The manufacturer and seller of a side saddle to a husband was held to be under no duty to the wife, for whose use be knows it to have been purchased, for its defective construction ; Bragdon v. Perkins-Campbell Co., 87 Fed. 109, 30 C. C. A. 567, 66 L. R. A. 924. The leading case is Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, where the der fendant had contracted with the postmaster general to provide a mail coach and keep it in repair. He was held not liable to an employee of one who contracted with the postmaster-general to provide horses and coachmen for the purpose of carrying the mail.
Where the defendant sold gunpowder to a child, and the parents took charge of It and let the child have some, the sale was held too remote as a cause of injury to the child by an explosion ; Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass.
507 ; on the other hand an injury from a railway accident, having been the direct cause of a diseased condition which resulted in paralysis, was held to be the proximate cause of the latter; Bishop v. R. Co., 48 Minn. 26, 50 N. W. 927; but where by rea son of injury in a collision a passenger be came disordered in mind and body and eight months after committed suicide, in a suit for damages against the railroad com pany it was held that his own act was the proximate cause of his death; Scheffer v. R. Co., 105 U. S. 249, 26 L. Ed. 1070. A woman's illness, caused by fright from shooting a dog in her presence, is not a re sult reasonably to be anticipated; Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90, 30 N. W. 435, 1 Am. St. IRep. 654.
If two causes operate at the same time to produce a result which might be produced by either, they are concurrent causes, and in such case each is a proximate cause, but if the two are successive and unrelated in their operation, one of them must be proxi mate and the other remote; Herr v. City of Lebanon, 149 Pa. 222, 24 AU. 207, 16 L. R. A. 106, 34 Am. St. Rep. 603. When there is no order of succession in time, when there are two concurrent causes of a loss, the predominating efficient one must be re garded as the proximate when the damage done by each cannot be distinguished; How ard Fire Ins. Co. v. Transp. Co., 12 Wall.
(U. S.) 194, 20 L. Ed. 378 (a marine insur ance case). See the reporter's note of Mr. J. C. Carter's argument for appellant. As an illustration of concurrent causes, where lumber was negligently piled, and remained a long time In that condition, and was caus ed to fall by the negligence of a stranger, the negligence in piling concurring with the negligence of the stranger, wap the direct and proximate cause; Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87.
The qUestion as to what is the proxi mate cause of an injury is ordinarily not one of science or of legal knowledge, but of fact for the jury to determine in view of the accompanying circumstances, all of which must be submitted to the jury, who must determine whether the original cause is by continuous operation linked to each successive fact ; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Me Keen, 90 Pa. 122, 35 Am. Rep. 644; Milwau kee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. Ed. 256; a finding that the burning of the plaintiff's mill and lumber was the un avoidable consequence of the burning of the defendant's elevator, is in effect a finding that there was no intervening and inde pendent cause between the negligent con duct of defendant and injury to plaintiff ; id. The doctrine under consideration finds its most frequent application in fire and marine insurance; L. R. 4 Q. B. 414; L. R. 4 C. P. 206; L. R. 5 Ex. 204; Nelson v.
Ins. Co., 8 Cush. (Mass.) 477, 54 Am. Dec. 770; Paine v. Smith, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 301; Mathews v. Ins. Co., 11 N. Y. 9 ; Montgom ery v. Ins. Co., 16 B. Monr. (Ky.) 427 ; West ern Ins. Co. v. Cropper, 32 Pa. 351, 75 Am. Dec. 561; General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sher wood, 14 How. (U. S.) 351, 14 L. Ed. 452 ; in cases of tort founded on negligence; 5 C. & P. 190 ; L. R. 4 C. P. 279 ; L. R. 8 Q. B. 274; 3 M. & R. 105; Cuff v. R. R. Co., 35 N. J. L. 17, 10 Am. Rep. 205 ; Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. 86, 10 Am. Rep. 664; Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. R. Co., 109 Mass. 277, 12 Am. Rep. 689 ; in measure of dam ages and in highway cases; 15 Harv. L. Rev. 541, which see for a thorough review of the history of this doctrine ; Webb's Poll. Torts 29, 566 ; Howe, Civ. L. 201.
See NEGLIGENCE.