In several states divorces are by statute inoperative when a person goes out of the state and obtains elsewhere a divorce for a cause not valid in the state from which he goes. And in Massachusetts the courts have held invalid decrees, for causes not cogniza ble in that state, granted in another state, for a divorce when the party there to procure it; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156, 23 Am. Rep. 299 ; or to annul a marriage; Loker v. Gerald, 157 Mass. 42, 31 N. E. 709, 16 L. R. A. 497, 34 Am. St, Rep. 252; and such a decree does not violate the full faith and credit clause of the United States con stitution ; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 II. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366 ; and such a divorce was held invalid as against public policy, in Wisconsin, where the marriage in another state was considered as having been entered into for the purpose of evading the statute ; Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N. W. 787, 17 L, R. A. (N. S.) 804, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1085; but where it was not shown that the party went to the other state for that purpose and the wife had executed a release to the husband, she was not per mitted to impeach the decree ; Loud v. Loud, 129 Mass. 14; and so where an appearance was entered in the other state ; Elliott v. Wohlfrom, 55 Cal. 384 ; or where there has been obtained a bona fide domicil elsewhere; Gregory v. Gregory, 76 Me. 535.
The supreme court of the United States has no jurisdiction to re-examine, the judg ment of a state court, recognizing valid the decree of a court of a foreign country an nulling a marriage; Roth v. Ehman, 107 U. S. 319, 2 Sup. Ct. 312, 27 L. Ed. 499. See Whart. Confi. Laws.
It was never the practice of the English parliament to grant a divorce for any other cause than adultery ; and it was the gen eral rule to grant it for simple adultery only when committed by the wife, and upon the application of the husband. To entitle the wife, other circumstances must ordinarily concur, simple adultery committed by the husband not being sufficient; Macq. Parl. Pr. 473. The English statute of 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, before referred to, prescribes substantial ly the same rule,-it being provided, § 27, that the husband may apply to have his mar riage dissolved "on the ground that his wife has, since the celebration thereof, been guilty of adultery," and the wife, "on the ground that, since the celebration thereof, her hus band has been guilty of incestuous bigamy, or of bigamy with adultery, or of rape, or of sodomy, or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce a mensa et thoro, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or upwards." In this country the question depends up on the statutes of the several states, the provision .of which are far from uniform. In some of the states, also, the matter is left wholly or in part to the discretion of the court. See Bish. Mar. D. & Sep.; Weber v. Weber, 16 Or. 163, 17 Pac. 866. For more specific information, recourse must be had to the statutes of the several states.
Some of the more important grounds for divorce are: deserticin; for a statutory pe riod; Whitfield v. Whitfield, 89 Ga. 471, 15 S. Millowitsch v. Millowitsch, 44 III. App. 357 ; Hemenway v. Hemenway, 65 Vt. 623, 27 Atl. 609 (see DESERTION) ; abandon ment; McLean v. Janin, 45 La. Ann. 664, 12 South. 747; adultery; Carter v. Carter, 37 Ill. App. 219; McGrail v. McGrail, 48 N. 3', Eq. 532, 22 Atl. 582 ; cruelty; De Zwaan v. De Zwaan, 91 Mich. 279, 51 N. W. 998; Day v. Day, 84 Ia. 221, 50 N. W. 979 ; Mayhew v. Mayhew, 61 Conn. 233, 23 Atl. 966, 29 Am. St. Rep. 195 ; 69 Law T. 152; Glass v. Wynn, 76 Ga. 319 ; Myers v. Myers, 83 Va. 806, 6 S. E. 630 (see LEGAL CRUELTY) ; habitual drunkenness; McBee v. McBee, 22 Or. 329, 29 Pac. 887, 29 Am. St. Rep. 613; De Lesder nier v. De Lesdernier, 45 La. Ann. 1364, 14
South. 191; Page v.. Page, 43 Wash. 293, 86 Pac. 582, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 914, 117 Am. St. Rep. 1054 ; conviction of crime, in most states ; incurable insanity, in some states ; failure to support; and impotence, relation ship, incapacity to enter into the contract, fraud, duress, etc.
Fraud in the contract is an offence or wrong done by one spouse to another, so affecting the essential conditions of the mar riage status as practically to destroy that relation, and render the continuance of the bond an injury to the state as well as to the parties. The wrong becomes complete on the completion of the marriage contract. It may consist in false statements as to existing facts which affect one or more of the essen tial purposes of the status. The injured spouse may however condone the injury and accept the relation or, upon discovery of the wrong, may apply for a divorce ; Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 61 Atl. 604, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 531.
Concealment of epilepsy is a fraud within the meaning of a statute allowing divorce for fraud in the contract of marriage, where the statute forbids an epileptic to marry under penalty of imprisonment. Such statute is valid and a marriage in disregard of it IS voidable, not void; id.
Where a statute gave a court of chancery sole cognizance to decree a marriage null and void where either of the parties was at the time insane, drunkenness was held not insanity for which a divorce could be grant ed; Elzey v. Elzey, 1 Houst. (Del.) 308; nor was an excessive indulgence in morphine con sidered a ground for divorce under a statute permitting divorce for habitual drunkenness ; Youngs v. Youngs, 130 III. 230, 22 N. E. 806, 6 L. R. A. 548, 17 Am. St. Rep. 313; Dawson v. Dawson, 23 Mo. App. 169. It is said there must be an involuntary tendency to become intoxicated as often as the temptation is presented, which comes from a fixed habit acquired from frequent and excessive indul gence; McBee v. McBee, 22 Or. 329, 29 Pat: 887, 29 Am. St. Rep. 613 ; Burns. v. Burns, 13 Fla. 369. As an independent ground, drunk enness is held in Maryland to furnish no cause for divorce; Shutt v. Shutt, 71 Md. 193, 17 Atl. 1024, 17 Am. St. Rep. 519; Mason v. Mason, 131 Pa, 161, 18 Atl. 1021. Where the statute coupled habitual intemperance with intolerable cruelty as a cause for di vorce, it was said the habitual use of intoxi eating liquor, though producing excitement, will not justify a divorce. The habit must be so gross as to produce suffering or want In the family to a degree which cannot be reasonably borne. The term cannot well be defined, but must be applied to cases as they arise by inclusion or exclusion, and the ex istence of the condition in question decided as a matter of fact ; Dennis v.. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 36 Atl. 34, 34 L. R. A. 449, 57 Am. St. Rep. 95, where it is said : "While there may be, on the one hand, such a clear case of intemperate habits as to justify the court in saying that such and such facts: Constitute a condition of habitual intemperance, or, on the other 'hand, such an entire absence of proof, beyond an occasional indulgence in the use of ardent spirits, as to warrant the opposite conclusien,' yet the main field of in quiry and the determination of the question must be submitted to the jury, and the ques tions on this submission must 'be decided by them." , If at the time of the marriage the wife was with child by another man, it may be ground for divorce; Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87; or the marriage may be declared null and void 'ab itatio ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605 ; Carris v. Carris, 24 N: J. Eq. 516; contra, [1897] P. D. 263; but where the wife concealed' the fact that she had been previously married and divorced and had a child, it was not such fraud as to entitle the husband to a sentence of nullity; Donnelly v. Strong, 175 Mass. 157, 55 N.' E. 892.