represented to be harmless, but containing bits of broken glass; Watson v. Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S. E. 152, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1178, 110 Am. St. Rep. 157 ; or where a manufacturer sold a defective article knowing it to be defective, thot'igh there was no privity of contract between the person injured and the manufacturer ; Schu bert v. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. W. 1103, 15 L. R. A. 818, 32 Am. St. Rep. 559 ; Woodward v. Miller, 119 Ga. 618, 46 S. E. 847, 64 L. R. A. 932, 100 Am. St. Rep. 188; Holmvik v. Self-feeder Co., 98 Minn. 424, 108 N. W. 810.