The Elkins Act of Feb. 19, 1903, pro vides that a carrier corporation is liable to conviction as well as its officers, agents, etc., for willful failure to file and observe tar iffs. Discriminations and concessions from tariff charges are forbidden. Rates filed, published or participated in are conclusively deemed the legal rates, as against the car rier. For the acceptance of a rebate the per son or firm so accepting shall, in addition to any penalty, forfeit to the United States, three times the amount of money so received and three times the value of any other con sideration accepted. The Interstate Com merce Commission will enjoin discrimination and departure from tariff rates through a federal court sitting in equity having jurisdic tion and the district attorney must prosecute such proceedings.
The Expedition Ad of Feb. 11, 1903, provides for the expediting of causes arising under the Commerce Act, when the cause is of general pUblic importance, by giving it precedence over others.
The Commission is made a body corporate, with legal capacity to be a party plaintiff or defendant in the federal courts, by reason of the provision in the act that it "shall have an official seal, which shall be judicially no ticed," and that making it lawful for it to ap ply by petition for the enforcement of its or ders ; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com merce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940.
The Commission has exclusive original ju risdiction to determine whether a regulation or a practice affecting rates or matters sought to be regulated by the act is unjust or unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, preferential or prejudicial, and this although the regulation or practice complained of has ceased ; Mitchell C. & C. Co. v. R. Co., 230 U. S. 247, 33 Sup. Ct. 916, 57 L. Ed. 1472.
The object of the Commerce Act is' to com pel the establishment of reasonable rates and their universal application. A guarantee to a shipper of a particular train is a dis crimination, if not open to all ; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kirby; 225 U. g. 155, 32 Sup. Ct. 648, 56 L. Ed. 1033, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 501.
The orders of the Commission are final unless (1,) beyond the power which it could constitutionally exercise ; or (2) beyond its statutory power ; or (3) based upon a mis take of law. But questions of fact may be involved in the determination of questions of law, so that an order regular on its face may be set aside if it appears that (4) the rate is so low as to be confiscatory and in violation of the constitutional prohibition against the taking property without due pro cess of law ; or (5) if the Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence or without evidence to support it ; or (6) if the authority therein involved has been exercised in such an un reasonable manner as to cause it to be with in the elementary rule that the substance and not the shadow determines the validity of the exercise of the power ; Int. Corn. Corn.
v. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308, citing Int. Cora. Corn. v. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155, 54 L. Ed. 280; Southern Pac. Co. v. Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 31 Sup. Ct. 288, 55 L. Ed. 283; Int. Com.
Com. v. R. Co., 216 U. S. 538, 30 Sup. Ct. 417, 54 L. Ed. 608.
Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be unreasonable or unjust, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate, so as to give undue preference to persons or traffic similarly circumstanced, the act leaves common carriers as they were at common law, free to make special con tracts, to classify their traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates, and generally, to man age their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound in other pursuits ; Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Grain Co., 222 U. S. 215, 32 Sup. Ct. 39, 56 L. Ed. 171. The act was not designed to prevent compe tition between different roads, or to inter fere with the customary arrangements made by railway companies for reduced fares in consideration of increased mileage, where such reduction does not operate an unjust discrimination. It is not all discriminations that are prohibited, but only those that are unjust and unreasonable ; Interstate Com merce Commission v. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 844, 36 L. Ed. 699, affirming 43 Fed. 37. The act is not to be construed so as to abridge or take away the common law right of the carrier to make contracts and adopt proper business methods, further than its terms and recognized purposes re quire ; a railroad company may lawfully charge low rates on coal in the summer months, if its rates are equal to all persons; Interstate Commerce Commission v. R. Co., 5 I. C. Rep. 656 (C. C., M. D. of Tenn.).