In Germany the conception of executive power is much broader than In the United States, and it is more important from the administrative point of view. There are important constitutional limita tions on the action of the Prince, or executive head of the subdivisions of the empire; but in the ab sence of such limitations he is recognized as having the governmental power, being as in France the possessor of the residuum of the governmental pow er. The limitations upon his action by the constitu tion are found in the requirement of legislative consent for the validity of legislative acts affect ing freedom of person and property and the finan cial affairs of the government, judicial power ad ministered by courts independent of the control of the executive, and the necessity that each of his official acts must be cnuntersigned by a minister who is responsible for 'it either to the legislature T or to BA courts. The administrative' pow ers are' Including that of appoint ment aI oval, and a very wide power of di rection, together with the authority to make de crees or ordinances as to all matters not regulated in detail by legislation.
In the imperial government, the Emperor occu pies, from the administrative point of view, about the same position as the President of the United States. ' He has a general power of appointment and of administrative direction, which latter is, however, exercised under the responsibility of the chancellor, who must countersign all acts by which it' is exercised; but just what. the responsibility of the latter officer Is seems to be undefined other than that he may be called upon to defend his policy be fore the federal counciir The Emperor does not have any ordinance power except such as is ex pressly in the constitution or delegated by the legislature, and in the exercise ,of it he often requires the consent of the federal council. He is entirely irresponsible. id. ch. v. .A leading German commentator regards the governmental form of the empire as a republic ; 1 Zorn, Das Retichsstaats recht, 162.
In the United States, the federal execu tive power is vested in the president. In all the states the chief executive is the gov ernor. With respect to the power of the lat ter the differences in the state constitutions make it necessary, for brief statements of the executive officers and their duties, to re fer for, more detailed information to the constitutions of the states, compara tive views of the provisions on particular points may be found in Stimson, Am. Stat. Law. Many features are common to most of the states and, making due allowance for differences of detail, the character of the of ficer is substantially the same. In general, it may be noted that he is commander of the state militia, subject to the paramount federal constitutional control when it is in the actual service of the United States : he has in most cases a pardoning power (ex cept in some states for treason), as to which, however, there is a growing tendency to lim it it by requiring the recommendation of a board of pardons, either such in name or ef fect, usually composed . of several executive
officers, Mrtute olliciii; he has usually a veto pOwer which compels the reconsideration of legislation by a two-thirds vote in most cas es, but in some, three-fifths, and in others a mere majority ; in most of the states he has power summon the legislature in extra session, and to adjourn its sessions when the two houses disagree as to the time. As a rule, the governor's power of appointment is donfined to minor state officials, and he has no power of removal except for cause and after a hearing. He is' usually charged with the duty of sending messages to the legisla ture> containing his views and recommenda tions upon public questions. The constitu tional powers vested in, the governbr alone are addreSsed to and regulated by his own uncontrolled discretion ; for example, . where an officer assuming to act as goVernor, in his absence, had issued a proclamation conven ing the legislature in extraordinary session, the governor having returned previous-to the time named for the meeting, and issued a second proclamation, revoking the first, it was held that, the power of convening the legislature being discretionary, the call might be recalled before the meeting took place ;, People v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409, 19 Am. Rep. 634.
Under the United States constitution the governor of a state may call upon the presi dent, when necessary, for aid in the enforce ment of the laws.
His limited power of removal makes• his power of direction and administration very slight. He is in effect a political rather than an administrative officer, his powers of the former class having increased while those of the latter class have been gradually cur tailed. , In this respect his relative position is quite the reverse of that of the president. For a discriminating review of this subject, see 1 Goodn. Comp. Adm. L. ch. iii.
The right of the executive officers named in the constitution to exercise all the powers properly belonging to the executive depart ment is given indisputably by the constitu tion ; State v. Savage, 64 Neb. 684, 90 N. W, 898, 91 N. W. 557. They may, unless limited by constitution statute, determine as to the time and place where the exercise of their jurisdiction is necessary, and the peo ple and local officers of that locality have no constitutional or statutory right to be heard on that question ; Gilmore v. Penobscot, 107 Me. 345, 78 Atl. 454.