While the science of government in modern times may be said to accept the general theory of the separation of powers, subject to limitations and ex ceptions suggested, the application of the theory has not been uniform. Great difficulty has been found practice in determining the depositary 'of executive power and whether it should be vested in one man or a board of control, the latter being sup posed to insure deliberation and possibly to prevent tyranny, and the other being more conducive to ef ficient administration. See 2 Sto. Const. §§ 1419-23; Montesq. Espr. de L. b. xi. ch. vi. ; De Lolme, Const. Eng. b. 2, ch. 2; Federalist No. 70; 1 Kent 271. The necessity for the latter has led to the al most universal adoption of the plan of having a single executive head, and the principal remaining difficulty has been the extent and character of the power to he entrusted to it. This Is in part the re suit of the effort to apply too rigidly the theory of the absolute separation of powers already shown to be inipracticable. 'Another difficulty has been said to arise from the failure to recognize that execu tive power really comprises two functions, the polit ical or governmental and the administrative. The former concerns the relations of the chief executive authority with the great powers of government, the latter relates to the practical management of the public service. It has been said that the executive authority, as understood in the American states, is mainly a political chief, that in France and to a less extent in its position as an adminis trator is more important, while in the federal gov ernment in this country it is both, as it is also in Germany ; 1 Goodnow, Comp. Adm. L. 51.
The proper treatment of this subject involves the consideration of the systems of executive adminis tration developed in the principal countries of the world which have adopted the principle of the distribution of powers. Only the briefest summary, however, is here practicable.
The general theory of the distriffution of powers in Great Britain is very much like. that in the princely governments of Germany. The residuum of governmental powers is in the crown, and the crown may exercise all authority not expressly otherwise delegated; but it rests with parliament to decide ultimately what powers shall be exercised by the crown and how it shall exercise them ; here in it differs from the German system. From the comprehensive Norman idea of royalty which com bined all the sovereign powers of the Saxon and Dane with those of the feudal theory of monarchy exemplified at the time in France, there developed at first hereditary and despotic power which was gradually limited by the necessity of the concurrent action of parliament for the imposition of taxes and the enactment of laws affecting the ordinary rela tions of individuals. Later it was considered that a law once enacted could not be changed without the consent of parliament, and finally the latter body assumed the right to initiate as well as ap prove laws, and the crown lost its original power of veto which has certainly become obsolete, though it has• been said to be merely ,dormant and sus ceptible of being revived; 2 Todd, Pat4 ifovt. in Eng. 390. See 1 Stubbs, Const. Iiist. ffrEbg. 338.
The result of this development is that'Oarliament has assumed most of the legislative power, though many matters not regulated by it are cdffirolled by the crown which exercises a large ordinance power both independent and supplementary. The crown has lost both the taxing power and the judicial power, but retains In large part its old executive powers, and its action is controlled very largely by a body whose power has gradually developed, viz., the privy council. The crown may do anything which it is not forbidden to do and possesses the administrative as well as the political power. It may create offices as well as fill them, and both remove and direct the incumbents. The crown is, therefore, the chief both of the administrative and political departments of the executive power, its position being modified by the principle that its advisers, without whom it cannot act, must possess the confidence of the majority in the house of com mons. The principle of parliamentary responsibility puts the crown in the position of reigning but not governing ; but so long as it possesses the confi dence of the house of commons it has very ex tensive executive powers, and in council may declare war and make treaties, which in other countries can be done only with the consent of the legis lature. The crown is in theory irresponsible, but when its ministers are in a minority in the house of common it chooses new ministers who will have the confidence of parliament, or dissolvee parlia Ment in the hope that the new body will have con fidence in the existing ministers, but the theory is that in all cases the crown and not parliament administers. See Porn. Const.' Law § 176 ; 1 Goodn. Comp. Adm': L. ch. vi.
In France the executive power is vested in a president elected by the legislature. His position is said by a recent writer, probably on account of the monarchical traditions in France, to be more im portant from the administrative point of view and less from a political point of view than that of the President of the United States, he having no veto power. He has quite an unlimited power of ap pointment and also a very extensive power of re moval, not only of officers appointed by himself, but of local administrative officers; as mayors of communes ; Law, Apr. 5, 1884; and he may dissolve local and municipal legislative bodies in the de partments and communes ; LL. Aug. 10, 1871, and Apr. 5, 1884. In addition to his power of executing' caws, he has In' many cases authority to supplement the law without any delegation of legisative power by what are known as decrees. This supplemental power is accorded to him under a constitutional provision that he shall watch over and secure the execution of the laws, and the difference between the interpretation put upon this and the similar provision in the United States constitution is ac credited to the monarchical traditions of the coun try, and the resulting idea that the residuary gov ernmental power is vested in the executive and not, as in this country, in congress. The president is also held to a greater responsibility for his action than in the American system. 1 Goodnow, Comp. Adm. L. ch. iv.