3. Acts conclusively presumed to be mall dons, such as violations of statutes. Where liability for personal injury is imposed by statute on counties, etc., or persons for de fective highways, bridges, etc., the innocent intervening act of a third person will not discharge the first wrong-doer from his re sponsibility; Hayes v. Hyde Park, 153 Mass. 514, 27 N. E. 522, 12 L. R. A. 249.
Generally it is held that a company main taining overhead wires is liable for injuries resulting from their fall notwithstanding an intervening act of a third person who at tempts to remove them. This is usually on the ground that the company should have foreseen that some person would interfere with such wires; Citizens' Telephone Co. of Texas v. Thomas, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 20, 99 S. W. 879 ; Neal v. R. Co., 3 Pennewili (Del.) 467, 53 Atl. 338; Smith v. Telephone Co., 113 Mo. App. 429, 87 S. W. 71; Dannea hower v. Telegraph Co., 218 Pa. 216, 67 Atl. 207; Kansas City v. Gilbert, 65 Kan. 469, 70 Pac. 350 ; but where a wire fell to the ground and was knocked by a policeman with his club towards the sidewalk, the in tervening act of the policeman was held the proximate cause of injury to one who caught the wire; Seith v. Electric Co., 241 T11. 252, 89 N. E. 425, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 978, 132 Am. St. Rep. 204. And the negligence of a telephone company in maintaining a pole in a dangerous position until it fell across a highway was held not the proximate cause of an accident, when it was set back in the hole by passers-by and insecurely propped, afterwards falling and killing the daughter of the plaintiff ; Harton v. Telephone Co., 146 N. C. 429, 59 S. E. 1022, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 956, 14 Ann. Cas. 390.
Where a manufacturer undertook to sup ply a boiler which would stand a working pressure of one hundred pounds and at a less pressure the boiler exploded in conse quence of the defective construction of a hinge, thereby injuring the buyer's employ ees, and rendering such buyer liable in dam ages to them, it was held that though the buyer might have discovered the defect by inspection, yet he was entitled to recover from the manufacturer, as, even if hls con duct be called want of ordinary care, it was induced by the warranty or representations of the manufacturer; Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 S. E. 657, 51 L. R. A. 781, 86 Am. St. 'Rep. 478. In [1895] 1 Q. B. 857, and [1895] 2 Q.
B. 650, it is intimated that the injured workman could have recovered against the manufacturer in the first place. In the Mas sachusetts case it is said that there are difficulties in holding one liable in damages when the tort of another has intervened be tween his act and the consequences com plained of, but that in some cases there may be a recovery, citing Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. R. Co., 62 N. H. 159.
The manufacturer or vendor of a tool ma chine or appliance which is not in its nature intrinsically dangerous is not ordinarily liable for defects therein to one not in priv ity with him; Belzer v. Mfg. Co., 110 Mo. 605, 19 S. W. 630, 15 L. R. A. 821, 33 Am. St. Rep. 482 ; Heindirk v. Elevator Co., 122 Ky. 675, 92 S. W. 608, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1103; but a well recognized exception to this rule is where the thing is eminently dangerous to human life; Thomas v. Win-' chester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455; as where circulars sent out by a bottler of aerated water indicated his knowledge that the bottles were liable to explode, and the evidence tended to show that the tests ap plied by him to the bottles sent out were not adequate to justify the conclusion that they would not burst under customary usage, with the knowledge of which defendants might reasonably be chargeable; Torgesen v. Schultz, 192 N. Y. 156, 84 N. E. 956, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, 127 Am. St. Rep. 894.
A contractor, after the completion and de livery of possession of a building and its acceptance by the owner, Is not liable to a stranger to the contract for injuries result ing from defects in the construction of the building; Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244, 12 L. R. A. 322, 23 Am. St. fRep. 220, where the court said, quoting from Wharf.. Neg. 439, "There must be causal connection between the negligence and the hurt, and such causal connection is inter rupted by the interposition between the neg ligence and the hurt of any independent human agency; Miner v. McNamara, 81 Conn. 690, 72 Atl. 138, 21 L. EL A. (N. S.) 477; Fitzmaurice v. Fabian, 147 Pa. 199, 23 Atl. 444; Fowles v. Briggs, 116 Mich. 425, 74 N. W. 1046, 40 lb R. A. 528, 72 Am. St. Rep. 537, where a shipper of lumber negligently loaded was held not liable for injury to a brakeman, after it had become the duty of the railroad company to provide for the inspection of the car.