In Ireland there is no divorce a vineulo, except by act of parliament.
In this country the usage has been various. Formerly it was common for the various state legislatures, like the English parlia ment, to grant divorces by special act. This practice is now much less common. In many states it has been expressly prohibited by state constitutions ; 1 Bish. Mar. & D. § 1471. Such an act is constitutional; Wright v. Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 429, 56 Am. Dec. 723; Berthelemy v. Johnson, 3 B. Monr. (Ky.) 90, 38 Am. Dec. 179; and does not offend against the constitutional provision which forbids laws impairing the obligation of contracts, even though there was no valid ground for divorce and the wife was not notified ; May nard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, where the husband was a resident of the territory. See also State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272, 63 N. W. 83, 31 L. R. A. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 928. Generally, at the- present time, the jurisdiction to grant divorces is conferred by statute upon courts of equity, or courts possessing equity powers, to be ex ercised in accordance with the general prin ciples of equity practice, subject to such modifications as the statute may direct. The action is statutory only; there is no common law jurisdiction over the subject of divorce ; Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N. Y. 73, 93 N. E. 192. The practice of the English eccle siastical courts, which is also the foundation of the practice of the new court for divorce and matrimonial causes in England, has never been adopted to any considerable ex tent in this country ; but it is said that in some jurisdictions the principles and prac tice of the ecclesiastical courts are followed so far as they are applicable to our altered conditions and in accord with the spirit of our laws; 2 Bish. Mar. & Div. 460. See Le Barron v.. Le Barron, 35 'Vt. 365 ; J. G. v. H. G., 33 Md. 401, 3 Am. Rep. 183.
Numerous and difficult questions are con stantly arising in regard to the validity in one state of divorces granted by the courts or legislature of another state. The subject is treated in 2 Bish. Mar. Div. and Sep. § 128. The learned author there states the following propositions, which he elaborates with great care: First, the tribunals of a country have no jurisdiction over a cause of divorce, wherever the offence may have oc curred, if neither of the parties has an actual bona Ade domicil within its territory; sec ondly, to entitle the court to take jurisdic tion, it is sufficient for one of the parties to be domiciled in the country ; both need not be, neither need the citation, when the dom iciled party is plaintiff, be served personally on the defendant, if such personal service cannot be made, but there should be reason able constructive notice, at least ; thirdly, the place where the offence was committed, whether in the country in which the suit is brought or a foreign country, is immaterial; fourthly, the domicil of the parties at the time of the offence committed is of no conse quence, the jurisdiction depending on their domicil when the proceeding is instituted and the judgment is rendered ; fifthly, it is imma terial to this question of jurisdiction in what country or under what system of divorce laws the marriage was celebrated; sixthly, without a citation within the reach of pro cess, or an appearance, the jurisdiction ex tends only to the status and what depends directly thereon, and not to collateral rights.
The doctrine of the first proposition is said not to have been thoroughly established In England ; 2 Bish. Mar. D. .& Sep. § 43; but it is fully established in America ; Davis v. Corn., 13 Bush (Ky.) 318; Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21; State v. Arming ton, 25 Minn. 29; People v. Smith, 13 Hun (N. Y.) 414; Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah, 112; Smith v. 'Smith, 43 La. Ann. 1140, 10 South. 248 ; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 315, 21 S. W. •54; The Meli v. De Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996, 17 Am. St. Rep. 652 ; Watkins v. Watkins, 135 Mass. 83; Arrington v. Arrington, 102 N. C. 491, 9 S. E. 200; Ap peal of Platt, 80 Pa. 501; Andrews v. An drews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366 ; Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 Sup. Ct. 551, 45 L. Ed. 804; Streitwolf v. Streit wolf, 181 U. S. 179, 21 Sup. Ct. 553, 45 L. Ed. 807. Mr. Bishop maintains the second prop osition as fully supported on principle and authority ; see especially Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87 ; Thompson v. State, 28 Ala. 12; Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Ia. 238; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 108, 19 L. Ed. 604; Richards v. Richards, 19 D. C. 431; but see People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78, 32 Am. Rep. 274; Story, Confl. Laws, Redf. ed. As to the third proposition, which is said by the same author to be 'universal, see Hanberry v. Hanberry, 29 Ala. 719; Clark v. Clark, 8 N. H. 21; Holmes v. Holmes, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 305; Pawling v. Willson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 192. The fifth proposition is universally recognized ; see Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts (Pa.) 349, 32 Am. Dec. 767; Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 181, 25 Am. Dec. 372; Thompson v. State, 28 Ala. 12; Stand ridge v. Standridge, 31 Ga. 223. See, how ever, 2 Cl. & F. 568.