Some question has arisen as to whether the veto power of the governor extends to proposals for the amendment of the constitu tion. In Delaware, the governor's power over such proposals is recognized in the constitution, and in some other states they are exempted, but as a general rule there is no mention of the governor in connection with such proposals. It has been held that the veto power of the executive does not ap ply to them in Cum. v. Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 46 Atl. 505, 50 L. R. A. 568 ; Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441, 36 Pac. 221; Warfield v. Van diver, 101 Md. 78, 60 AU. 538, 4 Ann. Cas. 692 ; but it has also been held that, while proposing constitutional amendments is not legislation in the ordinary sense, it is such so far as that it must be included in the gov ernor's proposals for legislation in a special session in order to be valid; People v. Cur ry, 130 Cal. 82, 62 Pac. 516.
The practice of the federal government is that proposals by congress of amendments to the constitution are not submitted to the president for his approval. Of the seventeen amendments thus far adopted, none have been approved by the president except the XIIIth. The resolution proposing that par ticular amendment is published with the note at the foot, "Approved February. 1st, 1865"; 13 Stat. 567; but this does not ap pear in the resolution as published by the secretary of state in his announcement of its ratification. Prior to the XIIIth, no res olution proposing amendments, as published, has any note at the foot. Subsequent to the XIIIth they appear with "Received at De partment of State" or "Deposited in Depart ment of State," noted at the foot of the reso lution as published in the Statutes at Large. The only, exception to the general practice of having no approval by the president is the XIIIth which seems to have been inad vertence.
In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dail. (U. S.) 380, 1 L. Ed. 644, It was argued by W. Tilghman and Rawle, upon the question whether the XIth amendment did, or did not, supersede all pending suits against states, that the amendment was not propos ed in due form because never submitted for approval of the president. When Lee, Atty. Gen., answered that the same course had been pursued relative to all the other amend ments, Chase, J., interrupted: "There can, surely, be no necessity to answer that argu ment. The negative of the president applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. He has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the constitution." The date is no necessary part of executive approval of a bill either by the president ; Gardner v. The Collector, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 499, 18 L. Ed. 890 (where it is said that nei ther the constitution nor any act of con gress requires him to affix a date to his sig nature): nor in the case of a governor ; State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan. 178, 81 Am. Dec. 503; and the signature in any place on the bill is sufficient ; National Land & Loan Co. v. Mead, 60 Vt. 257, 14 Atl. 689.
Where the constitution provides that meas ures submitted for executive approval "shall be presented" to him, it is held that it is unnecessary that they should be presented to him in person; but it is sufficient that they be left at the executive chamber, or other place determined by usage where com munications are made to the governor ; Opin ion of Justices, 45 N. H. 607; otherwise, as
was said arguendo, the executive, by simply absenting himself, could defeat any law ; Hamilton v. State, 61 Md. 14 ; on the other hand, it is said that it is not sufficient that the bill is sent to the secretary of state; Opinion of Justices, 99 Mass. 636; or the gov ernor's private secretary, who returned it as not properly signed ; Monroe v. Green, 71 Ark. 527, 76 S. W. 199; and see Lyth v. City of Buffalo, 48 Hun (N. Y.) 175, and Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189, 2 Am. Rep. 432, where it was held that merely exhibiting a meas ure to the governor was not a proper pres entation; which must be such as to notify the executive that it is intended to secure his final action ; State v. Newark, 25 N. J. L. 399. The presentation must he of the same bill which was passed; State v. Wend ler, 94 Wis. 369, 68 N. W. 759 ; Padavano v. Pagan, 66 N. J. L. 167, 48 Atl. 998; and if the title has been changed it is material, particularly where the title is required to ex press the substance of the bill; Simpson v. Stockyards Co., 110 Fed. 799; People v. Onondaga Sup'rs, 16 Mich. 254; the presen tation must be within a reasonable time be fore the expiration of the time limit for ap proval; State v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 57 South. 565, 49 L. R. A. 218, 78 Am. St. Rep. 364. In the absence of any express provi sion for the approval of bills after the ad-. journment of the legislature, it has been held that the power of the executive, is at an end and the legislation void; Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165 ; Hardee v. Gibbs, 50 Miss. 802, overruled in State v. Sup'rs of Coahoma County, 64 Miss. 358, 1 South. 501; but where the constitution provided that a bill should become a law if not returned within ten days, and that within five days after ad journment the governor might sign any act passed within the last five days of the ses sion, his signature within ten days after the passage of the hill, although it was passed more than five days before adjournment, was valid; City of Detroit v. Chapin, 108 Mich. 136, 66 N. W. 587, 37 L. R. A. 391 (where the cases are examined at large in the opin ion and a note) ; but where he is allowed five days and returns it in less time with a notification that he does not sign it, it .will become a law, as the five days allowed is a matter of privilege; Hunt v. State, 72 Ark. 241, 79 S. W. 769, 65 L. R. A. 71, 105 Am. St. Rep. 34, 2 Ann. Cas. 33. Of course, this question is settled by a constitutional provi sion authorizing executive action after the adjournment, and such action has been sus tained upon the basis of long-established custom; Solomon v. Com'rs of Cartersville, 41 Ga. 157. On the other hand, custom to the contrary was held to be abrogated by a single departure from it by the president ; U. S. v. Weil, 29 Ct. Cl. 523. But when that question arose in a case before the supreme court, that court held that an act was not invalid by reason of its being signed during a recess of Congress, but it declined to de cide whether the president could sign after the final adjournment ; La Abra Silver Min. Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 423, 20 Sup. Ct. 168, 44 L. Ed. 223.