In regard to rights of property as between husband and wife, a sentence of divorce leaves them as it finds them. Consequently, all transfers of property which were actually executed, either in law or fact, continue un disturbed; for example, the personal estate of the wife, reduced to possession by the husband, remains his after the divorce the same as before. On the termination of a tenancy by the entirety, created by a con veyance to husband and wife, by an absolute divorce, they afterward hold the land as ten ants in common without survivorship ; Stelz v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 263, 28 N. E. 510, 13 L. R. A.'325, 26 Am. St. Rep. 475. See Hopson v. Fowlkes, 92 Tenn. 697, 23 S. W. 55, 23 L. R. A. 805, 36 Am. St. Rep. 120. But it puts an end 'to all rights depending upon the marriage and not actually vested ; as, dow er in a wife, all' rights of the husband in the real estate of thn wife, and his right to re duce to possession her choses in action; Law son v. Shotwell, 27 Miss. 630 ; Gould v. Crow, 57 Mo. 200 ; Whitsell v. Mills, 6 Ind. 229; Clark v. Clark, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 85 ; Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harr. (Del.) 440 ; Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541; Legg v. Legg, 8 Mass. 99 ; Ren wick v. Renwick, 10 Paige, Ch. (N. Y.) 420 ; Doe v. Brown, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 309 ; Oldham v. Henderson, 5 Dana (Ky.) 254 ; Arrington v. Arrington, 102 N. C. 491, 9 S. E. 4 ; Ameri can Legion of Honor v. Smith, 45 N. J. Eq. 466, 17 Atl. 770 ; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 216, 8 Sup. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654 ; Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 525, 4 Sup. Ct. 598, 28 L. Ed. 505; Lamkin v. Knapp, 20 Ohio St. 454. In respect to dower, however, it should be observed that a contrary doctrine has been settled in New York, it being there held that immediately upon the marriage being solemnized the wife's right to dower becomes perfect, provided only she survives her hus band; Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95; Forrest v. Forrest, 6 Duer (N. Y.) 102.
Courts will annul or vacate decrees of di vorce on sufficient showing after the death of one or both of the parties thereto, where property rights are involved; Johnson v. Coleman, 23 Wis. 452, 99 Am. Dec. 193 ; Law rence v. Nelson, 113 Ia. 277, 85 N. W. 84, 57 L. R. A. 583 ; Wood v. Wood, 136 Ia. 128, 113 N. W. 492,''12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891, 125 Am. St.. Rep. 223 ; Shafer v. Shafer, 30 Mich. 163 ; or where it is shown that the divorce was fraudulently obtained ; Appeal of Fi delity Ins. Co., 93 Pa. 242 (where the rule to vacate it was not filed until thirteen years after the decree was obtained and after. the death of the party obtaining it); Brown v. Grove, 116 Ind. 84, 18 N. E. 387, 9 Am. St. Rep. 823 (twenty years after the date of the decree and long after the death of the party obtaining it); or where lack of jurisdiction to grant the decree is shown ; Rine v. Hodg son; 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 275 ; Willman v. Willman, 57 Ind. 500.
One against whom a divorce is obtained who accepts the benefit of the decree, and acts in a way which would be illegal but for the divorce so granted, cannot, after a long lapse of time and after the death of the other party, deny its validity, or assert that it was obtained without due notice ; In re Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 292, 19 Atl. 82;
Mohler v. Shank's Estate, 93 Ia. 273, 61 N. W. 981, 34 L. R. A. 161, 57 Am. St. Rep. 274: nor can one who invokes the jurisdiction of a state and submits himself thereto be heard to question such jurisdiction ; Matter of Mor risson, 52 Hun 102, 5 N. Y. Supp. 90, affirmed in 117 N. Y. 638, 22 N. E. 1130 ; and his rep resentatives can occupy no better position than he would have, if living ; id. If the defendant in a divorce decree cannot attack it because it was obtained by his own fraud, his administrator cannot attack it because of such fraud ; Dow v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76, 35 N. E. 761, 39 Am. St. Rep. 156. In Kirschner v. Dietrich, 110 Cal. 502, 42 Pac. 1064, where no property rights were involved, it was held that, by the death of a party, a suit for a divorce was absolutely abated, and that the purpose of the action being to change the personal status of the plaintiff in her rela tions to her husband after her death, there was none which could be changed by judg ment; and in Barney v. Barney, 14 Ia. 189, there being no property in which the hus band, except for the divorce, would have had an interest at the death of the wife, and no fraud being alleged, it was held that the suit abated. Where in an action for dower in Ohio the defence was set up that the de ceased had previously obtained a divorce in an Indiana court, of which it was proved that the wife had no knowledge until after the death of the husband, and the record did not show the ground upon which the decree was based, it was held that the decree acted only on the marital relations, and having been rendered without jurisdiction of the person of the wife, her property rights in Ohio were unaffected; Doerr v. Forsythe, 50 Ohio St. 726, 35 N. E. 1055, 40 Am. St. Rep. 703.
The death of the complainant in a divorce suit, before a of, error, was held not to destroy the subject-matter of the suit, as re spects the jurisdiction of the court of re view ; although the record fails to show that any property right was involved ; Chatter ton v. Chatterton, 231 Ill. 449, 83 N. E..161, 121 Am. St. Rep. 339, where the court ap proved of decisions denying that, by the death of a party in such suit, the marriage status was forever destroyed and that there was no subject matter of which a court of review could assume jurisdiction ; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236, where the writ of error was taken before the death of the par ty and a motion to amend the record, so as to give effect to the judgment as of a prior term, was allowed ; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman (Ill.) 72, where it was held that a writ of error might be prosecuted after the death of the other party, to reverse the decree; .Wren v. Moss, 1 Gilman (Ill.) 560, where a motion to abate the suit as to alimony and to make the executor a party for a writ of error was allowed.